Raynor v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc., DOCKET NO. 3:17–cv–00160–FDW–DSC
Decision Date | 07 June 2018 |
Docket Number | DOCKET NO. 3:17–cv–00160–FDW–DSC |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
Parties | E. Ray RAYNOR, Plaintiff, v. G4S SECURE SOLUTIONS (USA) INC., Defendant. |
William Everett Moore, Jr., Gray, Layton, Kersh, Solomon, Sigmon, Furr & Smith, PA, Gastonia, NC, for Plaintiff.
Joseph D. Budd, Brown Law LLP, Raleigh, NC, Mary Julia Franki, Pro Hac Vice, Kelly Elisabeth Eisenlohr–Moul, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.
Frank D. Whitney, Chief United States District JudgeTHIS MATTER is before the Court upon "Defendant G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc.'s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or for a New Trial" (Doc. No. 80), "Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Rule 50)" (Doc. No. 81), "Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and for Relief from Judgment or Order Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b), (e), and 60(b)" (Doc. No. 82), and "Plaintiff's Notice of Election of Remedies and Motion for Reasonable Attorney's Fees (and Allowable Costs) under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D–45 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37" (Doc. No. 83).1 These motions are now ripe for resolution.2 The Court addresses each motion but not necessarily in the order filed.
In the interests of judicial economy, the Court provides a general overview of the case here but summarizes the specific background relevant to the issues raised by the parties' motions in the analysis. This matter arises from the conclusion of Plaintiff E. Ray Raynor's ("Plaintiff") employment with Defendant in 2016. Defendant provides security services to clients, including risk consulting and investigations, systems integration, security software and technology, and security professionals. Defendant employed Plaintiff from July 16, 2001 until August 26, 2016. After a five day trial, the jury found in Defendant's favor on Plaintiff's claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and for wrongful discrimination on account of his age in violation of North Carolina public policy. (Doc. No. 74). The jury found in Plaintiff's favor on Plaintiff's claim to entitlement to a bonus and pay for vacation time, paid time off, and/or extended leave under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act ("NCWHA"). The jury awarded Plaintiff $6,434.80 for his bonus and $14,974.96 for his vacation time, paid time off, and/or extended leave. The jury did not find Plaintiff entitled to severance pay under the NCWHA. The jury found Defendant liable for punitive damages and awarded $64,347.52.
Pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party that moved for judgment as a matter of law at trial may renew the request for judgment as a matter of law within twenty-eight days of the entry of judgment. The moving party must have moved under Rule 50(a) for relief on similar grounds to move after trial under Rule 50(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 ; Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008). Failure to move under Rule 50(a) and "apprise the district court of the alleged insufficiency of ... [the] suit" results in waiver of that unraised insufficiency. Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1249 (4th Cir. 1996) ; see also Bridgetree, Inc. v. Red F. Mktg. LLC, No. 3:10-cv-00228-FDW-DSC, 2013 WL 443698, at *17 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2013).
A motion under Rule 50(b)"assesses whether the claim should succeed or fail because the evidence developed at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the claim." Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., 679 F.3d 146, 155 (4th Cir. 2012). When considering a Rule 50(b) motion, the court cannot reweigh the evidence or consider the credibility of the witness and must view "all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and draw all reasonable inferences in [the prevailing party's] favor." Konkel v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 165 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Thus, a jury's verdict will withstand a motion under Rule 50 unless the court "determines that the only conclusion a reasonable trier of fact could draw from the evidence is in favor of the moving party." Tools USA and Equip. Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 F.3d 654, 656–57 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Winant v. Bostic, 5 F.3d 767, 774 (4th Cir. 1993) ); see also Konkel, 165 F.3d at 279. The court may allow judgment on the verdict, order a new trial, or direct entry of judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
Rule 59(a) provides that courts may grant a new trial after a jury trial "for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). Under this standard, "[a] new trial will be granted if ‘(1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or (2) is based upon evidence which is false, or (3) will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict.’ " Cline v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). In making this determination, courts may "weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses." Id. (citation omitted).
"[E]rrors in admitting or excluding evidence" are not grounds for a new trial "[u]nless justice requires[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. "A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party and ... [the] party, on the record: timely objects or moves to strike; and states the specific grounds, unless it was apparent from the context." Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). An error is harmless and does not require a new trial if the court can "say ‘with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the errors.’ " Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 235 (4th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). By focusing on "whether the error itself had substantial influence[,]" this analysis allows the court to distinguish between harmless errors and those impacting a substantial right. Id.
"A judgment will be reversed for error in jury instructions ‘only if the error is determined to have been prejudicial, based on a review of the record as a whole.’ " Abraham v. County of Greenville, 237 F.3d 386, 393 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 938 (4th Cir. 1983) ). Specific jury instructions "may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge[,]" Noel v. Artson, 641 F.3d 580, 586 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 153 n. 10, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977) ), and "in light of the whole record[,]" Abraham, 237 F.3d at 393 (citation omitted).
"District courts are necessarily vested with a great deal of discretion in constructing the specific form and content of jury instructions." Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc., 50 F.3d 1291, 1293 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Price v. Glosson Motor Lines, Inc., 509 F.2d 1033, 1036 (4th Cir. 1975) ). "Instructions will be considered adequate if construed as a whole, and in light of the whole record, they adequately informed the jury of the controlling legal principles without misleading or confusing the jury to the prejudice of the [objecting] party." Gentry v. E.W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co. Inc., 816 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bunn v. Oldendorff Carriers GmbH & Co. KG, 723 F.3d 454, 468 (4th Cir. 2013) ).
A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment "may only be granted in three situations: ‘(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.’ " Mayfield v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Zinkand v. Brown, 478 F.3d 634, 637 (4th Cir. 2007) ). A Rule 59(e) motion "may not be used, however, to raise arguments which could have been raised prior to the issuance of the judgment, nor may they be used to argue a case under a novel legal theory that the party had the ability to address in the first instance." Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 485 n.5, 128 S.Ct. 2605.
In the exercise of its discretion, a district court may grant relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding, under Rule 60(b). McLawhorn v. John W. Daniel & Co., Inc., 924 F.2d 535, 538 (4th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). "To prevail, a party must demonstrate (1) timeliness, (2) a meritorious defense [or claim], (3) a lack of unfair prejudice to the opposing party, and (4) exceptional circumstances." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. AMH Roman Two NC, LLC, 859 F.3d 295, 299 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1993) ); see also Boyd v. Bulala, 905 F.2d 764, 769 (4th Cir. 1990) (); McLawhorn, 924 F.2d at 538 (holding remedy "is only to be invoked upon a showing of exceptional circumstances" (quoting Compton v. Alton Steamship Co., 608 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1979) ). Then, the party "must satisfy one of the six specific sections of Rule 60(b)." Wells Fargo Bank, 859 F.3d at 299 (quoting Dowell, 993 F.2d at 48 ). The specific reasons for relief under Rule 60(b) are:
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