Ray v. Recovery Healthcare Corp.
| Decision Date | 22 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-3055-G |
| Parties | SHELLANY RAY, Plaintiff, v. RECOVERY HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the court is the defendant Recovery Healthcare Corporation ("Recovery")'s Motion to Dismiss (docket entry 42) ("Recovery Motion to Dismiss") and the defendant Alcohol Monitoring Systems, Inc. ("AMS")'s Motion to Dismiss (docket entry 40) ("AMS Motion to Dismiss") (collectively, "the defendants" and "the motions to dismiss"). For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
This suit arises out of the plaintiff Shellany Ray ("Ray")'s required use of an ankle monitor designed to determine whether Ray consumed alcohol in violation of the conditions of her probation. Second Amended Complaint (docket entry 35) ("SAC") ¶¶ 8, 15.
AMS produces an ankle monitor (known as a "SCRAM device") that is designed to determine whether the wearer has consumed alcohol. Id. ¶ 8. Probationers are usually required to wear the SCRAM devices 24 hours per day, seven days per week in compliance with probation terms prohibiting alcohol use. Id. Once per day, the SCRAM device uploads monitoring data collected throughout the day to the internet. Id. The data is then transmitted to a central data center operated by AMS where the data is reviewed to determine if any "monitoring 'event' occurred that indicates that the wearer ingested alcohol." Id.
Unlike traditional blood-alcohol monitoring which directly measures the level of alcohol present in the blood stream, the SCRAM device "relies on transdermal alcohol monitoring." Id. ¶ 9. Transdermal alcohol monitoring "operates by detecting the amount of alcohol that evaporates through the skin." Id. The SCRAM device takes measurements of transdermal alcohol levels every 30 minutes. Id. ¶ 18. Because blood-alcohol content ("BAC") is not measured directly, transdermal alcohol monitoring requires "the use of an algorithm to approximate the blood alcohol content of the wearer based on the amount of alcohol vapor detected at the skin surface." Id. ¶ 9.
Ray alleges that "the SCRAM device is by its design susceptible to detecting 'false-positive' alcohol readings" because the SCRAM device is unable to accurately distinguish between transdermal alcoholic vapors resulting from a wearer'sconsumption of alcohol and alcoholic vapors resulting from non-ingested "environmental alcohol." Id. ¶ 10. Ray asserts that environmental alcohols "take many forms, and many everyday products contain alcohol that evaporates upon exposure to air" which, in turn, can trigger a SCRAM device to detect such vapors. Id. ¶ 11. Environmental alcohols, according to Ray, include "body spray, cologne, aftershave, hand sanitizer, household cleaners (such as Windex), [and] gasoline." Id.
Ray avers that AMS "offers its devices and services through an integrated network of distributors," including Recovery. Id. ¶ 14. Recovery allegedly "contracts with Dallas County to monitor probationers who have been convicted of alcohol offenses" and "provides those services to Dallas County in conjunction with AMS." Id. Ray further maintains that AMS and Recovery "knew that the SCRAM device and its related services were unreliable" in distinguishing between environmental and ingested alcohol, and that the defendants knowingly made false representations to Dallas County about the SCRAM device's ability to do so. Id. ¶¶ 14, 19.
As a result of a 2016 conviction for driving while intoxicated, Ray "was sentenced to community supervision and prohibited from consuming any alcohol." Id. ¶ 15. To enforce the prohibition, the state court ordered her to wear a SCRAM device created by AMS and operated by Recovery. Id. On December 25, 2017, Ray's husband "sprayed Static Guard on the couple's bed sheets shortly before they used the bed." Id. ¶ 16. Thereafter, Ray asserts, "AMS and Recovery Healthcare sent areport to Dallas County probation officials indicating that [Ray] had consumed a large quantity of alcohol on that evening." Id. The report concluded that Ray's BAC skyrocketed from zero to 0.26 in a 30-minute span. Id. ¶ 18. Dallas County prosecutors issued a warrant for her arrest on January 16, 2018. Id. ¶ 17. Neither AMS nor Recovery alerted Ray to the positive recording, id. ¶ 28, and Ray allegedly became aware of the positive report only after county prosecutors issued the warrant.
Dallas County prosecutors then "filed a motion to revoke [Ray's] probation and incarcerate her." Id. ¶ 17. Ray turned herself in at a January 24, 2018 hearing. Id. At that hearing, Ray denied consuming any alcohol and explained that her husband used Static Guard on December 25, 2017, which she argued caused the spike in alcoholic vapors. Id. However, AMS and Recovery "insisted that Static Guard could not be the source of the alcohol reading" and "assured prosecutors and the state court that" the only explanation for the high alcohol reading was that Ray "had consumed a large quantity of alcohol." Id. Ray alleges that the defendant's "knew that their monitoring systems were flawed and unreliable," but that the defendants nevertheless "failed to disclose those facts to the court, instead maintaining that the SCRAM readings proved that [Ray] had consumed alcohol." Id. As a result of the hearing, "the state court ordered [Ray] to attend a 12-step recovery program every day for 90 days and provide proof of attendance to her probation officer." Id. Ray asserts that the program "created a considerable limitation on" herability to work. Id.
After the hearing, Ray hired Jan Semenoff, a forensic criminalist, as an expert witness to create a report demonstrating that alcohol consumption could not have caused the positive reading on December 25. Id. ¶ 18. Ray insists that "it would be nigh impossible to consume enough alcohol for one's BAC to go from zero to 0.26" in a single 30-minute interval. Id. To substantiate this assertion, Ray points to the Semenoff report which concluded that "it would be physiologically impossible for the body to process alcohol as quickly as the device suggested." Id. The Semenoff report instead concluded that "the detected alcohol levels are consistent with environmental exposure." Id. Ray alleges that after the report was provided to prosecutors, the prosecutors "abandoned their efforts to revoke [Ray's] probation" and withdrew their motion. Id.
Ray filed her initial complaint (docket entry 1) on December 26, 2019 and her First Amended Complaint (docket entry 15) on April 14, 2020. Ray then filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on October 30, 2020. In lieu of an answer, both defendants filed separate and independent motions to dismiss on November 20, 2020. On December 11, 2020, Ray filed a response to the Recovery Motion to Dismiss ("Response to Recovery") (docket entry 46) and a response to the AMS Motion to Dismiss ("Response to AMS") (docket entry 47). Finally, AMS andRecovery filed their reply briefs (docket entries 50, 51) on December 18, 2020 and January 7, 2021, respectively. Accordingly, the motions to dismiss are ripe for decision.
"To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1182 (2008). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." In re Katrina Canal, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. (quoting Martin K. Eby ConstructionCompany, Inc. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court has prescribed a "two-pronged approach" to determine whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). The court must "begin by identifying the pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. The court should then assume the veracity of any well-pleaded allegations and "determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Id. The plausibility principle does not convert the Rule 8(a)(2) notice pleading to a "probability requirement," but "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully" will not defeat a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678. The plaintiff must 'plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]' - 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). The court, drawing on its judicial experience and common sense, must undertake the "context-specific task," of determining whether the plaintiff's allegations "nudge" her claims against the defendant "across the...
To continue reading
Request your trial