Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–1774.,12–1774. |
| Citation | 706 F.3d 864 |
| Parties | Hoyt RAY, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., and Vipin K. Shah, Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Hoyt Ray (submitted), Pinckneyville Correctional Center, Pinckneyville, IL, pro se.
Tamara K. Hackman, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Urbana, IL, Matthew Lurkins, Attorney, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Springfield, IL, Craig L. Unrath, Attorney, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Peoria, IL, for Defendants–Appellees.
Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and TINDER, Circuit Judges.
Since July 2006 Hoyt Ray has experienced pain in one of his shoulders. He contends that the pain stems from an injury and that an MRI scan would point the way toward successful treatment; Dr. VipinK. Shah, Ray's treating physician at Western Illinois Correctional Center, believes that the pain stems from arthritis and that a scan would not help in diagnosis and treatment. Ray contends in this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Dr. Shah is wrong—so far wrong that he has violated the Constitution's cruel and unusual punishments clause. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The district court granted summary judgment to Shah, concluding that, right or wrong about the source of Ray's pain or the best diagnostic tools, Shah had not displayed deliberate indifference toward Ray's serious medical condition.
That Ray's pain is a serious condition is common ground among the litigants. For his part, Ray concedes that he has received medical treatment from several physicians. He has been examined often, x-rays have been taken, and physicians have prescribed painkillers—principally Ultram, a synthetic analgesic often used in the treatment of arthritis. The medical staff also has arranged for Ray to be assigned a lower bunk, so that he can avoid arm motions that he has found painful. Ray is sure that, with the assistance of an MRI scan, physicians could do better. But both Farmer and Gamble observe that medical malpractice is not actionable under § 1983. 511 U.S. at 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970,429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285. The district court concluded that even a conclusion of malpractice would be unwarranted. Ray does not deny that, if his pain stems from arthritis, his treatment is appropriate. And he has not produced evidence that norms of professional conduct call for using an MRI to determine whether a diagnosis of arthritis based on x-ray films may be mistaken.
Because Ray's claim fails the objective component of cruel-and-unusual-punishments analysis, we need not consider his contention that Dr. Shah displayed subjective antipathy. According to Ray, Shah once stated that “he didn't care how much pain I was in or how bad my shoulder hurt, he wasn't sending me for an MRI ... so I was going to have to live with it.” Ray calls this statement callous, and perhaps it was—though it may have been just an effort to get across Shah's view that a patient's level of pain does not affect the proper use of MRI scans to verify or refute a diagnosis of arthritis. The fact remains that, far from ignoring Ray's pain, Shah treated him for arthritis.
Ray has sued Shah's employer, Wexford Health Sources, which holds a contract to provide medical care in Illinois's prisons. Section 1983 does not create vicarious liability. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). An organization is answerable for its own policies, but if a given policy causes no harm to the plaintiff there is no possible relief. Ray contends that Wexford has a no-MRI policy; Wexford denies this and maintains that its staff can order MRI scans when medically appropriate. It is unnecessary to decide what the firm's policy may be, since Ray has not established a constitutional problem with his treatment and...
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