Rayfield v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections

• Decision Date: 20 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 1233,1233
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: D. Stephen RAYFIELD, as Administratrix of the Estate of Billie Lewis Rayfield, Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, William D. Leeke, James E. Aikens, William C. Wallace, Robert L. Foulks, Herbert Davis, William Weston, Eugene R. Grant, Robert E. Reynolds, John E. Huss, Marion Beasley, Lee Cathcart, Rhett Jackson, Hugh L. Lackey, Charles R. Sanders, Jesse Pratt and Grady A. Wallace, Respondents. D. Stephen RAYFIELD, as Administratrix of the Estate of Evelyn R. Rayfield, Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, William D. Leeke, James E. Aikens, William C. Wallace, Robert L. Foulks, Herbert Davis, William Weston, Eugene R. Grant, Robert E. Reynolds, John E. Huss, Marion Beasley, Lee Cathcart, Rhett Jackson, Hugh L. Lackey, Charles R. Sanders, Jesse Pratt and Grady A. Wallace, Respondents. . Heard

Page 910

374 S.E.2d 910

297 S.C. 95

D. Stephen RAYFIELD, as Administratrix of the Estate of Billie Lewis Rayfield, Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, William D. Leeke, James E. Aikens, William C. Wallace, Robert L. Foulks, Herbert Davis, William Weston, Eugene R. Grant, Robert E.

Reynolds, John E. Huss, Marion Beasley, Lee Cathcart, Rhett

Jackson, Hugh L. Lackey, Charles R. Sanders, Jesse Pratt and

Grady A. Wallace, Respondents.

D. Stephen RAYFIELD, as Administratrix of the Estate of Evelyn R. Rayfield, Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, William D. Leeke, James E. Aikens, William C. Wallace, Robert L. Foulks, Herbert Davis, William Weston, Eugene R. Grant, Robert E.

Reynolds, John E. Huss, Marion Beasley, Lee Cathcart, Rhett

Jackson, Hugh L. Lackey, Charles R. Sanders, Jesse Pratt and

Grady A. Wallace, Respondents.

No. 1233.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Jan. 20, 1988.

Decided Oct. 31, 1988.

Charles B. Burnette, III, of Ridley, Ridley & Burnette, Rock Hill, for appellant.

Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., of Richardson, Plowden, Grier & Howser, and William H. Davidson, II, of Nauful & Ellis, Columbia, for respondents.

BELL, Judge:

The Administrator of the estates of Billie Lewis Rayfield and Evelyn R. Rayfield brought these wrongful death actions against the South Carolina Department of Corrections and the South Carolina Department of Parole and Community Corrections. The individual defendants are various officers and servants of the two departments. For convenience, we shall call them the "Corrections Officers" and the "Parole Officers."

The complaint alleges that the Rayfields came to their deaths at the hand of one Cecil Lucas shortly after the Department of Parole freed him from the custody of the Department of Corrections. It goes on to state that the Corrections Officers and the Parole Officers were guilty of negligent acts and omissions which led to Lucas's release. In turn, the release of Lucas is alleged to have caused the Rayfields' deaths. The defendants answered with a qualified general denial and also raised numerous affirmative defenses. After extensive discovery, the circuit court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Rayfields' Administrator appeals. We affirm.

The facts of the case are as follows.

Shortly after midnight on May 20, 1983, Lucas murdered the Rayfields in their home in Rock Hill, South Carolina. ¹ The crime was a random act of violence perpetrated when Lucas broke into the Rayfields' home to commit a robbery. The Rayfields did not know Lucas, nor did he know them.

At the time of the murders, Lucas had a prior criminal record. In 1982, Lucas, then a resident of the Rock Hill area, stole an automobile, which led to his arrest for grand larceny. While detained in the York County jail, he escaped, but was recaptured. He was tried and convicted for grand larceny and escape. The court sentenced him to two years in prison. In June 1982, Lucas was transferred to the Department of Corrections to serve his time. On a straight time basis, Lucas would have completed his sentence on July 1, 1984.

In May 1983, Lucas came before the Parole Board for consideration. After a hearing, the Board ordered his release on parole. As a condition of his release, Lucas had to live in West Columbia and work at the Midland Human Resources Warehouse. His housing and employment were prearranged as part of his parole agreement. Pursuant to the parole order, the Department of Corrections released him on May 19, 1983. Several hours later, he murdered the Rayfields.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Rayfields, the evidence shows that the Department of Corrections maintained records on Lucas dating back to 1973, when he was imprisoned for a prior offense. Those records reflected that Lucas was a habitual user of narcotic drugs; that he displayed violent behavior while he was under their influence; that he took overdoses of drugs; that he repeatedly attempted suicide; that he assaulted prison officers and other inmates; that he had attempted to escape; and that he had a poor disciplinary record in prison. The evidence also indicated that during his imprisonment, Lucas had liberal access to unlawful drugs. There is testimony that one correctional officer actually sold drugs to inmates. During the last four months before he was released, his prison records document no less than a dozen incidents involving drug use or possession. In summary, Lucas's prison records showed habitual drug use, violent behavior, and other criminal acts from 1973 right to the time he was paroled in 1983.

I.

The Administrator sues for negligence. His theory of liability is simple. It starts with the factual premise that the Parole Board had inadequate records when it decided Lucas should be paroled. This deficiency was twofold: (1) a number of negative reports in Lucas's prior prison records were not included in the case file given to the Board; and (2) some recent incidents of prison misconduct by Lucas were not in the file because the responsible Corrections Officers had not reported them. Because the records were incomplete, the Board paroled Lucas. Because Lucas was released, he had the opportunity to commit the murders. Because of his past conduct, it was foreseeable he would commit the murders. Because he did commit them, the Corrections and Parole Officers responsible for the inadequate records are liable for the Rayfields' deaths.

The Administrator agrees that to recover for negligence he must show (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by a negligent act or omission; and (3) damage proximately resulting from the breach. South Carolina Insurance Company v. James C. Greene & Co., 290 S.C. 171, 348 S.E.2d 617 (Ct.App.1987). The absence of any one of these elements renders the cause of action insufficient. South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 289 S.C. 373, 346 S.E.2d 324 (1986).

On the other hand, the Corrections and Parole Officers assert that (1) they owed no duty of care to the Rayfields; (2) if they did owe a duty, they did not breach it; and (3) if they did breach it, the breach was not the proximate cause of harm to the Rayfields, because it was not foreseeable the breach would lead to their deaths. In addition, the Officers assert that they are shielded from liability for any wrongdoing by (1) sovereign immunity; (2) official immunity; and (3) judicial immunity.

A.

We begin by addressing the issue of whether the Officers owed the Rayfields a duty of care with regard to the keeping and furnishing of records or the supervision of those activities.

Ordinarily, the common law imposes no duty on a person to act. An affirmative legal duty exists only if created by statute, contract, relationship, status, property interest, or some other special circumstance. It follows that a person usually incurs no liability for failure to take steps to benefit others or to protect them from harm not created by his own wrongful act. In other words, a person has no duty to protect another from harm inflicted by a third person. Sharpe v. South Carolina Dept. of Mental Health, 292 S.C. 11, 354 S.E.2d 778 (Ct.App.1987) (Bell, J., concurring). Thus, under the general common law rule, the Corrections and Parole Officers had no duty to protect the Rayfields, or anyone else, from being harmed by Lucas, once he was released.

The Administrator acknowledges these general principles. He maintains, however, that in this case certain statutes discussed below created duties to the Rayfields upon which an action for negligence will lie.

It is true, of course, that a statute may be the source of a duty owed in negligence. For example, a statute may require a railroad train to ring its bell and blow its whistle for a distance of 500 yards from the point where the railroad crosses a publicly travelled way until the engine has passed the crossing. If the train fails to sound these warnings, the railroad company may be liable in negligence for any proximately resulting harm to others. Why? Because the statute creates a special duty of care to those others.

These principles are well illustrated by the cases of Clifford v. Southern Railway, 87 S.C. 324, 69 S.E. 513 (1910), and Hutto v. Southern Railway, 100 S.C. 181, 84 S.E. 719 (1915).

In Clifford, Miss Mary Clifford, in the company of a friend, was driving her buggy along a public highway when she approached a railroad crossing. The highway crossed the tracks at a point where it was difficult to see or hear the approach of a train because of the banks through which the railroad was cut. As they approached the crossing, Miss Clifford and friend looked and listened for an approaching train. They saw and heard none, so they proceeded to cross. Just as the horse was on the track, a work train came upon the crossing, running backward at a high rate of speed. The horse, being frightened by the near approach of the engine, sprang forward and threw the buggy against a wagon standing on the roadside on the far side of the crossing. The buggy overturned, and the unfortunate Miss Clifford was thrown from it and injured. The train had failed to ring its bell and blow its whistle as it approached the crossing.

Miss Clifford sued the railroad company in an action for common law negligence. The trial judge instructed the jury that if the train failed to give the signals required by the statute, ² the railroad was guilty of negligence; and if that negligence was the proximate cause of Miss Clifford's injury, the railroad was liable for her damages. The jury found for Miss Clifford.

On appeal, the railroad company argued that in an action at common law it was error to charge that failure to signal, as required by the statute, was negligence. The company contended the signalling statute applied only if the action was brought under another statute which...