Reader's Digest Assn. v. Superior Court

• Citation: 208 Cal.Rptr. 137,37 Cal.3d 244,690 P.2d 610
• Decision Date: 19 November 1984
• Docket Number: S.F. 24686
• Parties: , 690 P.2d 610, 11 Media L. Rep. 1065 READER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Marin County, Respondent; SYNANON CHURCH et al., Real Parties in Interest.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 137

208 Cal.Rptr. 137

37 Cal.3d 244, 690 P.2d 610, 11 Media L. Rep. 1065

READER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Marin County, Respondent SYNANON CHURCH et al., Real Parties in Interest.

S.F. 24686.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Nov. 19, 1984.

Bourdette, Benjamin & Weill, Philip C. Bourdette and David R. Benjamin, Badger, for real parties in interest.

BROUSSARD, Acting Chief Justice.

Petitioners seek a writ of mandate to review a ruling of the Marin County Superior Court denying their motion for summary judgment.

Petitioners are codefendants in a suit for libel and related causes of action filed by The Synanon Church (Synanon) and Charles Dederich, its founder. Plaintiffs allege that they were defamed in an article written by David MacDonald, an employee of Reader's Digest, and published in the July 1981 edition of Reader's Digest. The article, entitled The Little Paper That Dared, describes how David and Cathy Mitchell, publishers of the Point Reyes Light, received the Pulitzer Prize for a series of reports and articles critical of Synanon. Although Synanon has filed other suits attacking the articles in the Point Reyes Light, the present action relates only to the Reader's Digest article.

David MacDonald based his article on the Mitchells' newspaper accounts, their subsequent book, The Light on Synanon, research papers on Synanon by Richard Ofshe, professor of sociology at the University of California, and conversations with Ofshe and the Mitchells. The Mitchells reviewed a draft of the article and suggested corrections, some of which Reader's Digest adopted.

The article recounts the history of Synanon from its inception in 1958 as a program for the rehabilitation of drug addicts. It notes the transformation of Synanon into an "alternative life-style community," claiming to be a church, and describes the Mitchells' accusation that local officials had been lax in enforcing the law against Synanon. The Reader's Digest article went on to charge that Synanon had adopted a policy of intimidation, and cited examples: an assault on a former member when he returned to visit the Synanon facility in west Marin County, and a similar attack on another member who left Synanon when he refused Dederich's orders to have a vasectomy. In particular, the article discussed the case of Paul Morantz, an attorney who had filed several suits against Synanon and who was bitten by a rattlesnake placed in his mailbox. Dederich and two Synanon members were charged with conspiracy to murder Morantz, and were subsequently convicted and sentenced.

Despite the numerous and serious charges stated in the article, plaintiffs' lawsuit singles out only three sentences as defamatory. These sentences read: "Synanon was founded in 1958 by Charles Dederich, a reformed alcoholic, to rehabilitate drug addicts. Though his spectacular claims of success were never proved, Dederich and Synanon attracted publicity and enough cash donations to start a string of addiction centers.... Since 1968, minimal drug rehabilitation work had been attempted; funds, however, were still solicited on that basis." Plaintiffs assert that the sentences communicate to the reader "that plaintiffs have not been and are not successful in rehabilitating drug addicts and other character-disordered persons and that plaintiffs' representations of success were fraudulently made to enrich themselves." ¹

Synanon's suit names Reader's Digest, MacDonald, Ofshe, and the Mitchells as defendants. Reader's Digest and MacDonald moved for summary judgment. They claim that Synanon and Dederich are "public figures" under the New York Times doctrine (New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686), and consequently that defendants can be liable only for a statement "made with 'actual malice'--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." (376 U.S. at pp. 279-280, 84 S.Ct. at pp. 725-726.) The moving defendants maintain that there is no triable issue of fact as to actual malice, and hence that they are entitled to summary judgment. The trial court stated that the issue was close, but denied the motion. Reader's Digest and MacDonald now seek review by writ of mandate. ² We will conclude that the trial court erred in denying the motion for summary judgment and that the writ of mandate should therefore issue.

I. Summary Judgment as a Favored Remedy in Defamation Actions.

Before addressing the merits of the ruling below, we first examine whether summary judgment is a favored or disfavored remedy in defamation cases. In 1978, this court in Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.3d 672, 150 Cal.Rptr. 258, 586 P.2d 572, said that "because unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights, speedy resolution of cases involving free speech is desirable. [Citing Dombrowski v. Pfister (1965) 380 U.S. 479, 486-487, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 1120-1121, 14 L.Ed.2d 22.] Therefore, summary judgment is a favored remedy, and upon such a motion the trial court must determine whether there is a sufficient showing of malice to warrant submission of that issue to the jury." (22 Cal.3d P. 685, 150 Cal.Rptr. 258, 586 P.2d 572.) Court of Appeal decisions echo this approving view of summary judgment, though cautioning that summary disposition is not appropriate if a triable issue of fact exists. (See Kaufman v. Fidelity Fed. S. & L. Assn. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 913, 920, 189 Cal.Rptr. 818; Bill v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1015, 187 Cal.Rptr. 625; Desert Sun Publishing Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 49, 53, 158 Cal.Rptr. 519; Fuhrman v. Risner (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 725, 730-731, 155 Cal.Rptr. 122.)

The United States Supreme Court, and in particular Chief Justice Burger, however, has implied that summary judgment may be unsuited for deciding issues of actual malice. In Hutchison v. Proxmire (1979) 443 U.S. 111, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411, the district court had granted summary judgment for defendant, noting that in deciding issues of actual malice "summary judgment might well be the rule rather than the exception." (P. 120, 99 S.Ct. at 2680.) While reversing the district court on other grounds (the high court held that plaintiff was not a public figure and thus the New York Times standard did not apply), the opinion commented in a footnote: "Considering the nuances of the issues raised here, we are constrained to express some doubt about the so-called 'rule'. The proof of 'actual malice' calls a defendant's state of mind into question, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition. [Citations.] In the present posture of the case, however, the propriety of dealing with such complex issues by summary judgment is not before us." (443 U.S. at p. 120, fn. 9, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2680, fn. 9.) ³

It is pointless to declare in the abstract that summary judgment is a favored or disfavored remedy. A more subtle analysis is required--one that explains how a motion for summary judgment should be decided in a defamation case under the New York Times test. The Fifth Circuit in Rebozo v. Washington Post Co. (1981) 637 F.2d 375, undertook such an analysis and reached the following conclusion: "[T]he standard of review of First Amendment defamation actions, as in all summary judgment cases, is whether the record, construed in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment has been entered, demonstrates there are genuine issues of fact which, if proven, would support a jury verdict for that party. Since, however, a jury verdict in a defamation case can only be supported when the actual malice is shown by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a preponderance of evidence as in most other cases, Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1258 (5th Cir.1980), the evidence and all the inferences which can reasonably be drawn from it must meet the higher standard." (P. 381.)

We recognize a potential chilling effect from protracted litigation as well as a public interest in resolving defamation cases promptly. That does not mean, however, that a court should grant summary judgment when there is a triable issue of fact as to actual malice. Instead, courts may give effect to these concerns regarding a potential chilling effect by finding no triable issues unless it appears that actual malice may be proved at trial by clear and convincing evidence--i.e., evidence sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find for the plaintiff and for an appellate court to determine that the resulting judgment 'does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression' (Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, supra, 104 S.Ct. 1949 at p. 1958. To this extent, therefore, summary judgment remains a "favored" remedy in defamation cases involving the issue of "actual malice" under the New York Times standard.

II. Synanon and Charles Dederich are "Public Figures".

Synanon and its founder, Dederich, first contest their status as "public figures," a question of law which is crucial to the proper resolution of their libel claim. ⁴ In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, the United States Supreme Court fundamentally altered judicial treatment of defamation actions by placing a significant constitutional limitation on the ability of a public official to recover damages for a defamatory falsehood. Emphasizing the importance of free expression and a free press under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court determined that "public officials" may not prevail in an action for libel relating to their official conduct absent proof that the statement was made with "actual malice." (See also St. Amant v. Thompson (1968) 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct....