Ray v. Tennessee Valley Authority

• Decision Date: 04 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-7339,81-7339
• Citation: Ray v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 677 F.2d 818 (11th Cir. 1982)
• Parties: James D. RAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 818

677 F.2d 818

James D. RAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.The TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 81-7339.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

June 4, 1982.

James D. Ray, pro se.

Larry W. Harper, William T. Mills, Birmingham, Ala., Herbert S. Sanger, Jr., Justin M. Schwamm, Sr., Thomas F. Fine, David W. Miller, Tennessee Valley Authority, Knoxville, Tenn., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before RONEY and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and PITTMAN^*, District Judge.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

James D. Ray appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment on his claims against the Tennessee Valley Authority and his former attorney, Jack Drake.On appeal Ray argues that the district court erred in dismissing his breach of contract claim against TVA on the basis of res judicata; that his claim based on the violation of his veteran's reemployment rights is not barred by the statute of limitations; that his claim of defamation by a TVA employee states a proper federal cause of action; and that the court's dismissal of his malpractice action against his court-appointed attorney Jack Drake for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was improper.For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I.Background

Appellant Ray was formerly a research chemist for the TVA.In 1973, appellant's employment with the TVA was terminated by a reduction-in-force action (RIF).Ray appealed his dismissal to the Civil Service Commission, which decided against him, then filed suit against the TVA in federal court on June 20, 1974.In this action Ray sued for review of the Civil Service Commission decision and also alleged that the RIF violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,1985.The substance of Ray's complaint was that the RIF was a sham and that he had been improperly terminated by the TVA.¹The district court ruled against Ray on defendants' motion for summary judgment.Ray appealed, and his appeal was dismissed by the former Fifth Circuit as untimely.²

In 1980, Ray attempted to relitigate his claims by intervening in a race discrimination suit against the TVA.³The district court denied intervention on the basis of res judicata, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.⁴

This appeal results from Ray's third venture into the federal courts for redress of his grievances against the TVA.Ray's complaint contained three counts.Count I alleged that his termination by the 1973 RIF was improper and breached his contract of employment with TVA.Ray also asserted in this count that TVA had violated his reemployment rights under the Veteran's Preference Act, ch. 287,58 Stat. 387(1944).In count II Ray asserted that he had been defamed by a TVA employee, and count III alleged malpractice against Jack Drake, the attorney appointed by the court to assist Ray in his original 1974 lawsuit.Drake moved to dismiss count III for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The motion was granted by the trial court.TVA then moved for summary judgment on counts I and II.The court held that count I was barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations, and that count II was a pendent state claim which lacked a jurisdictional base once count I was dismissed.Accordingly, the court granted TVA's motion for summary judgment.

II.The Breach of Contract Claim

Res judicata ensures the finality of decision; under the doctrine, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by the parties based on the same cause of action.Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131, 99 S.Ct. 2205, 2209, 60 L.Ed.2d 767(1979);Blair v. City of Greenville, 649 F.2d 365, 368(5th Cir.1981).

For a prior judgment to bar a subsequent action, it is firmly established (1) that the prior judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) that there must have been a final judgment on the merits; (3) that the parties, or those in privity with them, must be identical in both suits; and (4) that the same cause of action must be involved in both suits.

Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d 103, 108(5th Cir.1975).The first three elements of this test unquestionably are met in this case.A final judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in Ray's 1974 lawsuit against the TVA.Thus in determining whether res judicata bars Ray's "breach of contract" claims the key issue is whether the claim constitutes the same "cause of action" as in his original 1974 lawsuit.

The principal test for determining whether the causes of action are the same is whether the primary right and duty or wrong are the same in each case.White v. World Finance of Meridian, Inc., 653 F.2d 147, 150(5th Cir.1981);Commercial Box & Lumber Co., Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 623 F.2d 371, 374(5th Cir.1980);Kemp v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1052(5th Cir.1980).As the former Fifth Circuit observed, in determining whether the causes of action are the same, the substance of the actions, not the form, controls.White v. World Finance of Meridian, Inc., supra;Astron Industrial Associates, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 405 F.2d 958, 961(5th Cir.1968);Acree v. Air Line Pilots Association, 390 F.2d 199, 201(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 852, 89 S.Ct. 88, 21 L.Ed.2d 122(1968).

Applying these principles to the facts before us, we agree with the district judge that Ray's breach of contract claim is barred by res judicata.In each suit the primary right at issue was Ray's right of continued employment with the TVA, and in each suit Ray alleged that TVA interfered with that right by terminating his employment through a pretextual RIF.In substance, if not in form, the breach of contract alleged by Ray in this suit is identical to his claims in the 1974 litigation and thus falls squarely within res judicata doctrine.

III.The Reemployment Rights Claim

Count I of Ray's complaint also alleged that the TVA had violated Ray's reemployment rights under the Veteran's Preference Act.We find this claim barred for two reasons.First, Ray has admittedly known of the reemployment rights claim since his original complaint in 1974.In fact, Ray asserts as part of his malpractice claim against Drake that Drake failed to raise the reemployment rights issue in the 1974 lawsuit.As we noted above, application of res judicata requires the existence of four elements.Once a court determines that these elements exist, however, res judicata bars subsequent litigation "not only in respect of every matter which was actually offered and received to sustain the demand, but also as to every ground of recovery which might have been presented."Jones v. Texas Tech University, 656 F.2d 1137, 1141(5th Cir.1981)(quotingStevenson, 516 F.2d at 108-09(emphasis added));Commercial Box & Lumber v. Uniroyal, Inc., 623 F.2d 371, 373(5th Cir.1980).After reviewing the record, we conclude that Ray's breach of contract claim and the alleged violation of his Veteran's Preference Act rights are substantially the same cause of action.We also find that substantially the same facts would be involved in support of each cause of action.SeeStevenson, supra, 516 F.2d at 109.The claim under the Act, therefore, is an alternative theory of recovery for his termination from TVA, and Ray's failure to incorporate this theory into his earlier lawsuit bars the claim under res judicata principles.

Second, even if Ray's claim was not subject to the bar of res judicata, it is untimely.Numerous Supreme Court and former Fifth Circuit precedents have reiterated the rule that when a federal statute granting a cause of action fails to include a limitations period, a federal court should look to the statestatute of limitations governing the state action most closely analogous to the federal action.E.g., United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 1562, 67 L.Ed.2d 732(1981);Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1794-95, 64 L.Ed.2d 440(1980);Johnson v. Railway Express, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295(1975);Vigman v. Community National Bank & Trust Co., 635 F.2d 455, 459(5th Cir.1981);Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260, 1261-62(5th Cir.1977).Of course, if the state limitations period is so short as to interfere with federal policies, it will not be applied to the federal action.Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2454, 53 L.Ed.2d 402(1977);Franklin v. City of Marks, 439 F.2d 665, 669(5th Cir.1971).

Here, Ray's claim that the TVA violated his rights under the Veteran's Preference Act is most analogous to state actions for "injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract," which in Alabama are subject to a one-year limitations period.Ala.Code § 6-2-39(a)(5).SeeRubin v. O'Koren, 621 F.2d 114, 116(5th Cir.1980), on rehearing, 644 F.2d 1023(5th Cir.1981)(one-year limitations period applies to civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);Sewell v. Grand Lodge of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 445 F.2d 545, 548-50(5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024, 92 S.Ct. 674, 30 L.Ed.2d 674(one-year period applies to suit under the federal labor laws for wrongful discharge);United Klans of America v. McGovern, 453 F.Supp. 836, 839-40(N.D.Ala.1978), aff'd, 621 F.2d 152(5th Cir.1980)(one-year period applies to claims by Ku Klux Klan that FBI officers violated its constitutional rights).Moreover, we conclude on the basis of these precedents that the one-year limitations period of Alabama law is not so short as to frustrate federal policy.Cf.Franklin v. City of Marks, supra, 439 F.2d at 669(court refused to adopt 10-day limitations period for a § 1983 action).From the record in this case, the fact is undisputed that...