Raymond J. Wilkins, Claimant v. Blanchard-McDonald Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 06 May 1947
• Parties: RAYMOND J. WILKINS, CLAIMANT v. BLANCHARD-McDONALD LUMBER COMPANY ET AL
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

52 A.2d 781

115 Vt. 89

RAYMOND J. WILKINS, CLAIMANT v. BLANCHARD-McDONALD LUMBER COMPANY ET AL

Supreme Court of Vermont

May 6, 1947

February 1947.

Workmen's Compensation.

1. The findings of the Commissioner of Industrial Relations in cases within his jurisdiction stand like those of a referee or master in that if they are fairly and reasonably warranted by the evidence they are conclusive on appeal, having in this respect the same force as a special verdict of a jury.

2. In determining whether the findings by the Commissioner of Industrial Relations are supported by the evidence, the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable for their support, all uncertainty as to its weight being resolved against the excepting party.

3. Since the award of the Commissioner of Industrial Relations is the equivalent of a judgment of a trial court, the Supreme Court must construe doubtful findings so as to support it, if this may reasonably be done.

4. The Workmen's Compensation Act is to be construed liberally to accomplish the humane purpose for which it was passed.

5. The period of temporary total disability under the Workmen's Compensation Act need not be continuous and immediately following the injury, but may be broken up in continuing intervals.

APPEAL FROM AWARD by the Commissioner of Industrial Relations Howard E. Armstrong, Commissioner, to the Supreme Court Windsor County. Affirmed.

The award is affirmed, and the cause remanded to the Commissioner of Industrial Relations with direction that he ascertain and report the date upon which payments for specific benefits under P. L. 6527, XX, are to commence, and amend his award accordingly. To be certified.

Christopher A. Webber for the defendants.

Lawrence & O'Brien for the claimant.

Present: MOULTON, C. J., SHERBURNE, BUTTLES, STURTEVANT and JEFFORDS, JJ.

OPINION

MOULTON

This cause comes before us on exceptions taken on behalf of the employer and the insurance carrier to an award of compensation made by the Commissioner of Industrial Relations to the claimant and to the findings of fact upon which the award is based. The findings state that the claimant sustained a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; that he was thereby temporarily totally disabled for work for a period of fifty-three weeks, and that he has, as a result of his injury a fifty per cent permanent impairment of the physical function of his back. The Commissioner has awarded compensation at the rate of $ 15. a week for temporary total disability for a period of fifty-two weeks, commencing on the eighth day of such disability, and compensation at the same rate for permanent partial disability for a period of one hundred and thirty weeks as authorized by P. L. 6527, subdivision XX.

The first exception challenges the finding that the claimant had been totally disabled for work for a period of fifty-three weeks. The grounds for this exception are that the finding is without support by the evidence, or by the other findings, and that it is erroneous as a matter of law.

The findings of the Commissioner of Industrial Relations in cases within his jurisdiction stand like those of a referee or master in that if they are fairly and reasonably warranted by the evidence they are conclusive and binding in this court. Kelley's Dependents v. Hoosac Lumber Co., 95 Vt. 50, 55, 113 A. 818; Chamberlain v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 100 Vt. 284, 287, 137 A. 326; Hall v. Crystal Lake Ice Co., 109 Vt. 416, 420, 199 A. 252. In this respect they have the same force as a special verdict of a jury. Town of Grand Isle v. Kinney, 70 Vt. 381, 389, 41 A. 130; Harris v. Howard, 56 Vt. 695, 697. The evidence must be taken in the most favorable light for their support, all uncertainty as to its weight being resolved against the excepting party. Eastman v. Jacobs, 104 Vt. 536, 537, 162 A. 382; Reed v. Hendee, 100 Vt. 351, 355, 137 A. 329. Since the award of the Commissioner is the equivalent of a judgment of a trial court we must construe doubtful findings so as to support it, if this may reasonably be done. Montpelier v. Calais, 114 Vt. 5, 8, 39 A.2d 350; Campbell v. Ryan, 112 Vt. 238, 240, 22 A.2d 502; Manchester v. Townshend, 110 Vt. 136, 144, 2 A.2d 207; Reed v. Vermont Accident Ins. Co., 110 Vt. 501, 504, 9 A.2d 111; Reed v. Hendee, supra, 100 Vt. at p. 354, 137 A. 329.

According to the findings of fact, the claimant was unable to work from the day of the accident, November 20, 1941, until December 27 following, and then entered the employment of the Fellows Gear Shaper Company of Springfield, Vermont. He suffered pain in his back, had to have assistance in lifting objects and was compelled frequently to sit down and rest. After about six months the pain became so severe that he consulted and received treatment from three different physicians, but without relief, his condition becoming worse. A fourth physician fitted him with a sacro-iliac brace in September, 1943, and after this he went back to work for the Fellows Gear Shaper Company and remained with that concern until September 17, 1945, when he became employed by the Mack Moulding Company, of Arlington, Vermont, where he was working at the time of the hearing before the Commissioner, in October, 1946. During the period of his severe pain and treatment he was totally incapacitated for an aggregate of nine weeks, and lost about twenty days, because of his injury, while with the Mack Moulding Company. He testified that, while working for the Fellows Gear Shaper Company, he thought he lost an average of five days a month from inability to perform his duties.

It is contended that the foregoing facts and testimony do not sustain the ultimate finding of fifty-three weeks total disability. The argument is that the respective periods of inability to work between November 20 and December 27, 1941 the nine weeks lost during the claimant's subsequent treatment, and the twenty days lost at the Mack Moulding Company amount, in all, to seventeen weeks; and that the loss of five days a month at the Fellows Gear Shaper Company amounts to a total loss of two hundred and twenty-five days for the time in which the claimant was there employed and this would be thirty-two and one seventh weeks, which, added to the seventeen weeks previously mentioned, shows only a total of forty-nine and one seventh weeks. But there was evidence that...