Ray v. Nimmo

• Decision Date: 16 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-7055,82-7055
• Citation: 704 F.2d 1480
• Parties: 31 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1310, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,600 Melva A. RAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert P. NIMMO, Administrator, U.S. Veterans Administration, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1480

704 F.2d 1480

31 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1310,

31 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,600

Melva A. RAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert P. NIMMO, Administrator, U.S. Veterans Administration, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 82-7055.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

May 16, 1983.

Jack Drake, Drake, Knowles, & Pierce, Tuscaloosa, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant.

Frank W. Donaldson, U.S. Atty., Frank S. James, III, Asst. U.S. Atty., Birmingham, Ala., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before HILL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and LYNNE ^*, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant, Melva A. Ray, filed her civil complaint alleging that in denying her a promotion, the Veterans Administration Medical Center ("VAMC") discriminated against her on the basis of sex and age, and also violated the VAMC's Merit Promotion Plan. Jurisdiction over her complaint was based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e et seq. (West 1982), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 621 et seq. (West 1982), and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ¹ In two separate orders, the district court dismissed all three of Ray's claims. ² In this direct appeal, Ray challenges the dismissal of her age discrimination claim and of her Fifth Amendment claim. ³ We reverse and remand.

I. FACTS

Melva Ray is a 45-year-old woman employed by the Veterans Administration Medical Center in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, as a secretary, GS-5. In April of 1980, Ray applied for promotion to the position of Personnel Management Specialist. Ray was rated by the personnel department as highly qualified for the promotion. Nonetheless, the position was awarded to an applicant from outside the VAMC who apparently had not been rated. On April 24, Ray initiated complaint proceedings within the VAMC by contacting the agency's EEO Counselor. See 29 C.F.R. Secs. 1613.204(d)(4), 1613.214. After this initial interview, the Counselor investigated the basis for Ray's complaint, and on April 29 the Counselor conducted a final interview with Ray. At this interview, the Counselor notified Ray "of her right to file a formal complaint and the time limits within which to do so." Record at 12. See 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.213.

Ray then filed her formal complaint on May 7, 1980. Receipt of her complaint was acknowledged by Mr. Robert Dawson, the VAMC's EEO Officer, by letter dated May 27. The complaint was forwarded to Mr. Steve Almasy, Discrimination Complaint Service, Office of Human Goals, and was forwarded by him to Mr. Neal Lawson, Assistant General Counsel of the Veterans Administration ("VA"). See 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.214. For the remainder of 1980, the record indicates that no action whatsoever was taken by the agency with regard to Ray's complaint. ⁴

On January 9, 1981, Ray filed this civil action in federal district court alleging that the denial of promotion resulted from sex discrimination and age discrimination, and that her non-promotion, "made in direct violation of the merit promotion plan of the VAMC," was a denial of Ray's Fifth Amendment right to due process of law. Soon after filing her civil complaint, Ray was notified that her administrative complaint had been accepted for processing, and that an EEO investigator would be assigned to her case. Record at 13; see 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.216. ⁵ In March, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss Ray's civil action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or alternatively Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As to Ray's Fifth Amendment claim, the defendant contended that Title VII and the ADEA constituted Ray's sole remedies. As to her claim of age discrimination, the defendant contended that Ray failed to provide the EEOC with notice of intent to sue as required by 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 633a(d) (West 1982). ⁶

Meanwhile, the agency finally was taking action with regard to Ray's administrative complaint. On April 7, an EEO investigator was assigned to the case, and an investigation was conducted from April 20 to the 24. On April 30, Mr. B.D. Price, the Director and Station EEO Officer, issued Ray a notice of proposed disposition which denied her relief. In addition, this notice alerted Ray to her right to an EEOC hearing and a decision by the General Counsel; alternatively, Ray could request a decision by the General Counsel without hearing. Record at 7-8; see 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.217. Ray requested a decision by the General Counsel without a hearing. There is no indication in the record of whether a final agency decision was ever rendered.

On May 19, Ray filed an amended civil complaint addressing the defendant's contention that she had failed to provide the EEOC with notice of intent to sue as required by 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 633a(d) (West 1982). According to Ray, her filing of an administrative charge with the VAMC had been intended to put all relevant agencies on notice of her complaint. Further, Ray contended that her failure to comply with the notice of intent to sue requirement stemmed from the defendant's failure to provide her with notice of the proper grievance procedures. Record at 5. On October 22, 1981, and without stating its reasons, the trial court dismissed Ray's age discrimination and Fifth Amendment claims. See note 2 supra.

On this appeal, appellant makes the following contentions: (1) the notice of intent to sue provision of Sec. 633a(d) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, and may be tolled for equitable reasons (discussed in Part II, The Age Discrimination Claim); (2) a federal employee may bring a direct cause of action under the Fifth Amendment due process clause when an agency fails to follow its own procedures in making employment decisions (discussed in Part III, The Due Process Claim).

II. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM

Under the ADEA, a federal employee who believes that she has been discriminated against on the basis of her age may proceed through two alternative avenues of relief. First, she may file a formal complaint with the EEOC and pursue an administrative remedy. If denied relief through this avenue, she may then institute a civil action. Second, she can forgo the administrative channel and proceed directly to federal district court, providing she institutes her civil suit no later than 180 days from the event in question and providing that she has filed a "notice of intent to sue" with the EEOC at least 30 days prior to instituting suit. See 29 U.S.C.A. Secs. 633a(c) and 633a(d); Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir.1981); ⁷ Purtill v. Harris, 658 F.2d 134, 138 (3d Cir.1981); Macellaro v. Goldman, 643 F.2d 813, 816 (D.C.Cir.1980) (per curiam); Nabors v. United States, 568 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir.1978). This requirement that a complainant file a notice of intent to sue with the EEOC prior to instituting a civil action was intended to allow the EEOC sufficient time to attempt informal conciliation between the parties. Woodard v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 650 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir.1981); Powell v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 494 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir.1974); S.Rep. No. 95-493, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 504, 515. It is well established, however, that the notice of intent to sue requirement is not an absolute jurisdictional requirement, but is subject to modification or excuse for equitable reasons. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d at 524 (plaintiff may claim equitable grounds for not having filed notice and must prove that the reasons she was prevented from filing can be blamed upon employing agency); H.R.Rep. No. 95-950, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 528, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 528, 534 (notice requirement not a jurisdictional prerequisite and equitable modification for failing to file within time period will be available to plaintiffs). See also Zipes v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394-95, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1133, 71 L.Ed.2d 234, 244-45 (1982) (parallel notice of intent to sue provision in Title VII not jurisdictional but subject to equitable tolling); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d 584 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc) (notice of intent to sue provision for private employees in Sec. 626(d) of ADEA subject to equitable tolling, and not jurisdictional prerequisite).

Ray's amended complaint clearly states that her failure to file the requisite notice may be attributed to the agency itself. Further, the record discloses that soon after instituting her administrative complaint, Ray's attorney requested from the agency all information pertaining to relevant grievance procedures. The defendant admits that Ray received no response to this inquiry. Joint Letter Brief dated Jan. 12, 1983, at 2-3. Finally, we note the substantial delay involved in the administrative processing of Ray's complaint. Although Ray filed her complaint on May 7, 1980, an EEO investigator was not assigned to the case for 10 months. We therefore reverse and remand to the district court so that it can determine whether Ray's failure to file the notice may be excused on equitable grounds. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d at 524; Charlier v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 556 F.2d 761, 763-64 (5th Cir.1977).

Moreover, we note that in her amended complaint Ray contends that the filing of her administrative complaint in April of 1980 constituted the filing of "a complaint concerning age discrimination with the Commission," within the meaning of Sec. 633a(d). This allegation is significant because by its own terms subsection (d) requires a notice of intent to sue only when the complainant has not filed a complaint with the Commission. ⁸ See Purtill v. Harris, 658 F.2d at 138; Macellaro v. Goldman, 643 F.2d at 816; Nabors v. United States, 568 F.2d at 660. Thus, a plaintiff need not file such a notice prior to proceeding to federal court when the plaintiff has already proceeded through the EEOC...