Raynor v. United States, 6096

Citation89 F.2d 469
Decision Date11 May 1937
Docket Number6097.,No. 6096,6096
PartiesRAYNOR v. UNITED STATES. FOWLER v. SAME.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

George R. Jeffrey, of Indianapolis, Ind., and John Elliott Byrne, of Chicago, Ill., for appellants.

Val Nolan, U. S. Atty., and B. Howard Caughran and Paul A. Pfister, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of Indianapolis, Ind.

EVANS, Circuit Judge, and LINDLEY and BRIGGLE, District Judges.

BRIGGLE, District Judge.

The defendants were convicted in the District Court under the second count of an indictment charging that they "on or about the 9th day of October, 1936, after a distinctive paper had been adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States for the obligations and other securities of the United States, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly and feloniously have in their possession * * * similar paper adapted to the making of such obligations and other securities, without the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury or any other proper officer of the United States." Defendants prosecute separate appeals, but as the same questions are involved in each they will be disposed of in one opinion.

The section of the statute under which defendants were convicted (Cr.Code § 150, 18 U.S.C.A. § 264) consists of one sentence, separated into seven distinct subdivisions by semicolons. It is the last of these seven subdivisions with which we are here concerned, but for a better understanding the entire section is appended in the margin.* That portion here involved provides that "whoever shall have or retain in his control or possession, after a distinctive paper has been adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury for the obligations and other securities of the United States, any similar paper adapted to the making of any such obligation or other security, except under the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury or some other proper officer of the United States."

The pertinent facts are without substantial dispute and are as follows: The Secretary of the Treasury of the United States adopted in 1928 a distinctive paper for the printing of government obligations and securities, which was a high grade rag bond paper with short, fine, red and blue silk fibers impregnated. The silk fibers are placed in the pulp and distributed throughout the paper at the time of manufacture and are visible to the eye after the paper is manufactured and after the currency or obligations are printed. This distinctive paper is manufactured for the government under a contract with a private concern upon an ordinary paper machine. As it comes from the machine it is put under government guard, cut to the size specified, put in sealed cases and delivered under guard to Bureau of Printing and Engraving of the Treasury Department.

The defendants were found in possession of a small piece of paper, introduced in evidence as Government's Exhibit 3, which was a high grade bond paper, cut the size of ordinary currency and approximately the same color, weight, thickness and opacity as the "distinctive" government paper. It "rattled" very much the same on crushing, had small, irregular red and blue lines on the surface (apparently pencil marks) made to imitate the red and blue silk fibers of the genuine, but did not in fact contain red and blue silk fibers. The record contains proof of many other facts concerning the maneuvers of defendants in an attempt to either produce counterfeit currency or to swindle other persons who might be willing to join them in some such unlawful scheme, all of which may have been pertinent to another count of the indictment on which the court directed a verdict of not guilty, but have no direct bearing upon the count now before us and need not be detailed.

The decision turns upon the construction to be given the statute and particularly the word "similar" and the phrase "adapted to the making of any such obligation or other security." Appellants contend that the paper, the possession of which is prohibited by the statute is paper similar to the distinctive paper adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury and adapted to the making of genuine government obligations and securities. The District Attorney contends that the paper contemplated by the statute is paper, which if printed as a counterfeit obligation, would pass as currency in the general trade of the United States. Appellants assert that the test is not whether it would pass as currency in the general trade of the country, but whether it is in fact adapted to the making of valid government obligations.

Webster defines the word "similar" to mean "nearly corresponding, resembling in many respects, somewhat like." Winston's simplified dictionary says, "having a more or less marked resemblance or correspondence to one another or to something else, analogous, like but not exactly the same, of the same nature."

We think that "similar" does not import "exactly alike" but is to be understood in its usual and ordinary meaning of having a "marked resemblance" to, or of the same general nature, degree or order. Under the facts, therefore, we think a jury was justified in saying that the paper in question was similar to the genuine government paper. This, however, is not sufficient — it must also be "adapted to the making of any such obligation or other security."

The recognized authorities define the transitive verb adapt to mean, to make suitable; cause to conform; make fit by alteration. They define the adjective adaptable to mean, easily fitted or made suitable; easily and quickly able to conform to new or strange circumstances; that can be adapted or can easily adapt itself. The word "adapted" is not specifically defined in the authorities but is the past tense of the transitive verb "adapt." Following through the meaning of the verb it may be said to indicate that the object referred to has been made suitable; has been made to conform to; has been made fit by alteration.

The government urges a construction of the word "adapted" as though it means the same as "adaptable" — easily made suitable. It is to be noted, however, that Congress has chosen the word "adapted" and we cannot agree that it is synonymous with "adaptable." Rather, we think that it should be accorded its ordinary and commonly accepted meaning to connote something that has already been made fit for the purpose indicated. An application of this meaning indicates that Congress had in mind paper that had been made fit or suitable to the making of such obligations or securities and not paper that could be made fit or that was adaptable.

The words "such obligation or other security" are also involved. We think such words refer back to the genuine obligations and securities of the United States. These are the plain words of both the statute and the indictment. The defendants were not charged with possessing paper adapted to the making of counterfeit currency that might reasonably be expected to pass in the trade of the country, but were charged with possessing paper adapted to making genuine obligations of the United States. Under the facts the paper they possessed cannot be said to be adapted to the making of genuine obligations because it does not contain at least one feature of the "distinctive paper" adopted by the government, in that it contains no red and blue silk fibers. We think the argument of the District...

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3 cases
  • Johnson County Farm Bureau Co-op. Ass'n, Inc. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue
    • United States
    • Tax Court of Indiana
    • March 21, 1991
    ...determine the significance of the words used in a statute. United States v. Raynor (1938), 302 U.S. 540, 58 S.Ct. 353, 82 L.Ed. 413, rev'g 89 F.2d 469, cert. granted, 302 U.S. 667, 58 S.Ct. 21, 82 L.Ed. 514. Accordingly, "legislative intent as ascertained from an Act as a whole will prevail......
  • United States v. Raynor Same v. Fowler v. 12 8212 15, 1937
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • January 3, 1938
    ...accepted and its judgment affirmed. * Rehearing denied 303 U.S. 665, 58 S.Ct. 520, 82 L.Ed. —-. 1 18 U.S.C.A. § 264, 35 Stat. 1116. 2 7 Cir., 89 F.2d 469, certiorari granted 302 U.S. 667, 58 S.Ct. 21, 82 L.Ed. —-. 3 Counterfeiting increases in periods of commercial distress, unemployment, a......
  • Taylor v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6031.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • May 24, 1937
    ...... par value of $145,000 to them, to "assume and pay all additional United States income and excess profits taxes ultimately found to be due from T. ......

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