Ray v. Village of Woodridge
| Decision Date | 16 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00 C 2325.,00 C 2325. |
| Citation | 221 F.Supp.2d 906 |
| Parties | Gideon RAY and Richard Ray, Plaintiffs, v. VILLAGE OF WOODRIDGE; Sgt. Edward Krause; Keith Grabarek; Patrick Nevison; Jeffrey Johnson; Paul Kumeiga; Steve Edson; Anthony Johnson; Jeffrey Buck; and Stephen Brown, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Gregory E. Kulis, Kathleen Coyne Ropka, Shehnaz I. Mansuri, Gregory E. Lulis & Assoc., Chicago, IL, Howard B. Brookins, Jr., Thaddeus Leonard Wilson, Brookins & Wilson, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Robert C. Yelton, III, Ryan James Harrington, Jeffrey Edward Kehl, Yelton & Kehl, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Before the court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
This case arises out of the response of the Village of Woodridge Police Department to an anonymous call that persons with guns were threatening people inside a PC Wireless retail store located in the Village. Plaintiffs brought this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 alleging that the individual police officers and the Village violated Plaintiffs' fourth amendment rights and Plaintiffs' interest in being free from false arrest and false imprisonment. The court outlines the relevant facts below, which come from the parties' briefs, Local Rule 56.1 statements, and accompanying exhibits. Disputed facts are noted in the text.
On or about April 1, 2000, a teenaged girl personally went to the Woodridge Police Department and told an officer that persons operating the PC Wireless store were selling guns out of the store.1 The girl also said that one of the persons may have shot another man during a dispute in a neighboring town. The owners/operators of the PC Wireless store were Plaintiffs, Gideon Ray and Richard Ray.
On April 2, 2000, Defendant Woodridge Police Sgt. Krause conducted the third shift roll call. At that time, Sgt. Krause told the officers in attendance about the possibility that weapons were being sold out of the PC Wireless store, and about the possibility that one of the operators of the store had shot another man.
Shortly after the April 2nd third shift roll call, the Woodridge Police Department received an emergency phone call at its telephone dispatch center. The caller refused to leave her name, but she reported that there was a man at the PC Wireless store threatening people with a gun. The caller could not describe the man's clothing, but gave the man's name (Plaintiff, Gideon Ray) and a general physical description. The caller also said that the man's brother was at the store, and that both men had pistols. Again, the caller gave a general description of the man's brother, and gave the brother's name (Plaintiff, Richard Ray), but could not describe his clothing. Then the caller said that the men had vehicles parked in front of the store, described both vehicles, and gave license plate information about the vehicles.
In response to the call, the nine named individual Defendants (hereinafter "the Officers") went on an emergency basis to the PC Wireless store. The Officers were concerned about a possible armed robbery, armed violence, or a hostage situation. When the Officers arrived, the PC Wireless store appeared to be closed, and the Officers could not see inside the store. The Officers positioned themselves outside the store, so they would be able to see anybody who came out of the store. The Officers had their weapons drawn and pointed at the store entrance.
Per department policy, the Officers radioed their dispatch personnel and had dispatch attempt to make telephone contact with someone inside the PC Wireless store. The first telephone attempt was unsuccessful. One of the Officers then drove by the front of the PC Wireless store in an unmarked car to try to get a look inside the store without giving away the positions of the other Officers. A second telephone attempt was successful, and dispatch asked the store occupants to walk out of the store one at a time with their hands raised.
The first person to come out of the store as directed was Plaintiff Richard Ray (hereinafter "Richard"). One of the Officers ordered Richard to walk backwards until he was clear of the store windows. After Richard did so, he was handcuffed and taken back to where other Officers were positioned. A second man, Plaintiff Gideon Ray (hereinafter "Gideon") then came out of the store in the same manner as Richard. Gideon was handcuffed and taken back to where Richard and the other Officers were standing. The Officers asked Gideon and Richard if there was anybody else in the store, and both men said the store was now empty. The Officers told Gideon and Richard about the emergency phone call, and said that they were investigating whether the store was being robbed, or if there were people making threats with guns. One of the Officers asked Gideon and Richard if there were any guns or drugs in the store, and both men said no.2
The Officers then conducted a protective sweep of the store, looking for anybody that may have remained in the store, either as a victim or perpetrator of a crime. The sweep went through the front part of the store as well as behind counters, under desks, and in back rooms. During the protective sweep, one of the Officers saw an open bag that was similar to a suitcase. Lying inside the bag in open view was a loaded ammunition clip for a handgun.3
The Officer that saw the ammunition clip did not touch the clip at that time. After finishing the protective sweep, the Officers went back outside. The parties dispute what happened next. The Officers claim they spoke to Gideon and Richard and asked about the ammunition clip. In response to the questions, the Officers assert that Gideon admitted having a .40 caliber pistol in a desk in a back room of the store. According to the Officers, Gideon and Richard gave consent for the Officers to search the store and Gideon's and Richard's vehicles. Gideon and Richard deny giving consent, and also deny that any of the Officers said anything about the ammunition clip.
The parties agree that the Officers searched the vehicles and did not find any weapons. The parties also agree that after the Officers searched the vehicles, the Officers brought Gideon and Richard, still handcuffed, back into the PC Wireless store. The Officers assert that they went to a desk as directed by Gideon and found a .38 caliber pistol. The Officers claim that they went back to Gideon and confronted him with the .38 caliber pistol after Gideon said that he had a .40 caliber pistol. According to the Officers, Gideon then conceded that he had two pistols in the store, a .40 caliber and a .38 caliber. The Officers went to another desk and found the .40 caliber pistol. Gideon and Richard deny that they made any such concession, and further deny that they directed the Officers to find either weapon. In any event, it is undisputed that the Officers found both a .40 caliber pistol and a .38 caliber pistol in desks in one of the back rooms.
Ultimately, the Officers concluded that Gideon's possession of the two weapons was not illegal, because he had a valid state firearm owner's identification card. After approximately 15-20 minutes, the Officers came to the conclusion that there was no evidence of criminality, and let Gideon and Richard go on their way.
Gideon and Richard filed this suit alleging that their seizure and the subsequent searches of their vehicles and the PC Wireless store violated their fourth amendment rights, and alleging Illinois common law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. Also included is a claim against the Village, alleging that its policies violate the fourth amendment. Gideon and Richard base most of their arguments on the anonymous emergency call and the fact that the Officers did not have search or arrest warrants. Defendants now move for summary judgment. In their individual capacity, the Officers argue that there is no evidence of a fourth amendment violation, and even if there is such evidence, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity. The Village argues that there is no basis for municipal liability. As discussed below, the court finds that all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Summary judgment is permissible when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The nonmoving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must identify specific facts, see Cornfield v. Consolidated High School District No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1320 (7th Cir.1993), that raise more than a mere scintilla of evidence to show a genuine triable issue of material fact. See Murphy v. ITT Technical Services, Inc., 176 F.3d 934, 936 (7th Cir.1999); see also Shank v. William R. Hague, Inc., 192 F.3d 675, 682 (7th Cir. 1999) (). A defendant is entitled to put the plaintiff to his proofs and demand a showing of the evidence. See e.g. Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Industries. Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir.1997). If the plaintiff fails to come up with the required proof, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. See id. It bears repeating that the plaintiff must present evidence, rather than speculation and conclusions without factual support. See Rand v. CF Industries, Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1146-47 (7th Cir.1994).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court can only consider evidence that would be admissible at trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir.1996). The court views the record and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to ...
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