Rayner v. Lee

• Decision Date: 10 May 1870
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: John Rayner v. Frederick J. Lee

20 Mich. 384

John Rayner v. Frederick J. Lee

Supreme Court of Michigan

May 10, 1870

Heard May 5, 1870

Appeal in Chancery from Livingston Circuit.

The bill in this cause was filed by John Rayner, in the Circuit Court for the County of Livingston, in Chancery, against Frederick J. Lee, to quiet the complainant's title to Lot 54, on Crane & Brooks' plat of the village of Howell and to compel a release of the defendant's pretended title.

The defendant answered denying the validity of the complainant's title; claiming title in himself; First under a deed made to him by the Auditor General of the State based on a sale of the premises for taxes assessed thereon and returned as delinquent for the year 1861; Second, under a deed from Flavius J. B. Crane and wife to him, bearing date the 15th day of April, A.D. 1865; and Third, under a deed from the Marshal of the village of Howell to him, based on a sale of the premises for the non-payment of municipal taxes assessed thereon for the year 1863.

A replication was filed and proofs taken; and on the hearing the Court dismissed the bill. The complainant appeals to this Court.

Decree of the Court dismissing the bill reversed, and a decree entered in this Court in conformity to these views.

H. H. Harmon, for complainant.

A. Russell, for defendant.

OPINION

Cooley, J.

The bill in this case was filed to quiet the complainant's title to a certain village lot in Howell, which he had purchased in 1861, at Sheriff's sale, on an execution against Samuel S. Hunt. Hunt's title, it appears, was derived through John G. Peterson, who, on March 22, 1842, gave a deed of the lot to Wellington A. Glover. Glover immediately took possession under his deed, claiming title, and died in the occupancy of the lot the next year, and it was sold at probate sale by his administrator to Hezekiah Gates. From Gates to complainant there were a number of intermediate conveyances, and it appears that the grantee in each of them was in possession, either in person or by tenants. This showing would appear, therefore, to make out a good prima facie title in complainant, by possession, without attempting to trace the title back of Peterson, which he made no effort to do. The defendant, however, claims that the title is defective.

1. Because to several of the deeds the certificate of acknowledgment, so far as the wife of the grantor is concerned, is not in conformity to the statute, and consequently the deed was not entitled to record, and could not be proved by the record, as was done in the present case.

We have looked into these records, and find that in every case except one, the acknowledgment is sufficient as to the grantor. If defective as to the wife, the deed nevertheless passes the title subject to the contingent right of dower, and was properly recorded as the deed of the husband.-- Hall v. Redson, 10 Mich. 21.--The exceptional case is a deed given by the widow of Glover after a second marriage, by way of release of her dower right. It is immaterial to the present case whether that deed is valid or not; the complainant's title will not be affected by its invalidity, except to the extent of the right which it assumed the grantor to possess; and that,--the dower not appearing to have been assigned,--was a mere right in action and nothing more.-- Cox v. Jagger, 2 Cow. 651; Shield v. Batts, 28 Ky. 12, 5 J.J. Marsh. 12; Stewart v. Chadwick, 8 Iowa 463.

2. The second objection made to complainant's title is, that, although he shows an unbroken chain of conveyances extending back more than twenty years, he does not show continuous possession under them, and consequently cannot claim title by adverse possession.

This objection is based upon the facts, that on two or three occasions there were brief periods when the premises were not occupied at all, and that, at other times, there were persons in possession who are not distinctly shown to have occupied under any of the parties in complainant's chain of title.

We attach no importance to the breaks in the possession. The evidence would indicate that they were only brief intervals between the departure of one tenant and the entrance of another; not at all indicating an intention on the part of the claimant to abandon his right. At no time were the premises vacant for any considerable period, and the evidence shows that in every year since 1842, some one under whom the complainant claims has assumed to be the owner, and has exercised public and notorious acts of ownership. We cannot, therefore, find that the possession once acquired was ever abandoned, since the evidence all tends to the opposite conclusion. And on this point, the evidence given by the complainant that the land was continuously assessed on the township roll as resident lands, and the taxes paid by some one in complainant's chain of title, was not only admissible but very significant.

The objection that it does not distinctly appear, in the case of some of the occupants, that they derived possession from parties under whom complainant claims, has more plausibility but is nevertheless untenable. In every instance it appears that the occupant was in as tenant merely, and it is but a just...