Read v. Baker

• Decision Date: 25 March 1977
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 4580.
• Citation: 430 F. Supp. 472
• Parties: Walter A. READ, Plaintiff, v. George P. BAKER et al., Trustees of the property of Penn Central Transportation Company, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

430 F. Supp. 472

Walter A. READ, Plaintiff, v. George P. BAKER et al., Trustees of the property of Penn Central Transportation Company, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 4580.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

March 25, 1977.

C. Waggaman Berl, Jr., Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.

Robert K. Payson and Donald J. Wolfe, Jr., of Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, Del., for defendants.

LATCHUM, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Walter Read has brought this diversity action against his former employer, the Penn Central Transportation Company,¹ seeking compensatory and punitive damages for alleged libel, slander, and wrongful discharge. Before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(b), F.R.Civ.P.

The plaintiff was a journeyman machinist for Penn Central in September, 1970, when he allegedly suffered a back injury which forced him to miss several months of work.² Later, upon notification that he had been formally discharged, the plaintiff brought suit against Penn Central in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (hereinafter the "Pennsylvania litigation") seeking compensatory damages for an employment-related injury.³ Trial in the Eastern District began on November 4, 1971. The transcript of that proceeding indicates that the defendant's lawyer alluded to expert witnesses who were expected to testify that a mental or emotional disorder was the source of the plaintiff's alleged physical infirmity.⁴ But before the experts actually testified the Court was informed that the parties had agreed to settle the case.⁵ Thus on November 17, 1971, the parties executed a settlement agreement in which the plaintiff, in consideration for fifteen thousand dollars, released Penn Central "from all claims, demands, actions and causes of action of every kind whatsoever."⁶

The plaintiff's complaint, filed in this court approximately fifteen months after the Pennsylvania litigation,⁷ contains three basic causes of action: (1) that Penn Central "wrongfully discharged" the plaintiff on February 11, 1971; (2) that statements made in court and published in the trial record of the Pennsylvania litigation concerning the plaintiff's mental health constitute slander and libel; and (3) that continuously from 1965 until 1971 Penn Central or its agents caused the plaintiff embarrassment and humiliation by releasing slanderous and libelous information to other employees of the defendant.

I. Defense of Release of All Three Claims.

Initially, the defendant argues that the plaintiff cannot prevail on any of the three foregoing causes of action by virtue of the general release executed upon settlement of the Pennsylvania litigation. However, in light of the rule that a trial court may grant summary judgment only "if it determines from its examination of the allegations in the pleadings and any other evidential sources available that no genuine issue as to a material fact remains for trial, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,"⁸ the Court cannot grant summary judgment where there are conflicting factual inferences with regard to the scope of the release intended by its signatories.⁹ Whether the release was meant to cover only the claims asserted in the Pennsylvania litigation for his injuries there alleged, or whether it was in satisfaction of any and all claims then existing that could be asserted against Penn Central is a genuine issue of material fact that renders summary disposition, on this ground, inappropriate.

II. Defense of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Wrongful Discharge Claim.

The defendant next contends that this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction over the cause of action based on wrongful discharge because plaintiff has failed to pursue the exclusive federal administrative remedy provided by the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.¹⁰ The Court agrees with this contention and, accordingly, will enter an order dismissing this aspect of the plaintiff's action pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3), F.R.Civ.P.

In 1972 the Supreme Court held that in the context of a discharge grievance under the RLA a claim of wrongful discharge must first be processed and settled before the Railroad Adjustment Board ("RAB"). Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 32 L.Ed.2d 95 (1972). In that case the plaintiff, a railroad employee in good standing, was injured in an automobile accident. After he allegedly had fully recovered and was physically able to resume his duties, the company refused to allow his return to work. The plaintiff brought suit against the company for wrongful discharge seeking damages consisting of past and future earnings and attorney's fees. Previously, Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.S. 630, 61 S.Ct. 754, 85 L.Ed. 1089 (1941) had held "that a railroad employee who elected to treat his employer's breach of the employment contract as a discharge was not required to resort to the remedies afforded under the Railway Labor Act for adjustment and arbitration of grievances, but was free to commence in state court an action based on state law for breach of contract." Andrews, supra, 406 U.S. at 321, 92 S.Ct. at 1564.

But Andrews overruled Moore on the ground that the "provision for arbitration of a discharge grievance, a minor dispute, is not a matter of voluntary agreement under the Railway Labor Act; the Act compels parties to arbitrate minor disputes before the National Railroad Adjustment Board established under the Act." Andrews, supra, 406 U.S. at 322, 92 S.Ct. at 1564, quoting Walker v. Southern R. Co., 385 U.S. 196, 198, 87 S.Ct. 365, 17 L.Ed.2d 294 (1966).

The plaintiff here claims that Penn Central refused to allow him to return to his job following an injury that forced him to miss several months of work. It is agreed by all, however, that the collective-bargaining agreement then in effect between the Pennsylvania Railroad Company (Penn Central) and the International Association of Machinists (plaintiff's union) established the procedure for determining whether an employee was physically able to return to work.¹¹ Thus, the source of the plaintiff's right not to be discharged or to treat a discharge as "wrongful" and entitling him to damages was the bargaining agreement between the union and his employer.¹²

In Andrews the Court observed that

"the pleadings indicate that the disagreement turns on the extent of respondent's obligation to restore petitioner to his regular duties following injury in an automobile accident. The existence and extent of such an obligation in a case such as this will depend on the interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement. Thus petitioner's claim, and respondent's disallowance of it, stem from differing interpretations of the collective-bargaining agreement.... His claim is therefore subject to the Railway Labor Act's requirement that it be submitted to the Board for adjustment." 406 U.S. at 324, 92 S.Ct. at 1565.

There is no dispute here that the plaintiff neither pursued his grievance adjustment remedies before a tribunal created by the machinists union collective-bargaining agreement nor sought to vindicate his alleged wrongful discharge before a division of the RAB.¹³ Accordingly, since arbitration of plaintiff's discharge grievance before the RAB is plaintiff's exclusive federal remedy,¹⁴ this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction over this claim and that claim will be dismissed. Haney v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 162 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 498 F.2d 987, 990 (1974); Tate v. Long Island R. Co., supra, 415 F.Supp. at 846; Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 413 F.Supp. 870, 872 (D.Mont.1976).

III. Defense That Statements Allegedly Libelous and Slanderous In Pennsylvania Litigation Were Absolutely Privileged.

The defendant also contends that the plaintiff's slander and libel claim based on statements by defendant's counsel during the Pennsylvania litigation and transcribed in the trial record is barred by an absolute privilege that attaches to statements and documents published in the course of judicial proceedings.

At the outset the Court recognizes that in diversity of citizenship cases, when deciding what law to apply, federal district courts must follow the rules prevailing in the states in which they sit. Day & Zimmermann v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 96 S.Ct. 167, 46 L.Ed.2d 3 (1975); Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). In a tort action brought in Delaware, its courts hold that the substantive rights of the parties are governed by the law of the place in which the tort takes place. Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del.Supr.1965); Lumb v. Cooper, 266 A.2d 196 (Del.Super.1970). Therefore, since the alleged publication of calumniatory matters was in connection with the Pennsylvania litigation, Delaware's conflict of laws rule requires the application of Pennsylvania law to the substantive issues in dispute.

Like many jurisdictions today, Pennsylvania law provides that statements, otherwise defamatory, by judges, counsel, parties and witnesses in connection with a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged if such statements are "pertinent, relevant and material to any issue" in the proceeding. Greenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 427 Pa. 511, 514, 235 A.2d 576, 578 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 907, 88 S.Ct. 2063, 20 L.Ed.2d 1366, rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 899, 89 S.Ct. 72, 21 L.Ed.2d 187 (1968); Kemper v. Fort, 219 Pa. 85, 67 A. 991 (1907).

The libel and slander which the plaintiff attributes to statements by defendant's attorney during the Pennsylvania litigation and transcribed in the trial record relating to the anticipated testimony of medical experts is barred by the absolute privilege protecting judicial proceedings. The expected testimony of the defendant's medical experts was clearly relevant and material to the issues of whether the plaintiff's injury was preexisting and the...