Rayfield v. Grand Rapids, City of

• Decision Date: 17 July 2018
• Docket Number: CASE No. 1:17-cv-867
• Citation: 373 F.Supp.3d 962
• Parties: Weston RAYFIELD, Plaintiff, v. GRAND RAPIDS, CITY OF, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

373 F.Supp.3d 962

Weston RAYFIELD, Plaintiff,

v.GRAND RAPIDS, CITY OF, et al., Defendants.

CASE No. 1:17-cv-867

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed July 17, 2018

Collin Harold Nyeholt, Law Offices of Casey D. Conklin, PLC, Okemos, MI, for Plaintiff.

Timothy E. Eagle, Herman Daniel Hofman, Randall J. Groendyk, Varnum Riddering Schmidt & Howlett LLP, Lindsay Anne Bondy, Grand Rapids, City of (City Attorney), Grand Rapids, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT J. JONKER, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

On October 1, 2014 Defendants Eric Hornbacher and Craig Glowney arrested Plaintiff Weston Rayfield for violating a Personal Protection Order ("PPO"). The PPO required that Mr. Rayfield refrain from approaching or confronting Ms. Nancy Sawinski—Mr. Rayfield's neighbor in a two-unit residence.¹ Mr. Rayfield brought this § 1983 action on September 28, 2017 alleging that his arrest was made without probable cause; that he was detained too long without a hearing; and that these events ultimately led to his forcible eviction from his residence.

Defendants move to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 25 and 27). The Court heard argument on the motions on June 25, 2018, and took the matter under advisement. (ECF No. 38 ). For the reasons detailed below, the individual named defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and the claims against the remaining defendants fail for several procedural or substantive reasons. Therefore, the two motions to dismiss are GRANTED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND²

1. Mr. Rayfield Begins a Relationship with Ms. Smith

Mr. Rayfield describes himself as an accomplished artist, author, designer, and business consultant. (ECF No. 14, PageID.65). He is also a repeat participant in ArtPrize, an annual art competition in the city of Grand Rapids, Michigan. (Id. ). Several years before the events in question, Mr. Rayfield met non-party Susan Smith while at ArtPrize, and both a business and a romantic relationship between the two developed. Mr. Rayfield moved into one of Ms. Smith's rental properties located on Kendalwood Street in the city of Grand Rapids, and Ms. Smith resided with Mr. Rayfield off and on during their relationship. (Id. at PageID.66). The rental unit was one of two units in a detached residence (one upper and one lower unit). The occupant of the upper unit was non-party Nancy Sawinski.

2. Mr. Rayfield's Relationship with Ms. Smith Ends and Ms. Smith and Ms. Sawinski seek to Evict Mr. Rayfield from his Rental Unit.

By the summer of 2014, the relationship between Mr. Rayfield and Ms. Smith came to an end, and Ms. Smith sought to evict Mr. Rayfield from the Kendalwood address. Mr. Rayfield resisted the eviction because he believed that he was entitled to stay as compensation due for certain renovation work he had done. Ms. Smith initiated formal eviction proceedings by filing a complaint against Mr. Rayfield in the 63rd state district court on September 17, 2014. Mr. Rayfield was served with the complaint on September 29, 2014, and a hearing on the matter was set for October 2, 2014. (Id. at PageID.67-68).

Mr. Rayfield contends that while these formal proceedings were pending, Ms. Sawinski decided to help Ms. Smith evict him from the Kendalwood address through informal, and illegal, means. So, according to Mr. Rayfield, during ArtPrize 2014 Ms. Sawinski illegally removed artwork, tools, and supplies from a shared garage space. Then Ms. Sawinski took out a PPO against Mr. Rayfield. This too, Mr. Rayfield contends, was done in order to push him out of the rental unit. In fact, Mr. Rayfield claims that an August 2014 police report establishes that Ms. Sawinski admitted this. (Id. at PageID.67). Mr. Rayfield also says that the PPO was difficult to enforce, as a practical matter, and that the Grand Rapids Police had previously acknowledged this. (Id. ).

3. Mr. Rayfield is Arrested for Violating the PPO

The day before the scheduled hearing on the eviction proceedings, on October 1, 2014, Defendants Hornbacher and Glowney were called to the Kendalwood address over a dispute between Mr. Rayfield and Ms. Sawinski. Mr. Rayfield says the October 1, 2014 call was initiated by Ms. Sawinski and stemmed from an altercation between the two that pertained to the common space in the Kendalwood address's garage.

The Amended Complaint alleges that when the defendant officers arrived, Mr. Rayfield explained to the officers that he had gone to court to get the PPO lifted. He also told the officers he had videotaped the incident that led to the call, and he explained to them that the tape would show that Ms. Sawinski was the aggressor in the altercation and that he had not violated the PPO. (ECF No. 14, PageID.68). Mr. Rayfield avers the officers refused to view the video and proceeded to arrest him.

4. Mr. Rayfield is Transferred to the Custody of Kent County and Misses his Court Date on Eviction Proceedings.

According to the Amended Complaint, "[a]t some point after [Mr. Rayfield's] arrest," his custody was transferred from the Grand Rapids Police Department to Defendant Kent County under the terms of an agreement between the two municipalities. (ECF No. 14, PageID.69). Mr. Rayfield says that in total he was detained for approximately three days, until October 3, 2014, before he was released from custody. The length of his detention exceeded the 24 hours that Mr. Rayfield contends was the maximum time he could be detained under Michigan law before he would have to be brought before a court for a hearing on bond. The exact timing that Mr. Rayfield alleges he was in the custody of each municipality is not clear in the complaint. But regardless of who held him at any particular moment, Mr. Rayfield contends that both the city and the county are responsible.

As a result of his allegedly unlawful detention, Mr. Rayfield contends he missed the scheduled hearing on the eviction proceedings, leading to entry of a default judgment against him. He then sought to have the default set aside, but was unsuccessful in his attempts. Ultimately he was forcibly evicted from the Kendalwood rental unit, which Mr. Rayfield contends resulted in the loss of significant amounts of his personal property. (Id. at PageID.71).

Mr. Rayfield originally filed this action against Defendants City of Grand Rapids, the Grand Rapids Police Department, and the individual officers Hornbacher and Glowney on September 28, 2017.³ He also named "John Doe" defendants, but never updated them with any real persons. Mr. Rayfield filed an Amendment Complaint that for the first time added Kent County as a defendant on January 11, 2018.⁴ All defendants move to dismiss

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Detailed factual allegations are not necessary. The Federal Rules provide that a cause of action may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Put differently, if a plaintiff does "not nudge[ ] [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [his] complaint must be dismissed." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) :

Assessment of the facial sufficiency of the complaint must ordinarily be undertaken without resort to matters outside the pleadings. If a court does consider material outside the pleadings, the motion to dismiss must be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 and all parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all material pertinent to the motion. However, a court may consider exhibits attached to the complaint, public records, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to defendant's motion to dismiss, so long as they are referred to in the complaint and are central to the claims contained therein, without converting the motion to one for summary judgment

Gavitt v. Born , 835 F.3d 623, 640 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). Here, Mr. Rayfield has referred to and quoted from multiple documents in his Amended Complaint which have been provided by Defendants as exhibits in their motions to dismiss. Accordingly, these items are a proper basis for consideration on the Rule 12(b)(6) record.

DISCUSSION

1. Officers Hornbacher and Glowney are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on the False Arrest and Unlawful Detention Claims

In the first two counts of the Amended Complaint, Mr. Rayfield claims Defendants Hornbacher and Glowney violated § 1983 by arresting him without probable cause, and detaining him. Defendants respond by arguing they are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims. The Court agrees with Defendants.

a. Governing Law

42 U.S.C. § 1983 confers a private federal right of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws. Burnett v. Grattan , 468 U.S. 42, 44 n.3, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 82 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984) ; Stack v. Killian , 96 F.3d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1996). To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the defendant deprived him of this federal right under color of law. Jones v. Duncan , 840 F.2d 359, 360–61 (6th Cir. 1988) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that extends to government officials performing discretionary functions. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 815-16, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d...