Ray v. Wallace, Case No. 4:12-CV-2400 NAB
| Decision Date | 23 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:12-CV-2400 NAB |
| Parties | DAMIEN RAY, Petitioner, v. IAN WALLACE, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Damien Ray's (Ray) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. 5.] Respondent Ian Wallace filed a response. [Doc. 12.] Ray filed a Reply Memorandum. [Doc. 18.] The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). [Doc. 15.] For the reasons set forth below, Ray's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus will be denied.
Ray was convicted of robbery in the first degree and armed criminal action after a jury trial. The evidence presented in the light most favorable to the jury verdict is as follows1: At approximately 1:30 a.m. on July 1, 2007, Lester Hash patronized a Shell gas station and convenience store where he noticed Ray sitting in the back seat of a white sports utility vehicle (SUV) looking at him as he walked into the store. While Hash was inside the store, he looked at the SUV again. Ray was still looking at Hash and talking to the other people inside the SUV.Hash again glanced at the SUV while he was in line, and saw that Ray was still looking at him. When Hash exited the store, Ray began to talk to him as he walked to his truck. After Hash got into his truck, he attempted to close the door, but Ray stepped in between the door and truck and held the door open. Ray offered to sell Hash drugs, which Hash declined. Hash tried to close the door when Ray pulled out a gun. Ray jammed the gun into Hash's stomach, telling Hash to give him $100.00 or Ray would fire the gun. Hash gave Ray all the money he had, which was about $120.00. Ray then got back into the SUV.
Hash called the police. Upon Officer Sean Lipina's arrival, Hash described the SUV to the officer as a white Ford Expedition with license plate number 411-RKF. Hash described Ray as being a black male; approximately five foot ten, one hundred and sixty to one hundred and seventy pounds; and wearing a blue shirt, black pants, and tattoos on his left forearm. About three hours later, Sergeant Bryan McGynn stopped a white SUV matching the description of the one Ray had occupied at the time of the robbery. Officer Lipina determined that Ray matched Hash's physical description of the man who robbed him, and that the vehicle was also an exact match for the description given by Hash. That same day, Hash viewed a physical line-up, which consisted of Ray and three other similar looking inmates. Hash identified Ray as the robber, claiming he was one hundred percent certain of the identification. Ray was charged with first-degree robbery and armed criminal action. (Resp't Ex. B at 15-16.) A jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts. (Resp't Ex. B at 54, 56.) Ray received two 20 year concurrent sentences for both convictions. (Resp't Ex. B at 73-76.)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 91 (2011). "In general, if a convicted state criminal defendant can show a federal habeas court that his conviction rests upon a violation of the Federal Constitution, he may well obtain a writ of habeas corpus that requires a new trial, a new sentence, or release." Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1917 (2013). The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (AEDPA) applies to all petitions for habeas relief filed by state prisoners after this statute's effective date of April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-29 (1997). In conducting habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings (1) resulted in a decision that is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct unless the petitioner successfully rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), the phrase "clearly established federal law refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state court decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). "In other words, clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id. at 72. To obtain habeas relief, a habeas petitioner must be able to point to the Supreme Court precedent which he thinks the state courts acted contrary to or unreasonably applied. Buchheit v. Norris, 459 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 2006).
A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court either 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases' or 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the] precedent.'" Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000)). A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case. Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-408). "A federal habeas court making the unreasonable application inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Penry, 532 U.S. at 793. "A state court decision involves 'an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings,' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record." Evanstad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 2006). A "readiness to attribute error is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). AEDPA's highly deferential standard demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt. Id.
Ray presents five grounds for relief.2 Ray alleges three trial court errors. First, he states that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress Hash's out-of-court and in-court identifications. Ray also contends that the Rule 29.15 post-conviction motion court erred in appointing independent counsel for three potential witnesses, because it violated Ray's due process right and his right to present a defense at his post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Rayalso asserts that the Rule 29.15 post-conviction motion court should have granted immunity to the three witnesses so that they would testify at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing.
Ray also asserts two ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Ray asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call three witnesses and failing to object to and preserve for review the use of peremptory strikes against three female venirepersons.
Petitioner's first ground for relief states that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress out-of-court identifications, because the identifications were unduly suggestive, created a substantial likelihood of misidentification, were inherently unreliable, and violated his rights. The Supreme Court has recognized, "state and federal statutes and rules ordinarily govern the admissibility of evidence, and juries are assigned the task of determining the reliability of the evidence presented at trial." Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 723 (2012). There is a "due process check on the admission of eyewitness identification, applicable where police have arranged suggestive circumstances leading the witness to identify a particular person as the perpetrator of a crime." Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 720. Reliability is the "linchpin" in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). The factors to be considered in determining admissibility are the following: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness' degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation. Id. "Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself." Id. "The existence of each factor is a factual determination to be made by the state court ... and is entitledto the requisite presumption of correctness." Palmer v. Clarke, 408 F.3d 423, 435-36 (8th Cir. 2005). "The admissibility of evidence in a state trial is a matter of state law," and habeas relief will be granted only if the "state court's evidentiary ruling infringes upon a specific constitutional protection or is so prejudicial that it amounts to a denial of due process." Palmer, 408 F.3d at 436.
In this case, Ray filed a motion to suppress identification. (Resp't Ex. B. at 33-34.) The trial court took the motion with the case. Hash testified that...
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