Razdan v. Razdan

• Decision Date: 06 April 2017
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 16-0004 FC,1 CA-CV 16-0004 FC
• Parties: In re the Marriage of: ANSHUMAN RAZDAN, Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. GINA M. RAZDAN, Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

In re the Marriage of: ANSHUMAN RAZDAN, Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. GINA M. RAZDAN, Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0004 FC

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

April 6, 2017

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2011-094268

The Honorable Theodore Campagnolo, Judge

The Honorable Bethany G. Hicks, Retired Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Ober & Pekas, PLLC, Phoenix

By Kevin Koelbel

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant

The Murray Law Offices, Scottsdale

By Stanley D. Murray

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Jole E. Milburn, PLLC, Mesa

By Jole E. Milburn

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

JONES, Judge:

¶1 Gina Razdan (Wife) appeals the family court's order denying her motion for relief from judgment and her request for an award of attorneys' fees. Anshuman Razdan (Husband) cross-appeals the court's order granting Wife's petition to enforce the consent decree. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS¹ AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Husband petitioned for dissolution of his marriage to Wife in September 2011. Thereafter, Wife petitioned for temporary orders seeking, among other things, the exclusive possession of the marital residence (the 1st Street Home). At an evidentiary hearing in February 2012, the parties agreed to grant exclusive use of the 1st Street Home to Wife, subject to her paying the mortgage, property taxes, insurance, homeowners' association fees, and other financial obligations continuing to accrue thereon. The family court entered formal temporary orders consistent with the parties' agreement two months later.

¶3 In March 2012 and January 2013, Husband filed petitions for contempt, both alleging Wife had failed to pay the mortgage and related expenses on the 1st Street Home, thereby requiring Husband to cover those expenses in contravention of the parties' stipulation and the family court's temporary orders. The court denied Husband's request for a hearing to address the petitions and advised that any violation of the temporary orders would be addressed at the dissolution hearing.

¶4 In March 2013, the parties submitted an Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (ARFLP) 69 agreement (the Agreement) that "vacate[d] any contempt petitions, custody evaluation[s], or any otheritems currently in front of the court." Under the Agreement, Husband was awarded the 1st Street Home. The Agreement did not contain any provision requiring Wife to reimburse Husband for the expenses he had incurred because of her failure to maintain the payments on the 1st Street Home. Additionally, the Agreement required Husband to transfer $375,000 of retirement funds to Wife.

¶5 In May 2013, the family court incorporated the terms of the Agreement into a decree of dissolution. Regarding the 1st Street Home, Husband became responsible for the mortgage, insurance, property taxes, and homeowners' association dues "owing on the home effective April 1, 2013." Wife was awarded the parties' second residence (the Hidden View Home) and thereby became responsible for all financial obligations associated with the Hidden View Home as of April 1, 2013. The parties were instructed to execute quitclaim deeds necessary to transfer ownership of the two homes.

¶6 In June 2013, Husband filed a third petition for contempt alleging Wife had failed to maintain her financial obligations connected with the Hidden Valley Home in violation of the decree. Wife also moved to enforce the decree, alleging Husband had failed to transfer the $375,000 in retirement funds to her. In September 2013, the parties jointly moved, pursuant to ARFLP 72, for a family law master to resolve their disputes. The family court appointed a family law master (the Special Master).

¶7 The Special Master submitted a report to the family court that concluded "Husband should be awarded . . . reimbursement for all expenses he paid and incurred on Wife's behalf after entry of the Temporary Orders." Because he also found "any failure to bring Wife's retirement account balances to $375,000.00 . . . [wa]s directly attributable to her own conduct," the Special Master recommended Husband be relieved of his obligation to transfer the funds "if Wife's failure [to cooperate] continues beyond January 31, 2014." In an order signed and entered by the clerk on March 25, 2014, the court adopted the Special Master's recommendations regarding the retirement funds (the Retirement Order), and entered judgment in favor of Husband for $61,297.21 in expenses Husband paid on Wife's behalf after entry of the temporary orders (the Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment).

¶8 Fourteen months later, in May 2015, Wife moved, pursuant to ARFLP 85(C), for relief from the entire March 2014 judgment. Wife argued the Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment was void because it sought to enforce temporary orders that terminated when the decree was entered.

Wife also asserted Husband was obstructing the transfer of the retirement funds, and included this latter assertion in a separate petition to enforce the decree as well. The family court denied Wife's motion for relief as to the Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment but scheduled an evidentiary hearing to decide whether either party was deliberately obstructing the transfer of the retirement funds.

¶9 At the October 2015 evidentiary hearing, Wife argued that, because the family court did not enter judgment on all her claims in her May 2015 motion for relief and did not include ARFLP 78(B) language in the order partially denying that motion, the issues regarding the Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment were preserved for the evidentiary hearing. The court ordered Wife to file a brief "outlining the reasons why the [Mortgage Reimbursement] [J]udgment should be set aside." The court then took the pending petitions under advisement.

¶10 In its under advisement ruling, the family court found the March 2014 judgment was not void because "the basis for the [Mortgage Reimbursement] [J]udgment, even if it was based on temporary orders, was renewed by the parties in attempting to resolve matters post-decree." And because Wife did not file her motion for relief from the March 2014 judgment until May 2015, the court held her motion was untimely. As to the transfer of retirement funds, the court found the Retirement Order required Wife to assist with the funds transfer by January 31, 2014, a date which had already passed when the judgment was entered, and thereby created an impossible deadline for Wife to meet. The court therefore granted Wife's petition to enforce and ordered that Wife had until January 2016 to assist in the transfer of funds. Finally, even though the court found Husband had more financial resources than Wife, the court denied both parties' requests for attorneys' fees.

¶11 Wife timely appealed the family court's denial of her motion for relief and request for attorneys' fees. Husband timely cross-appealed the court's order extending the deadline for Wife to comply with the transfer of retirement funds. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1)² and -2101(A)(2). See In re Marriage of Dougall, 234 Ariz. 2, 5, ¶ 9 (App. 2013) (holding an order denying a motion for relief is appealable as a special order after final judgment) (citations omitted); Merrill v. Merrill, 230 Ariz. 369, 371-72, ¶¶ 5-6 (App. 2012) (considering an appeal from a ruling on a petition to enforcea dissolution decree's allocation of retirement benefits appealable under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2)).

DISCUSSION

I. Because the Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment is Not Void for Lack of Jurisdiction, the Court Properly Denied Wife's Rule 85 Motion as Untimely.

¶12 Wife first argues the family court's Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment is void because the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enforce provisions contained in temporary orders that terminated upon entry of the decree. And, if the Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment is void, Wife contends, her motion for relief from that judgment was not untimely and should have been granted. Although we generally review the denial of a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion, we review the court's subject matter jurisdiction and decisions on claims of void judgments de novo. See Duckstein v. Wolf, 230 Ariz. 227, 231, ¶ 8 (App. 2012) (citations omitted).

¶13 "[T]he court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order or proceeding [if] . . . the judgment is void." ARFLP 85(C)(1)(d). There is no time limit in which to challenge a void judgment. See Ruiz v. Lopez, 225 Ariz. 217, 222, ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (citing Martin v. Martin, 182 Ariz. 11, 14 (App. 1994)). A judgment or order is void if the court entering it lacked jurisdiction to render the particular judgment or order entered. Martin, 182 Ariz. at 15 (citing In re Adoption of Hadtrath, 121 Ariz. 606, 608 (1979)). "The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry; not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong." Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. S. Union Gas Co., 76 Ariz. 373, 381 (1954) (quoting Tube City Mining & Milling Co. v. Otterson, 16 Ariz. 305, 311 (1914)). In other words, jurisdiction and void judgments relate to a court's authority to perform or hear a certain action. See Cockerham v. Zikratch, 127 Ariz. 230, 234 (1980) (citing Wahl v. Round Valley Bank, 38 Ariz. 411, 417 (1931); Tube City, 16 Ariz. at 311; and then Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940)).

¶14 In dissolution proceedings, the family court's jurisdiction derives solely from statute.³ See Thomas v. Thomas, 220 Ariz. 290, 292, ¶ 8(App. 2009) (citations...