Ray Hughes Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gordon

• Decision Date: 03 October 1975
• Citation: 294 Ala. 638,320 So.2d 652
• Parties: RAY HUGHES CHEVROLET, INC., a corp. v. Sharon K. GORDON. SC 1107.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 652

320 So.2d 652

294 Ala. 638

RAY HUGHES CHEVROLET, INC., a corp. v. Sharon K. GORDON.

SC 1107.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Oct. 3, 1975.

Cassady & Fuller, Enterprise, for appellant.

Kenneth R. Cain, Ozark, for appellee.

SHORES, Justice.

Sharon K. Gordon, appellee, brought suit against Ray Hughes Chevrolet, Inc., appellant, for damages resulting from the conversion of appellee's automobile.

Sharon K. Gordon sued Ray Hughes Chevrolet, Inc., claiming $15,000 damages for the conversion of her 1972 Vega automobile. The complaint, as amended, claimed punitive damages in that amount. Defendant, by answer, denied the allegations of the complaint, asserted that it held the automobile under a lawful claim and filed a counterclaim for $216.62, claimed to be due by the plaintiff for work and labor performed by the defendant on her automobile. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $14,783.38. The appeal is from a judgment entered in that amount.

The record indicates that Miss Gordon bought the automobile from Hughes in June of 1972 for a total price of $3,174.27. After the automobile had been driven some 11,000 miles, she experienced transmission trouble with the car and took it to Hughes for repair. There was some conversation at this time about whether the automobile was still under warranty, but Miss Gordon was informed that if it was not, the cost of repairs would be no more than $125.00.

When she returned for the automobile, the bill for repairs which was presented to her was $216.62. Miss Gordon testified that she told employees at Hughes that she was surprised that the bill was so much, but arrangements were worked out whereby she was given 30 days in which to pay this amount.

Six days after this transaction, Miss Gordon again experienced trouble with the car and returned to Hughes Chevrolet. At this time, representatives of Hughes drove the car and told her that the trouble she had experienced with the car could not be fixed, that the trouble was due to the fact that the car was a four cylinder car and the trouble was just not repairable.

It was Miss Gordon's testimony that she then prepared to leave and was informed by one Mr. Medley, the service manager, "I am sorry, Miss Gordon, we can't let you leave." It was her testimony that the service manager said: "You questioned our honesty and now we are questioning yours, and I have been given instructions to not let you leave until you pay your bill."

It was Mr. Medley's testimony that he had been instructed by Mr. Hughes, president of the defendant company, not to let Miss Gordon have the car until the bill was paid. Mr. Hughes did not deny that those were his instructions. On the contrary, he testified that '. . . I told them not to release that car without being paid for the bill.'

In arguing for reversal, the appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict, and further erred in denying its motion for new trial. The thrust of appellant's argument is that there is no evidence in the record to justify the jury in awarding to the plaintiff punitive damages. That contention is based upon the argument that punitive damages can be awarded only where there is evidence that the conversion was accompanied by insult, rudeness, malice or oppression and appellant claims that the record is devoid of any evidence to indicate that any employee of Ray Hughes Chevrolet was rude or threatening in his dealings with Miss Gordon.

It is true that this court has frequently said that the award of punitive damages, while discretionary with the jury, is permissible where the evidence shows legal malice, willfulness, insult, or other aggravating circumstances. Russell-Vaughn Ford, Inc. v. Rouse, 281 Ala. 567, 206 So.2d 371 (1968); Roan v. Smith, 272 Ala. 538, 133 So.2d 224 (1961).

However, it has never been stated that one must show, before a jury issue is made out on the question of punitive damages, that the intentional wrongful act must be accompanied by rudeness before punitive damages are allowable.

The Court of Civil Appeals was challenged on rehearing in Parker v. Sutton, 47 Ala.App. 352, 357, 254 So.2d 425, (1971), for the following statement contained therein:

'To such compensatory damages (awardable in a conversion case) the jury may add punitive damages if the trespass or conversion was willful, fraudulent, done in known violation of law or attended with circumstance of malice, insult or disregard of the rights or interest of the...