Ray v. State

• Citation: 859 S.E.2d 793
• Decision Date: 03 June 2021
• Docket Number: A21A0338
• Parties: RAY v. The STATE.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

859 S.E.2d 793

RAY
v.
The STATE.

A21A0338

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 3, 2021

859 S.E.2d 794

James Kenneth Luttrell, Woodstock, for Appellant.

Sonya R. Chachere-Compton, Atlanta, Elizabeth Dalia Racine, Ryan Reese Leonard, Aimee Fatemeh Sobhani, for Appellee.

Reese, Judge.

859 S.E.2d 795

In October 2018, a Douglas County grand jury indicted Kayla Ray on five counts of child cruelty in the first degree.¹ She entered a non-negotiated guilty plea, and following a hearing, the trial court sentenced her to 100 years with the first 50 to be served in confinement. Ray filed an amended motion to withdraw her guilty plea arguing, inter alia, that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, at which her plea counsel testified, the trial court denied Ray's amended motion. This appeal followed. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm.

"[O]n a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the trial court is the final arbiter of all factual issues raised by the evidence."² Considered in that light, the record shows the following. In September 2018, Ray and her three children (seven-month-old twins, B. R. and her sister, and an older toddler) were living in the home of the twins’ grandfather, Daniel Callies. Douglasville police visited Callies's residence for a welfare check after receiving a report of alleged child abuse. When officers arrived at the home, Callies stated that he had recorded Ray striking B. R., and he provided the officers the video. The video showed Ray picking up B. R., punching her, holding a towel over her face, holding her face against a chair cushion, choking her, and throwing her against the bottom of the crib. In her statement to police, Ray claimed that she had taken "a Xanax bar" in hopes of getting to sleep, and that she did not remember picking up or putting her hands on B. R. Ray's children were transported to a hospital for further evaluation, and Ray was placed under arrest.

A psychologist with the Georgia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities conducted a psychological evaluation of Ray, and concluded that, despite her use of methamphetamine and non-prescribed Xanax, there were no cogitative or psychological issues that would prevent her from being held criminally responsible for her actions. At her plea and sentencing hearing, the court advised Ray of her rights and she entered a non-negotiated guilty plea, which the court found she made freely and voluntarily. The State presented evidence in support of its recommended sentence of 60 years with the first 30 to be served in confinement. Ray's counsel presented witnesses and mitigating factors for the court's consideration, but did not provide a specific sentencing recommendation. The trial court sentenced Ray to 100 years with the first 50 to be served in confinement.

Ray filed an amended motion to withdraw guilty plea, arguing, inter alia, that her plea counsel offered ineffective assistance. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied Ray's amended motion, and this appeal followed.

"[W]hile a guilty plea may be withdrawn anytime before sentencing, once a sentence has been entered, a guilty plea may only be withdrawn to correct a manifest injustice, and a trial court's refusal to allow withdrawal will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion."³ Although the test for manifest injustice will vary from case to case, "it has been said that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice if, for instance, a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel, or the guilty plea was entered involuntarily or without an understanding of the nature of the charges."⁴ When reviewing a trial court's ruling on the effectiveness of trial counsel, "we accept the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts."⁵ Additionally, "[t]he question of whether offenses merge is a legal

859 S.E.2d 796

question that we review de novo."⁶ With these guiding principles in mind, we now consider Ray's claims of error.

1. Ray argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to withdraw guilty plea because she received ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea process. Specifically, she asserts that her counsel was deficient in failing to convey a plea offer from the State, and that not knowing of the State's sentencing proposal prejudiced her. We disagree.

When seeking to withdraw a guilty plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel, one must satisfy the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington ,⁷ namely she must show that "[her] counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."⁸ Even so, "[i]n considering an ineffectiveness claim, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional...