Rayburn v. State
Decision Date | 09 September 1986 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 25 |
Citation | 495 So.2d 733 |
Parties | Tony RAYBURN v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Jimmy Cashion, Hamilton, and Hirsch Friedman, Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Victor Jackson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Tony Rayburn pleaded guilty to the offense of selling marijuana, a violation of § 20-2-70, Code of Alabama 1975, and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. He specifically reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion challenging the array of the grand jury which indicted him, on the basis that the master list from which the grand jury venire was drawn did not represent a "fair cross section" of the community as required by the United States Constitution and § 12-16-55, Code of Alabama 1975 (Supp.1985).
Evidence presented at the motion hearing established that the master list for Marion County is derived exclusively from Alabama Department of Public Safety records of persons holding drivers' licenses or non-drivers' identification cards. The names are computer-sorted by county according to the postal zip codes shown on the licenses and cards. Potential Marion County jurors whose mail is delivered by a post office outside of Marion County, and whose drivers' licenses or identification cards carry a zip code indicative of another county, were excluded from the master jury list for Marion County.
Rayburn's evidence showed that approximately 3500 citizens residing in the communities of Hodges, Vina, Phil Campbell, Haleville, Detroit, and Glen Allen were omitted from the jury pool and that these citizens represented over 20 percent of the qualified Marion County jurors. The State conceded that the manner in which the list was compiled may have excluded some qualified jurors, but maintained that the number omitted was 1448 rather than 3500. Even if the higher figure is correct, however, we find that no constitutional or statutory right of the defendant was abridged by the compilation of the master jury list from which the grand jurors who indicted him were chosen.
The "fair cross section" requirement of § 12-16-55, supra, is analogous to the requirement, derived from the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Williams v. State, 453 So.2d 367, 369 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), that "petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community," Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538, 95 S.Ct. 692, 702, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). 1 "In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process." Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979).
The practice of using drivers' licenses as the sole source for compiling a master jury list does not violate the "fair cross section" requirement of § 12-16-55, supra. Vaughn v. State, 485 So.2d 388 (Ala.Cr.App.1986); Lopez v. State, 415 So.2d 1204, 1209 (Ala.Cr.App.1982). Therefore, the particular issue in this case is whether the citizens of the six rural communities omitted from the jury list constitute a "distinctive group" in Marion County. Duren v. Missouri, supra; Williams v. State, supra.
A "distinctive" or "cognizable" group, for fair cross section analysis has been defined by the following criteria:
United States v. Guzman, 337 F.Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y.), affirmed, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937, 93 S.Ct. 1397, 35 L.Ed.2d 602 (1973).
See also United States v. Blair, 493 F.Supp. 398, 406 (D.Md. 1980), affirmed, 665 F.2d 500 (4th Cir.1981); United States v. Smith, 463 F.Supp. 680, 682 (E.D.Wis. 1979); United States v. Test, 399 F.Supp. 683, 689 (D.Colo.1975), affirmed, 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir.1976); Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.3d 93, 154 Cal.Rptr. 734, 737, 593 P.2d 595, 598 (1979); State v. Elbert, 121 N.H. 43, 424 A.2d 1147, 1149 (1981); State v. Price, 301 N.C. 437, 272 S.E.2d 103, 109 (1980). "Mere geographical imbalance [in a master jury list], absent evidence that an identifiable and cognizable segment of the community has been systematically excluded or underrepresented by reason of such imbalance, does not violate the statutory and constitutional requirement that the jury panel represent a 'fair cross section of the community.' " United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 582 n. 4 (10th Cir.1976); See also United States v. Young, 618 F.2d 1281, 1288 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 844, 101 S.Ct. 126, 66 L.Ed.2d 52 (1980); People v. Chesler, 91 Misc.2d 551, 398 N.Y.S.2d 320, 324 (Sup.Ct.1977). Residents of cities, towns, or villages do not, per se, constitute a cognizable class or a "distinctive group" in the absence of a showing that the city lines also serve to separate racial groups or economic classes to any significant extent. Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1336 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 1419, 47 L.Ed.2d 354 (1976); Chesler, supra.
The defendant has the burden, in a jury selection challenge, to prove a prima facie case, United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333, 1347 (10th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936, 94 S.Ct. 1934, 40 L.Ed.2d 286 (1974); United States v. Blair, 493 F.Supp. at 406; Williams, supra. The defendant here introduced no evidence that the residents of the excluded rural communities were defined by a similar attribute or shared a common viewpoint which could not have been adequately represented by other segments of Marion County. Compare Rubio, supra ( ); Price, supra ( ).
The defendant proved only that the group omitted from the jury rolls here was rural and was sizeable (20 percent of the eligible population). While citizens of rural areas probably have some shared attributes, "the common characteristics of the group do not rise to constitutional proportions." Cf. Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d at 1336 ( ). Furthermore, the size of the excluded group alone does not make it cognizable or "distinctive."...
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