Ray v. State

• Decision Date: 07 June 1900
• Citation: 126 Ala. 9,28 So. 634
• Parties: RAY v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

28 So. 634

126 Ala. 9

RAY v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 7, 1900

Appeal from city court of Montgomery; A. D. Sayre, Judge.

Charles Ray was convicted of burglary, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The accused was convicted of burglary, the indictment charging that he broke and entered into a carriage house within the curtilage of a dwelling house of S. B. Marks, and feloniously took and carried away therefrom one set of harness of the value of $15. On the trial of the case the burglary and the larceny of the harness were proven. One J. G. Reasonover, a witness for the state, testified that he bought the harness which was identified as belonging to S. B. Marks from Charles Ray, and that upon the identification of the harness he delivered it to a police officer for delivery to Mr. Marks. This witness further testified that, hearing that Charles Ray had a set of harness for sale, he wrote a note addressed to Charles Ray, and delivered it to one Alex Taylor with directions to carry it to defendant. The defendant objected to this statement of the witness, and moved the court to exclude it on the ground that it was illegal, irrelevant, and incompetent, and did not tend to prove the commission of the offense, nor was it shown that the note was delivered to defendant. The witness then, in response to an inquiry by the court, said that within a short time after he had so delivered the note to Taylor defendant came to the place of business of witness, and engaged him in conversation about the harness, and offered to sell him a set. Thereupon the court overruled the last-named objection and exception of the defendant, and the defendant then and there duly excepted. The witness then testified that he went with defendant to the house of Mrs. Ray, the mother of defendant, but a different place from where defendant lived, and went into a room of said house to see the harness; that this was about 8 o'clock at night. The solicitor then asked the witness "Did the defendant have then, or did he show you, any other set of harness besides the set you purchased?" The defendant objected to the question on the ground that the same was irrelevant. The court overruled the objection, and defendant duly excepted to this ruling of the court. Witness then answered: "He had two sets of harness, both of which he took out of a closet in a back room of said house and offered to sell either of them; and I bought the one involved in this prosecution." Defendant moved to exclude said answer on the same grounds set forth in his objection to the question, but the court overruled and motion, and to this action of the court the defendant then and there duly excepted. The witness then testified that he bought the set of harness in question from Charles Ray, and paid for it. Alex Taylor, a witness for the state, testified that he took a note from the witness Reasonover directed to Ray, and delivered it to the house of Ray's mother. The defendant introduced one Calvin Oliver as a witness, who testified, in response to a question propounded to him by defendant, that he had never told Reasonover that Charles Ray had a set of harness for sale. The state introduced Reasonover as a witness in rebuttal, and he testified that Calvin Oliver told him (Reasonover) that Charles Ray had a set of harness for sale. To this testimony on the part of Reasonover the defendant objected on the ground that it was illegal and inadmissible. The court overruled the objection and the defendant duly excepted. The defendant, as a witness in his own behalf, testified that he had no connection with the larceny of the harness, and denied having sold it to Reasonover. The bill of exceptions recites that the "court charged the jury as to the offense of burglary but said nothing as to the offense of petit larceny. *** The defendant made no request of the court, either in writing or orally, to charge the jury in respect to the offense of petit larceny." After conviction and sentence, a motion was made for a new trial, which was overruled, and to this ruling the defendant duly excepted.

John W. A. Sanford, Jr., for appellant.

Chas. G. Brown, Atty. Gen., for the State.

TYSON J.

The action of the court in refusing to grant the motion for a new trial is not revisable. The statute allowing appeals from decisions granting or refusing to grant motions for new trials applies only to civil cases. Code, § 434; Bondurant v. State (Ala.) 27 So. 775. During the progress of the trial several exceptions were reserved to the rulings of the court upon the admission of evidence against the objections of defendant. The first of these involves the action of the court in permitting Reasonover to testify that he wrote a note...