Ray v. Am. Airlines Inc

• Citation: 609 F.3d 917
• Decision Date: 02 July 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-2317,09-2357.,09-2317
• Parties: Catherine RAY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.v.AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

609 F.3d 917

Catherine RAY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.v.AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Nos. 09-2317, 09-2357.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: June 16, 2010.

Filed: July 2, 2010.

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Timothy James Cullen, argued, Little Rock, AR, Tasha C. Taylor, Andrew M. Taylor, Little Rock, AR, and Paul Hudson, Sarasota, FL, on the brief, for appellant.

Michael V. Powell, argued, Dallas, TX, Carolyn Gebhard Johnson, Dallas, TX, and R. Christopher Lawson, Fayetteville, AR, on the brief, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Catherine Ray, the named plaintiff in a purported class action lawsuit against American Airlines (American), appeals from the district court's ¹ order denying her motion for a continuance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) and granting summary judgment in favor of American on her claims for false imprisonment and negligence arising from a nine hour tarmac delay. American cross appeals, arguing that Ray's state tort claims are preempted by federal aviation legislation. We affirm.

I.

Ray and her husband boarded an American flight at six a.m. on December 29, 2006, traveling from Oakland, California to Dallas, Texas. Due to bad weather and a backup of flights in the Dallas area, the flight was diverted to Austin, Texas for refueling. The plane landed around noon at the Austin airport, refueled, began to taxi toward the runway, and then stopped. At that point the pilot informed the passengers that the Dallas airport had been closed as a result of the bad weather and that the plane could not takeoff until it reopened.

About an hour later the pilot announced that a bus would be arriving to take any passengers who wished to deplane to the Austin airport. During her deposition, Ray testified that the pilot recommended that the passengers remain on board as it was likely they would be leaving within the next hour or so. She also testified that the pilot told passengers that if they chose to deplane, they would be “finished with this flight” and would be “on their own.” Ray and her husband believed that the pilot meant that passengers who chose to deplane would be required to fund alternate transportation home, although neither asked a member of the flight crew to clarify the pilot's statements. Ray testified that she and her husband chose to remain on the plane when the bus arrived because they did not have enough money to pay for alternate transportation.

After two to three hours on the tarmac the pilot announced that a second bus would be arriving to take any more passengers who wished to proceed to the terminal.² Ray testified that when the second bus arrived the passengers were instructed, “[t]his is your last chance, if you want to get off, get off now because this is it.” Ray and her husband again chose to remain on the plane.

American provided no further opportunities for passengers to exit the plane for the next six to seven hours. Ray asserts that during the remaining delay conditions on the plane deteriorated and the air became “stuffy” and “smelly.” Passengers were only given “two or three granola bars” and “two soda pops.” When Ray attempted to use one of the plane's lavatories, it had waste in it and would no longer flush, and there was no water with which to wash her hands. Ray did not alert any flight crew member of the nonworking lavatory and did not attempt to use another restroom. Ray also asserts that at one point a male passenger began arguing with a flight attendant and asked to see the pilot. When the pilot stepped out of the cockpit, the passenger demanded to be taken to a gate. Ray testified that she was concerned a fist fight would break out.

Around six p.m. the pilot announced that he was no longer able to fly the plane because he had reached his maximum duty hours. He informed the passengers that he was trying to get the plane to a gate but that there was lightning in the area which had required the ground crews to shut down. Ray alleges that the lightning ended shortly after the pilot made his announcement. At nine p.m. the plane was taken to a gate at the Austin airport and the remaining passengers deplaned. American did not provide passengers with food or lodging vouchers when they initially entered the terminal although the record indicates that some were later distributed. Many of the passengers, including Ray and her husband, spent the night in the terminal.

The following morning American flew Ray and her husband from Austin to Dallas, where they connected to another flight that day to Tulsa, Oklahoma. Ray testified that on the day after the delay, she experienced “some kind of intestinal stomach irritation” which she attributed to not being able to wash her hands after using the restroom aboard the plane. She did not seek any medical attention for the stomach irritation, which she described as a “24-hour kind of thing.”

Ray filed a putative class action against American in Arkansas state court alleging claims for false imprisonment, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and fraud or deceit. She alleged that the December 29 delay occurred because of American's “intentional or negligent lack of personnel, equipment, and planning for ordinary weather disruptions.” She also alleged that American had chosen for its own financial benefit not to allow passengers to deplane after the buses had left.

American removed the case to the Western District of Arkansas and then moved to dismiss all Ray's claims under 12(b)(6), arguing that the claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), 49 U.S.C. § 41713, and the Federal Aviation Act (FAA), 49 U.S.C. § 40103. The district court granted the motion to dismiss in part, concluding that the FAA precluded Ray from bringing state law claims based on the airline's decision to reroute the plane for safety and that the ADA preempted any state law claims seeking compensation for meals, lodging, ground transportation, and expenses during delays. Ray's breach of contract and fraud claims were dismissed as preempted. The court concluded, however, that her false imprisonment, emotional distress, and negligence claims were not preempted because they arose from American's actions “after the flight was diverted and on the ground in Austin.” American moved for reconsideration, which the court denied.

In October 2008 the district court filed its final scheduling order, which set the discovery deadline for May 20, 2009 giving the parties a seven month discovery period. Ray filed a motion for class certification in November 2008. In December 2008 American moved for summary judgment on Ray's remaining false imprisonment, emotional distress, and negligence claims. Ray submitted a response to American's summary judgment motion in January 2009 and concurrently moved for a continuance of its motion, arguing that she had not yet had a reasonable opportunity to obtain the information she needed to defend the summary judgment motion adequately. American opposed the motion for a continuance.

American moved for a temporary stay in February 2009, asking the district court to stay discovery until it ruled on the pending class certification and summary judgment motions. The district court did not grant the motion and discovery proceeded uninterrupted. Also in February 2009 Ray filed a Rule 20 joinder motion seeking to amend her complaint to join as plaintiffs two passengers of other American planes grounded on the same day as hers.

The district court granted summary judgment to American and dismissed Ray's false imprisonment, negligence, and emotional distress claims on April 2, 2009, three months after the motion had been filed and seven weeks before the discovery deadline. In the same memorandum opinion the court denied Ray's motions for continuance and joinder. Ray filed a motion to reconsider which the court denied.

Ray appeals the district court's denial of her motion for a continuance and the adverse grant of summary judgment on her false imprisonment and negligence claims. She also appeals the court's denial of her joinder motion. American cross appeals, challenging the district court's partial denial of its motion to dismiss and arguing that Ray's state law claims are preempted by federal legislation.

II.

Ray first contends that the district court prematurely granted American's motion for summary judgment on her false imprisonment and negligence claims without first ruling on her pending motion for a continuance. A district court's determination that a claim is ripe for summary judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion Robinson v. Terex Corp., 439 F.3d 465, 466-67 (8th Cir.2006), as is the denial of a rule 56(f) motion for a continuance. Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 484 F.3d 1046, 1054 (8th Cir.2007).³

Although discovery does not have to be completed before a district court can grant summary judgment, “summary judgment is proper only after the nonmovant has had adequate time for discovery.” In re TMJ Litigation, 113 F.3d 1484, 1490 (8th Cir.1997). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) allows a party opposing summary judgment to request the court postpone a decision until adequate discovery is completed. To obtain a Rule 56(f) continuance, the party opposing summary judgment must file an affidavit “affirmatively demonstrating ... how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Humphreys v. Roche Biomedical Lab., Inc., 990 F.2d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir.1993).

American filed a motion for summary judgment on Ray's false imprisonment and negligence claims two months into the parties' discovery period. Alongside her answer to the motion, Ray filed a Rule 56(f) motion...