Ray v. State, 28716

Decision Date01 December 1950
Docket NumberNo. 28716,28716
Citation228 Ind. 706,95 N.E.2d 212
PartiesRAY v. STATE.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Allen H. Nierman, Brownstown, for appellant.

J. Emmett McManamon, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Coughlin, George W. Hand, Jr., Norman J. Beatty, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellee.

YOUNG, Chief Justice.

This was a criminal action brought by the State of Indiana against the appellant. It was begun by filing of an affidavit in the Washington Circuit Court changing the appellant with the crime of inflicting a physical injury, with a dangerous and deadly weapon, while in the commission of robbery. The affidavit is based upon Section 10-4101, Burns' 1942 Replacement.

No question is suggested by the appellant as to the sufficiency of the evidence and the only questions raised by appellant are: (1) Error of law occurring at the trial, in that the court refused to permit the witness to answer the following question: 'Mr. Malott, did you employ Mr. Mead to assist the State in this trial? Is that correct?' (2) Error of law occurring at the trial in that the court permitted the witness, Don Winn, to answer a question as to whether or not a piece of brick, which was marked State's Exhibit A, was such that under the circumstances finger prints of anybody that might have handled it prior to the time it was turned over to authorities could then be lifted from it, (3) a similar question which the court permitted Robert L. Bennett to answer, and (4) whether there was any error in giving Instruction No. 15 by the court upon his own motion.

The first question does not necessarily involve the correctness of the court's ruling in permitting Mr. Malott to answer the questions put to him. We do not find it necessary to go into the questions raised upon this proposition. It seems to be well settled in Indiana that in cross-examining a witness any fact tending to impair the credibility of a witness is proper examination and, in our opinion, the court should have allowed the question to be answered, but the failure to do so does not seem to us to have been harmful. The witness, under examination, was the prosecuting witness, who, of course, was known to be particularly interested in the lawsuit. An outside attorney was appearing to help the prosecutor in the case, and the only purpose that could have been served was whether or not the prosecuting witness, by employing the additional attorney to assist the State in the trial, was sufficient to show further his opinion of the defendant who had hit him on the head with a part of a brick. The additional attorney was there, participating in the trial in the presence of the jury and the witness and the court. If the answer had been 'yes' it would only have been corroborative of what the jury might have expected. The extent of cross-examination of a witness on such matters is within the sound discretion of the trial court. It would not have changed the situation at all and would not have affected the attitude of the jury in the case, as we see it. This error was clearly harmless.

The second and third questions were of such nature that the court, had he been so requested, could have permitted the State, in its original case, to have asked it, and the fact that he overruled the objections to these questions is clearly indicative that he would have granted such motion had it been presented. Denny v. State, 1921, 190 Ind. 76, 82, 83, 129 N.E. 308; Stalker v. Breeze, 1917, 186 Ind. 221, 225, 114 N.E. 968; Sanger v. Bacon, 1913, 180 Ind. 322,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Taylor v. State, 3--675A107
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • December 16, 1976
    ...the credibility of the witness, and that in so doing he is not limited to the facts testified to on direct examination. Ray v. State (1950), 228 Ind. 706, 95 N.E.2d 212. Nevertheless, the trial court is invested with broad discretion in controlling cross-examination. We will not find revers......
  • The William C. Haak Trust v. Wilusz
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • May 16, 2011
    ...and the fact that the transfer of title is accomplished by a judgment is no reason for not extending the rule.” Moore, 229 Ind. at 315, 95 N.E.2d at 212.Conclusion Application of the law to the undisputed facts of this case leads us quickly to the conclusion that the Trust has, and will ret......
  • Lamar v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • January 8, 1964
    ...as in this case, was given an opportunity of surrebuttal. In discussing this issue, this court, in the case of Ray v. State (1950), 228 Ind. 706, 709-710, 95 N.E.2d 212, 214, 'The rule is so thoroughly established that it does not seem to require argument, but, for the sake of the record, w......
  • Cockrell v. Hawkins
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • March 8, 2002
    ... ... Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 229 Ind. 309, 315, 95 N.E.2d 210, 212 (1950) (citing State ex rel. McNutt v. Orcutt, 211 Ind. 523, 199 N.E. 595 (1936), reh'g denied, 211 Ind. 523, 7 N.E.2d 779) ...         To demonstrate that the ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT