Ready v. State, 1 Div. 162

Decision Date21 September 1990
Docket Number1 Div. 162
Citation574 So.2d 894
PartiesMancel Albert READY v. STATE
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Thomas M. Haas and N. Ruth Haas, Mobile, for appellant.

Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Andrew J. Segal, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

McMILLAN, Judge.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to 35 years' imprisonment in the State penitentiary. He was further ordered to pay a $10,000 fine.

The record indicates that the victim, Earl Couch, who was 67 years old at the time of the offense, testified, through the use of a video taped statement taken at a preliminary hearing, that on the morning in question, the appellant's accomplice knocked on the victim's door and asked to borrow some sugar. The victim testified that the accomplice had been a frequent visitor and that he invited the accomplice into his home. Subsequently, the appellant came to the victim's door, and his accomplice let him in. The victim stated that the appellant had also been in his home on several occasions. He stated that the three of them sat at his dining room table, having a casual conversation. The appellant was sitting across the table. Suddenly, the accomplice hit the victim on the forehead with his right hand. The victim lost consciousness. He stated that he next remembers hearing the telephone ringing and seeing blood all over the floor. His eyeglasses were lying on the floor, with no lenses in them. He was able to drive himself to the emergency room at the hospital. He stated that, since the incident, he has been unable to take care of himself.

The victim also identified a check, which was drawn on his account and signed with a signature purported to be his own. However, the victim stated that he had never signed the check, nor had he authorized anyone to sign the check on his behalf. He identified another check similarly signed and also testified that he had neither signed the check, nor authorized anyone to sign it. He stated that the checks had been stolen and that he had requested the bank to place a stop payment order on the checks contained in the checkbook from which they came.

The State also presented the testimony at trial of a physician, specializing in pulmonary disease, who had examined the victim prior to the offense, that at the time of that examination the victim had been able to get around and take care of himself. The physician testified that when he observed the victim after the offense, he was so grotesquely swollen that the physician initially believed that he was at the wrong patient's bed. He testified that, following the offense, the victim was evaluated for trauma to his head and it was determined that he had suffered a blood clot on his brain, as well as bruising on his brain due to a beating or an assault. He testified that the victim's skull was fractured and that he had multiple lacerations and torn skin over his body, especially in the area of his face and arms. At the time of trial, the victim had been diagnosed as having a seizure disorder, and the record indicates that prior to sentencing the victim had suffered a seizure, lapsed into a coma, and died.

The State also introduced into evidence a video taped confession by the appellant in which he stated that he and his accomplice had decided to go to the victim's house and kill him so that they would not have to worry about being caught with the previously stolen checks. He stated that they planned on killing the victim by beating him up with their fists. He stated that when he and his accomplice left the victim's house, after the beating, they believed the victim to be dead. He stated that as they walked down the street from the victim's house they discussed whether he was dead and whether they would be caught.

I

The appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying him youthful offender status. The appellant bases his argument on the fact that the evidence presented at his hearing for youthful offender status revealed that he was 18 years old at the time of the offense; that he had never been arrested before; that he was of lower than average intelligence; that he was easily led and was characterized as a follower; and that he had never personally struck the victim in the case. The appellant further alleges that the trial court's reasons for refusing the youthful offender treatment were that it believed the appellant to have a "wily" nature and that the appellant had given different versions of the offense. Thus, the appellant argues that the trial court's decision was arbitrary.

The record reveals that the hearing on the appellant's motion for youthful offender status took place over a five-day period and included the testimony of 12 witnesses, 7 of which were witnesses for the appellant. Thereafter, the trial court denied the appellant's youthful offender status; stating the case action summary:

"The court, having considered all factors due consideration under the Youthful Offender Act and having thereupon determined that youthful offender status is inappropriate, the court DENIES the petition for treatment as a youthful offender."

Thereafter, the appellant filed a motion to reconsider the decision on youthful offender status, and the trial court again denied the motion, stating:

"... I have thought long and hard about the youthful offender treatment and when I consider all the areas and factors that would determine whether or not it's appropriate I just don't see that it's designed for this particular defendant and this particular offense. And accordingly, youthful offender treatment is denied."

The trial court indicated that it considered all of the evidence presented before making its decision. He stated, following the hearing on the appellant's motion, that "I've gotten to know [the appellant] pretty well through these hearings and he has seemed quite wily and he's one of the less forthright witnesses that I've seen." There is no indication that the trial court's decision was arbitrary. A trial court is not required to state its reasons for denying youthful offender status, as long as there is an indication that the statutory requirements of investigation and examination were met. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). "Almost absolute discretion is vested in the trial judge by the Youthful Offender Act to grant or deny youthful offender status after an appropriate investigation is conducted." Fairchild v. State, 505 So.2d 1265, 1268 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (citing Morgan v. State, 363 So.2d 1013, 1015 (Ala.Cr.App.1978)). Moreover, much of the necessity of such discretion being vested in the trial judge lies in the fact that it is he who has the opportunity to "personally observe the youth." McClendon v. State, 341 So.2d 174, 175 (Ala.Cr.App.1976), cert. quashed, 341 So.2d 178 (Ala.1977). Thus, the trial judge's personal observation of the youth may properly be a factor in his ultimate determination concerning the request for youthful offender status. We find no indication of abuse of discretion by the trial court in this matter.

II

The appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting his statement into evidence, because the statement was involuntary. Moreover, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in telling the jury that the issue of voluntariness had been ruled on.

The evidence presented at trial concerning the voluntariness of the appellant's confession was conflicting. The appellant presented evidence that he was "scared to death" and that his uncle, who was present at the police annex when the appellant was being interrogated, overheard the interrogating officer yelling and cursing at the appellant and making such statements as, "[I]f I get a chance, I'm going to fry these little bastards." The appellant's uncle further testified that the appellant was upset and crying. He also testified that the officer "was going back and forth" between the appellant and his accomplice, and yelling at the appellant that "you need to tell us the truth." Thereafter, the appellant's uncle stated that the officer told the appellant that his accomplice was "spilling his guts" and blaming everything on the appellant so that he had better tell the truth. 1 The appellant's uncle then testified that he went to the appellant and told him that he needed to tell the truth. He stated that the appellant then began to admit his role in the series of events.

The State presented the testimony of the interrogating officer who stated that the appellant was neither hysterical nor crying during the interrogation. He testified that he did not harass or curse at the appellant. The interrogating officer denied ever saying that he was going to "fry these little bastards." He testified that he had probably positioned the appellant and his accomplice so that they were face-to-face in the interrogating room, but stated that this was not until the interviews were completed and was in the course of filling out forms necessary to book them into jail. A detective, who was also present at the police annex when the appellant was questioned, testified that he never heard any profanity used toward the appellant and that he never heard the interrogating officer make a threatening statement. He further testified that the appellant was never harassed or threatened in his presence and that the appellant was not crying. He stated that the appellant appeared to be rational and coherent at the time of questioning. He testified that, just prior to the appellant's making the incriminating statement, the officers told the appellant that "we [the officers] wanted the truth." He further stated:

"We wanted the truth as to the motive for them going down to that house. And we discussed that with him. We did not promise him anything. All we did was go in there and tell him that [the accomplice] had...

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  • Cardenas v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • May 23, 1991
    ...a police officer.1 As an illustration, see the video tape preliminary hearing evidence documented like a deposition in Ready v. State, 574 So.2d 894 (Ala.Cr.App.1990). The prosecution took no chances about the injured victim's inability to attend the trial. The victim could not attend and t......
  • Harrison v. State
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    ...to the jury that it was to determine what weight or credibility, if any, to give to the appellant's statements. See Ready v. State, 574 So.2d 894 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). For these reasons, we do not find that there was any reversible error with regard to the trial court's comments. Therefore, ......
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    ...informed the jury of its role in determining what weight should be given the confession.' 674 So.2d at 1325. See also Ready v. State, 574 So.2d 894, 900 (Ala.Cr.App.1990) ("Because the trial court clearly informed the jury that they were to make the ultimate determination as to whether the ......
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