Raymond v. Amada Co., Ltd.

• Decision Date: 12 April 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:94-CV-77-JTC.
• Citation: 925 F. Supp. 1572
• Parties: William A. RAYMOND, Plaintiff, v. AMADA CO., LTD., Amada Engineering & Service Co., and U.S. Amada, Ltd., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

925 F. Supp. 1572

William A. RAYMOND, Plaintiff, v. AMADA CO., LTD., Amada Engineering & Service Co., and U.S. Amada, Ltd., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:94-CV-77-JTC.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Newman Division.

April 12, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John G. Blackmon, Daniel Wayne Sigelman, Atlanta, GA, Michael G. Kam, Newman, GA, Steven W. Saccoccia, Edward H. Kellogg, Jr., Decatur, GA, for plaintiff.

William Franklin Long, III, Alan R. Perry, Jr., Atlanta, GA, for defendants.

ORDER

CAMP, District Judge.

This action is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment # 46 and Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Brief # 58. The Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief # 58 is DENIED.

I: FACTS

Plaintiff was employed by Hoshizaki America, Inc., in the sheet metal shop. Part of Plaintiff's job duties included operating and cleaning a "Fine Alpha Bender" machine. There were several of these machines in the sheet metal department.

The Fine Alpha Bender is an industrial machine used to bend sheets of metal to make ice machines. A "key switch" could turn off the power to the machine, freezing the machine in the position it last held. The rear of the machine contained a heavy metal arm called the "back gauge." The back gauge was lowered by pressing a button on the front of the machine which activated a hydraulic pump. When pressed, the button caused the back gauge arm to lower to its lowest position. The back gauge arms were not visible from the area where the button is depressed. Plaintiff claims that the moving parts of the machine which were visible from the front or during operation proceeded at a slow pace. He states that he had no knowledge of the rapidity with which the back gauge arms descended, but assumed them to move at the same pace as the moving parts which were visible. He never saw the back gauge arms while in motion.

Maintenance of the machine required that the area underneath the back gauge arms be cleaned out every three to four weeks. The arms were required to be in the raised position for cleaning under the arms. On July 10, 1992, near the end of the shift, Plaintiff was cleaning a Fine Alpha Bender. Plaintiff did not use the key switch to deactivate the machine. While he was behind the machine cleaning under the back gauge arms, another operator pressed the button lowering the back gauge arms. The machine then rapidly dropped the back gauge bar on Plaintiff's right hand. Plaintiff's hand was crushed and received severe injuries.

The "Fine Alpha Bender" machine was manufactured, sold and distributed by Defendants. Plaintiff originally brought this action in state court, but Defendants removed on diversity grounds. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges negligent failure to warn, and strict products liability based on design defects.

II: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on grounds of an open and obvious defect and assumption of the risk.

A) SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines the standard for summary judgment: Courts should grant summary judgment when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ... and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The substantive law applicable to the case determines which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "The district court should `resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant,' ... and draw `all justifiable inferences ... in his favor....'" United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir.1991). The court may not weigh conflicting evidence nor make credibility determinations. Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir.1993), rh'g denied, 16 F.3d 1233 (1994) (en banc).

As a general rule, "the party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). However, the movant's responsibility varies depending upon which party bears the burden of proof at trial on the issue in question.

For issues upon which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must affirmatively demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to each element of its claim on that legal issue. It must support its motion with credible evidence that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. If the moving party makes such a showing, it is entitled to summary judgment unless the non-moving party comes forward with significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of an issue of fact. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1437-38).

On the other hand, when the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's claim but may simply point out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case on the issue in question. Id. at 1115-16. Of course, the movant may offer evidence to affirmatively negate a material fact upon which the non-movant has the burden and which is essential to its claim. In either case, the non-movant may not rely upon allegations or denials in the pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The non-movant must respond with sufficient evidence to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial. Hammer v. Slater, 20 F.3d 1137, 1141 (11th Cir.1994) (citing Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116-17). The non-movant may do so either by pointing out evidence in the record which the movant overlooked or by coming forward with additional evidence. Id.

"The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is not genuine if it is unsupported by evidence, or if it is created by evidence that is "merely colorable" or is "not significantly probative." Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Similarly, a fact is not material unless it is identified by the controlling substantive law as an essential element of the non-moving party's case. Id., at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

B) Discussion

1) Open and Obvious Defect

Defendants argue that they are not liable because any danger from the back gauge arm of the Fine Alpha Bender was open and obvious. Plaintiff responds that the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994), has abrogated the open and obvious rule. Banks altered Georgia law in products liability cases by adopting a risk-utility analysis for design defects. Id., at 735-37, 450 S.E.2d 671.

This Court has recently held that the "open and obvious" doctrine no longer applies as an absolute defense after Banks. See Snow v. Bellamy Mfg., Civil Action No. 1:94-CV-957-JTC (N.D.Ga.) (Order of September 26, 1995).

Georgia law has long recognized the "open and obvious" or "patent danger" rule, whereby an injured party cannot recover if the danger from which he was injured is open and obvious. See, e.g., Weatherby v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 195 Ga.App. 169, 393 S.E.2d 64 (1990), Cert. Den.; Wilson v. Bicycle South, Inc., 915 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Weatherby and other Georgia cases). The open and obvious doctrine is not an affirmative defense, but in essence points out the failure of part of a plaintiff's case — the necessity to prove a latent defect. Kruk, Products Liability: Modern Status of Rule that There is No Liability for Patent or Obvious Dangers, 35 A.L.R.4th 861, § 2 at 865 hereinafter "Modern Patent Danger"; Darling, The Patent Danger Rule: An Analysis and a Survey of its Vitality, 29 Mercer L.Rev. 583, 583 & 601 n. 132 (1978) hereinafter "Patent Danger Rule"; see also Weatherby, 195 Ga.App. at 171, 393 S.E.2d 64. The open and obvious rule states "that a product is not defective if the absence of a safety device is open and obvious, and there is no duty to warn of an obvious danger." Id., at 170, 393 S.E.2d 64. Whether a danger is open and obvious depends on an "objective view of the product;" the user's perceptions are irrelevant. Id., at 171, 393 S.E.2d 64.

Banks does not directly address the open and obvious rule. See 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671. However, the Banks court specifically overruled previous Georgia product liability cases in which the alleged product defect presented an obvious danger to the user. Id., at 734, 450 S.E.2d 671. The Court has located no decisions of Georgia courts which discuss an open and obvious defect under a risk-utility analysis.¹ Thus, the Court must begin its analysis by examining the sources upon which the Banks court relied in reaching its decision.

Banks cited cases from New Jersey, Montana, and California in adopting its risk-utility analysis. 264 Ga. at 735-37, 450 S.E.2d 671. The common law of these jurisdictions uses obviousness of the defect as one factor in the risk-utility calculus. See Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 485 A.2d 305 (1984), superseded by statute as recognized in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239, 1253 (1990); Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal.App.3d 533, 132 Cal.Rptr. 605 (1976); Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 176 Mont. 123, 576 P.2d 725 (1978). Furthermore, the...