De La Raza v. Trump
| Decision Date | 25 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-cv-04980-PJH |
| Parties | LA CLINICA DE LA RAZA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Before the court is defendants Donald J. Trump, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service ("USCIS"), Chad Wolf,1 and Kenneth Cuccinelli's (collectively "defendants") motion to dismiss. The matter is fully briefed and suitable for decision without oral argument. Having read the parties' papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby rules as follows.
This case involves a challenge to the implementation of the final rule entitled "Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds," published by DHS on August 14, 2019. See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019) ("the Rule"). On October 10, 2018, DHS began the rulemaking process to create a new framework for the public charge assessment by publishing a Notice of ProposedRulemaking ("NPRM"). See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (Oct. 10, 2018). The Rule was originally set to become effective on October 15, 2019.
Publication of the Rule resulted in several complaints filed in federal district courts across the nation. Three such complaints were filed in the Northern District of California and related before this court. Dkt. 24. The present motion involves one of the three cases: La Clínica de la Raza, et al. v. Donald J. Trump, et al., Case No. 19-cv-04980-PJH, wherein the La Clínica De La Raza and California Primary Care Association (the two together are the "healthcare organizations"), Maternal and Child Health Access, Farmworker Justice, Council on American Islamic Relations-California, African Communities Together, Legal Aid Society of San Mateo County, Central American Resource Center, and Korean Resource Center (the "legal organizations" and, together with the healthcare organizations, the "organizational plaintiffs" or "plaintiffs") filed a first amended complaint ("FAC") asserting eight causes of action: (1) Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706—Contrary to Law; (2) Violation of APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706—Arbitrary and Capricious; (3) Violation of APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706—Arbitrary and Capricious; (4) Violation of APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706—Arbitrary and Capricious; (5) Violation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act ("FVRA"), 5 U.S.C. § 3345 et seq., and DHS Organic Statute, 6 U.S.C. § 113; (6) Violation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3345 et seq.; (7) Violation of the Fifth Amendment; and (8) Declaratory Judgment Act—Unlawfully Appointed Agency Director. Dkt. 161.
On October 11, 2019, this court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from applying the Rule to any person residing in the City and County of San Francisco, Santa Clara County, the States of California, Oregon, or Maine, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the District of Columbia. Dkt. 131 at 92. Defendants appealed the preliminary injunction on October 30, 2019. Dkt. 129. A three-judge panelof the Ninth Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction on December 5, 2019.2 Dkt. 141; see City & Cty. of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 944 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2019). On February 18, 2020, the Ninth Circuit panel voted to deny plaintiffs-appellees' motions for reconsideration and for rehearing en banc. Dkt. 153. Other district courts also issued preliminary injunctions prohibiting enforcement of the Rule, but these were ultimately stayed by the Supreme Court. See Dep't of Homeland Security v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020); Wolf v. Cook Cty., Illinois, 140 S. Ct. 681 (2020). Accordingly, the Rule went into effect on February 24, 2020. Most recently, the district court for the Southern District of New York enjoined the Rule as long as the government has declared a public health emergency related to COVID-19. See New York v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., — F. Supp. 3d —, Nos. 19 Civ. 7777 (GBD), 19 Civ. 7993 (GBD), 2020 WL 4347264, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2020).
A broader summary of the relevant statutory framework and the changes implemented by the Rule may be found in the court's preliminary injunction order. Dkt. 131 at 6-10. To briefly summarize here, DHS promulgated the Rule pursuant to its authority under the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq., which requires that all noncitizens seeking to be lawfully admitted into the United States or to become lawful permanent residents prove they are not inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1225(a). A noncitizen may be deemed inadmissible on any number of grounds, including that they are "likely at any time to become a public charge." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A). The statute directs immigration officials to form an opinion as to whether the applicant "is likely at any time to become a public charge." Id. In forming that opinion, immigration officers must consider "at a minimum" five statutorily-defined factors: (1) age; (2) health; (3) family status; (4) assets, resources, and financial status; (5) education and skills. 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(a)(4)(B)(i). The Rule would define the term "public charge" and set out various criteria for government officials as part of their totality of the circumstances determination.
A federal court may dismiss an action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Rule 12(h)(3) similarly provides that a court "must dismiss the action" if it "determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction" and the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction "rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted).
A jurisdictional challenge may be facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). When the attack is facial, the court determines whether the allegations contained in the complaint are sufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. Where the attack is factual, however, "the court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations." Id.
When resolving a factual dispute about its federal subject matter jurisdiction, a court may review extrinsic evidence beyond the complaint without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988) (); see also Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4 (1947) (). "Once the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction." Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at1039.
The Ninth Circuit has noted that "jurisdictional dismissals in cases premised on federal-question jurisdiction are exceptional, and must satisfy the requirements specified in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)." Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Sun Valley Gas., Inc. v. Ernst Enters., 711 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1983)). "In Bell, the Supreme Court determined that jurisdictional dismissals are warranted 'where the alleged claim under the constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction or where such claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.'" Id. (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83).
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires that a complaint include a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff fails to state a cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013).
While the court is to accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). The complaint must proffer sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 558-59 (2007).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Where dismissal is warranted, it is generally without prejudice, unless it is clear the complaint cannot be saved by any amendment. In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005).
Review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint, although the court can also consider...
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