Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 December 1942
• Docket Number: No. 7945.,7945.
• Parties: REAGAN v. GUARDIAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

166 S.W.2d 909

REAGAN v. GUARDIAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 7945.

Supreme Court of Texas.

December 9, 1942.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Second Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by C. R. Reagan against the Guardian Life Insurance Company to recover damages for alleged libel. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. To review a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, 155 S.W.2d 950, reversing the judgment of the trial court and rendering judgment for defendant, the plaintiff brings error.

Judgment affirmed.

W. A. Hawkins, Clark, Craik, Burns & Weddell, and J. Harold Craik, all of Fort Worth, for plaintiff in error.

J. Alex Blakeley, Chrestman, Brundidge, Fountain, Elliott & Bateman and O. D. Brundidge, all of Dallas, for defendant in error.

CRITZ, Justice.

This is a libel action. It was filed in the District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, by C. R. Reagan against the Guardian Life Insurance Company, a corporation. Trial in the district court resulted in a judgment for Reagan against the Insurance Company for $2,500. The jury found actual damages for Reagan in the sum of $10,000, but the trial court required a remittitur of $7,500. The remittitur was filed, and judgment was entered for $2,500. On appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals at Fort Worth this judgment was reversed and judgment rendered for the Insurance Company. 155 S.W.2d 950, 952. Reagan brings error. We will hereinafter refer to Reagan as plaintiff, and to the Guardian Life Insurance Company as defendant.

Plaintiff's petition alleges that the defendant circulated a libelous statement, by filing with the Board of Insurance Commissioners of this State the following written statement, purporting to have been signed by one Florence Aquilar:

                       "Fort Worth, Texas, Sept. 16-38
                

"To Whom It May Concern:

"On Thursday, Sept. 15 about 3 P. M., C. R. Reagan, who used to collect our insurance with the Guardian Life Ins. Co. several years ago, came to my house and told me he came to collect for our insurance. He said that he had left Mr. R. L. Brewer, (our present collector for the Guardian Life Ins. Co.) at the office but that he was here to collect for the Guardian Life Ins. Co.

"I told him he would have to come when my husband was home, and he said he would come back at 5-30. He has not returned.

"I have stated the truth and have done so of my own free will.

                                     her
                  "(Signed) Florence (×) Aquilar
                                     mark
                         "210 E. First St., Fort Worth
                "Witness
                  "G. J. Nelligan
                  "Roy L. Brewer."
                

Plaintiff's petition alleges that the above written statement was never signed by Florence Aquilar, but was and is a pure forgery. It is also alleged that Florence Aquilar not only did not sign the above statement, but that she did not authorize it to be signed for her. Plaintiff contends that the defendant circulated the above-quoted written statement by one of its agents filing it with the Board of Insurance Commissioners. It is alleged that the Insurance Company knew the statements made in the instrument were false, and knew that it was not signed by Florence Aquilar. The petition alleges damages, actual and exemplary.

The defendant answered by general demurrer and numerous special exceptions, general denial, and several special answers. We deem it only necessary to say that the defendant, both by demurrer and by special answer, pleaded that the act of its agent in filing the above instrument with the Board of Insurance Commissioners was absolutely privileged.

The evidence shows that the plaintiff had been employed by the defendant as a soliciting and collecting agent at Fort Worth, but that such employment had fully terminated shortly before the time the events here involved transpired.

R. L. Brewer, who was a soliciting and collecting agent for the defendant at Fort Worth, testified that on September 15, 1938, he went to Florence Aquilar's house in Fort Worth to collect a life insurance premium for the defendant. Brewer testified that on this occasion Florence Aquilar told him that the plaintiff had just been to her house, trying to collect the insurance premium due the defendant, but that she did not pay it to him. The next morning, September 16, 1938, Brewer returned to Florence Aquilar's house, accompanied by one G. J. Nelligan. Nelligan was an agent of the defendant at Fort Worth. We are not fully apprised as to what Nelligan's authority or duties were. It is shown that he acted as the district manager of defendant's Fort Worth office. We judge from the evidence that he had some control over the defendant's soliciting and collecting agents in Tarrant County. While at Florence Aquilar's house, the written instrument above set out was written by Nelligan, including the signature. Brewer and Nelligan both testified that the instrument was read over to Florence Aquilar, and that she signed it by making her mark, as appears from the instrument. Florence Aquilar denied ever having signed the instrument, and further denied that she had ever made any statement to either Nelligan or Brewer, to the effect that the plaintiff had been to her house, attempting to collect any money due the defendant company, after he had ceased to be its agent.

After the above instrument was written, it was mailed to the defendant at its home office in Dallas, Texas. For the purposes of this opinion we assume that Nelligan mailed it. When the instrument reached the home office, it came into the possession of Walter E. Rose. Rose was then employed by the defendant, at its home office at Dallas, as its agency director. His duties were to develop defendant's agency department. The agency department had charge of the sale of life insurance, the collection of premiums, and the care of such details as might come up. After the above instrument came into his possession, Rose carried it to Austin, and delivered it to the Board of Insurance Commissioners. At the time the instrument was filed with the Board of Insurance Commissioners, plaintiff was employed by another company. We assume for the purposes of this opinion that the filing of the instrument with the Board caused plaintiff to lose his employment, and caused him damages in the sum awarded by the trial court.

The case was submitted to a jury on special issues in the district court. In response to such issues the jury in effect found:

(1) That Florence Aquilar did not make the statement to Mr. Nelligan set forth in the written statement above.

(2) That plaintiff suffered actual damages in the sum of $10,000, which damages directly flowed from the publication of the above statement.

(3) That Florence Aquilar did not sign the statement above mentioned, by placing her mark thereon.

(4) That the filing of the statement set forth above with the Board of Insurance Commissioners was actuated by malice towards the plaintiff.

(5) That the filing of the statement above mentioned with the Board of Insurance Commissioners was not privileged.

(6) That the filing of the statement above set forth with the Board of Insurance Commissioners was not conditionally privileged.

There is evidence in this record showing that Florence Aquilar did not make the statement with reference to plaintiff contained in the above-quoted instrument, either orally or in writing. In this connection, there is evidence to show that she did not sign such instrument, either by writing her name thereon or by making her mark. There is also evidence to the contrary. From the verdict of the jury we must conclude that it was a pure forgery. We must further conclude that G. J. Nelligan and R. L. Brewer knew that it was a forgery. So far as is pointed out to us, no evidence was offered before the jury showing, or tending to show, that W. E. Rose, who filed the above statement with the Board of Insurance Commissioners, had any actual knowledge that it was forged, or that he had any reason to suspicion such fact. Of course, the findings of the jury that the instrument was not privileged or conditionally privileged were findings on pure questions of law. They are, therefore, of no effect.

As shown by the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, plaintiff contends that he was libeled by the act of the defendant's agent in circulating the above forged and untrue instrument. It is contended that the...