Reagan v. Marathon Oil Company

Decision Date27 June 2001
Docket NumberNo. 10-99-152-CV,10-99-152-CV
Citation50 S.W.3d 70
Parties(Tex.App.-Waco 2001) DOYLE D. REAGAN, Appellant v. MARATHON OIL COMPANY, ET AL., Appellees
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Bill Youngkin, Ctlin, Bryan, Stacy & Dillard, Bryan, for appellant.

Albert Witcher, Keith C. Cameron, Naman, Howell, Smith & Lee, P.C., Waco, Kenneth P. Dougherty, Dougherty Law Firm, P.C., Tyler, Bryan F. Russ, Jr., Palmos, Russ, McCullough & Russ, L.L.P., Hearne, for appellee.

Before Chief Justice Davis, Justice Vance, and Justice Gray

OPINION

REX D. DAVIS, Chief Justice

Doyle Reagan filed a declaratory judgment action against Marathon Oil Company, Brounkowski Oil and Gas Partnership, Ltd., Horace and Evelyn Bumpurs, and James Bumpurs to obtain a determination of the parties' respective rights to the minerals in two narrow tracts of land located under Texas Highway 7 in Robertson County. The parties (with the exception of James Bumpurs) filed competing motions for partial summary judgment. The court granted the defendants' motions and denied Reagan's motion, decreeing that Reagan take nothing by his suit. Several months later, the court signed a separate order granting the defendants their appellate attorney's fees but denying trial attorney's fees. In the attorney's fee order, the court included a Mother Hubbard clause to dispose of any remaining issues and make its judgment final.

Reagan claims in three points that the court erred in granting the defendants' summary judgment motions and denying his own because: (1) the plain language of the deeds at issue demonstrates that he retained ownership of the minerals in question and thus the strip-and-gore doctrine should not apply; (2) the judgment effectively deprives the State of its title to the surface estate of the property in question without the State's joinder or consent; and (3) Appellees (with the exception of James Bumpurs) judicially admitted that Reagan had reserved ownership of the minerals to himself. Reagan argues in a fourth point that the court abused its discretion by awarding the defendants their appellate attorney's fees but not their trial attorney's fees because "such an award is calculated to sway [him] from appealing the trial court's ruling."

BACKGROUND

Prior to the conveyances in question, Reagan owned a series of adjoining tracts of land in the Maria de la Concepcion Marquez Eleven Leagues Survey, Abstract No. 25 in Robertson County. An undivided one-half interest in the minerals in the western portion of this acreage had been conveyed to others by Reagan's predecessors in title.1 In 1949, Reagan conveyed a 14.116-acre tract of land to the State for construction of Highway 7, reserving the oil, gas and sulphur in the property to himself. Reagan conveyed 55.25 acres to Horace Bumpurs and his wife Evelyn in 1957 without reserving any mineral interests. This tract lies on the northern side of Highway 7, and the legal description in the conveyance expressly follows "the north line" of the highway. 47.679 of these acres are involved in the current dispute. These 47.679 acres comprise Unit Tract Nos. 5, 6, and 9 on a well unit plat prepared for Marathon Oil Company ("Marathon").

The Marathon plat appears as follows:

[Tabular or Graphical Material Omitted]

In 1958, Reagan conveyed to the State a 3.018-acre tract of land along the southern boundary of the previously-conveyed 14.116-acre tract. Reagan again reserved the oil, gas and sulphur in this property to himself. The 14.116-acre tract and the 3.018-acre tract which Reagan conveyed to the State traverse the disputed properties as follows [Tabular or Graphical Material Omitted]

Reagan and his wife Frances conveyed a 304.22-acre tract on the southern side of Highway 7 to Emil Kmiec and Esidor Brounkowski in 1970, purporting to reserve an undivided one-half mineral interest for life with right of survivorship. Similar to the Bumpurs conveyance, the legal description in the deed to Kmiec and Brounkowski expressly follows concrete highway markers set along the southern boundaries of the tracts Reagan conveyed to the State for Highway 7. Brounkowski Oil and Gas Partnership, Ltd. ("Brounkowski Oil") presently owns this 304.22-acre tract. 139.177 acres from this tract are involved in the present dispute. These 139.177 acres comprise Unit Tract Nos. 1, 2, 3, 10, and 11 on the Marathon plat.

Reagan and his wife Frances conveyed 1.026 acres to James Bumpurs and his wife Betty Jean in 1978. The legal description in this deed, like the conveyance to Horace and Evelyn Bumpurs, expressly follows "the south line" of Highway 7. The Reagans did not reserve any mineral interests in this conveyance. The Marathon plat designates this tract as Unit Tract No. 4.2

In 1993, the Brounkowskis, Horace and Evelyn Bumpurs, and James and Betty Jean Bumpurs executed mineral leases in favor of Marathon.3 In April 1993, Reagan executed a document ratifying the Brounkowski lease. Marathon pooled these tracts with an adjoining tract to form the Brounkowski No. 1 Gas Unit. Marathon drilled a well in this unit which began to produce gas in November 1995.

After Marathon refused to pay Reagan royalties for his claimed interest in the minerals in and under the 17.134 acres he conveyed to the State, Reagan instituted this lawsuit to obtain a declaration of his ownership interest in the minerals located in and under the State's 17.134 acres. Marathon, Brounkowski Oil, Horace and Evelyn Bumpurs, and James Bumpurs all filed counterclaims for declaratory relief asserting that Brounkowski Oil and the Bumpurses own the disputed minerals.

Horace and Evelyn Bumpurs filed a motion for partial summary judgment alleging that Reagan's 1957 conveyance to them constituted a conveyance of the minerals to the center of Highway 7 as a matter of law because Reagan did not reserve any mineral interests to himself in the conveyance. Brounkowski Oil and Marathon filed similar motions alleging that the 1957 conveyance to the Bumpurses and the 1970 conveyance to Kmiec and Brounkowski conveyed the minerals to the center of Highway 7 as a matter of law because Reagan did not reserve any mineral interests in the conveyance to Horace and Evelyn Bumpurs and his attempted reservation in the Kmiec/Brounkowski conveyance is ineffective because of the undivided mineral interests conveyed by his predecessors in title.

Reagan then filed a motion for partial summary judgment alleging that he is entitled to judgment declaring his ownership of the minerals in question as a matter of law because he expressly reserved the minerals in his deeds to the State and the legal descriptions of the tracts conveyed to Horace and Eugene Bumpurs and Kmiec/Brounkowski do not overlap the legal descriptions of the tracts conveyed to the State.

In a January 1999 order, the court granted the motions for partial summary judgment filed by Marathon, Brounkowski Oil, and Horace and Evelyn Bumpurs.4 The court denied Reagan's motion. The court decreed that Reagan take nothing by his suit and rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants "on all issues" except attorney's fees and court costs. The court subsequently received evidence from the parties on attorney's fees. The court signed an order in May 1999 denying defendants' trial attorney's fees and granting them appellate attorney's fees. The court denied Reagan's request for attorney's fees and concluded the order with a Mother Hubbard clause.

Although a "Mother Hubbard" clause does not necessarily make a judgment final, we treat such a judgment as final for purposes of appeal if it "actually disposes of every pending claim and party." Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001). The partial summary judgment in this case expressly adjudicates the merits of every party's claim regarding the title to the disputed minerals and expressly disposes of "all issues except the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs of court." The attorney's fee order expressly disposes of every party's attorney's fee claim and then concludes with the Mother Hubbard clause. For these reasons, we conclude that the court rendered a final, appealable judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When the parties have filed competing motions for summary judgment and some are granted while others are denied, an appellate court may consider the propriety of the denial as well as the granting. See Commissioners Court v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex.1997); Sarandos v. Blanton, 25 S.W.3d 811, 814 (Tex. App.-- Waco 2000, pet. denied). If the pertinent facts are undisputed, the court can determine the issues presented as a matter of law. See Sarandos, 25 S.W.3d at 814. In this situation, the court will either affirm the judgment or reverse and render. See Jones v. Strauss, 745 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex.1988); Tobin v. Garcia, 159 Tex. 58, 64, 316 S.W.2d 396, 400-01 (1958); Sarandos, 25 S.W.3d at 814. Because the facts in this case are not disputed, we will examine the summary judgment record to determine whether the facts establish that Reagan or Appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.5 See Sarandos, 25 S.W.3d at 814.

THE LETTER RULING

Reagan contends in his second point that the court's decree effectively deprives the State of its title to the surface estate of the property in question without the State's joinder or consent. He points to a pre-judgment letter from the court advising the parties of its ruling and requesting that the defendants prepare an order reflecting the ruling. However, a pre-judgment letter does not constitute competent evidence of the court's ruling. See Cherokee Water Co. v. Gregg County Appraisal Dist., 801 S.W.2d 872, 878 (Tex. 1990); Maddox v. Cosper, 25 S.W.3d 767, 771 n.5 (Tex. App.-- Waco 2000, no pet.). Moreover, the language in the letter of which Reagan complains does not appear in the judgment. Accordingly, we overrule Reagan's second point.

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