Reagan v. Rider

• Decision Date: 01 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 776,776
• Citation: 521 A.2d 1246,70 Md.App. 503
• Parties: John Matthew REAGAN v. Glenda Ann RIDER
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 503

70 Md.App. 503

521 A.2d 1246

John Matthew REAGAN v. Glenda Ann RIDER.

No. 776 Sept. Term, 1986.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 6, 1987.

John E. Bohlen, Jr. of Baltimore, for appellant.

Charles S. Rand (Bruce H. Cherkis, on the brief), Rockville, for appellee.

Argued before BLOOM, KARWACKI and POLLITT, JJ.

POLLITT, Judge.

Ten years ago the Court of Appeals, in Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977), affirmed the holding of this Court, in Jones v. Harris, 35 Md.App. 556, 371 A.2d 1104 (1977), recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort in Maryland. The Court of Appeals, noting that 37 jurisdictions appeared then to have recognized the tort as a valid cause of action, adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974), holding that four elements must coalesce to impose liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

(1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless;

(2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous;

(3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and

(4) The emotional distress must be severe.

The Court said that close adherence to these four elements, essentially those set forth in § 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 2, Emotional Distress (1965), would minimize the problems of distinguishing the true from the false claim and the trifling annoyance from the serious wrong.

Since that time many attempts have been made, nearly all of them unsuccessful, to extend the principles of that tort to the facts of a particular case.

In the case before us today, we shall hold that the evidence presented to a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County was sufficient to enable that jury to find that the conduct of appellant, John Matthew Reagan, was the cause of emotional distress suffered by appellee, Glenda Ann Rider, and that such emotional distress was "severe." Appellant does not challenge the findings that his conduct was "intentional or reckless," and that it was "extreme and outrageous." We shall hold, therefore, that Judge John F. Fader, II, did not err when he denied appellant's motions for judgment.

Appellee sued appellant, her stepfather, for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. The factual predicate for all of the counts was a pattern of sexual abuse continuing over a period of several years. All counts except the intentional infliction of emotional distress were dismissed either prior to or during the trial. That count was submitted to the jury, resulting in a verdict for appellee in the amount of $28,845 ($18,845 compensatory damages and $10,000 punitive damages). This appeal is from the judgment entered on that verdict.

On appeal, Reagan presents two questions:

(1) Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to allow submission of the case to the jury on the issue of causation?

(2) Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to allow submission of the case to the jury on the issue of the severity of the emotional distress?

Appellee testified that, beginning when she was ten years of age, she lived with her mother, stepfather, grandmother and two stepbrothers in Baltimore County. Her mother, a nurse, often was required to work during the evening hours. It was during these times that the sexual abuse occurred. What began as harmless backrubs soon progressed to sexual contact, including masturbation and cunnilingus, but not sexual intercourse. She said there were several hundred such encounters over a six-year period, when she was between the ages of 11 and 17. As a child, she enjoyed the attention and did not resist, but, as she grew older and began to understand the nature of such activities, she tried to avoid him and resisted his advances, which precipitated heated arguments. As she approached graduation from high school, appellant told her she would have to either submit to his advances or leave the home. She left home shortly thereafter and went to live with her father. In response to her mother's urgings that she return home, appellee finally told her mother of the sexual abuse and was persuaded by her mother to report it to the police. Appellant was tried and acquitted of the criminal charges.

Appellee testified that these experiences caused her to suffer extreme embarrassment, humiliation, mortification and depression, and caused her to gain weight to the point of obesity. The pattern of sexual abuse prevented her from forming normal personal relationships and caused her to engage in what she felt were improper and unusual sexual activities, including homosexual and group sex and masturbation.

Dr. Michael K. Spodak, a forensic and clinical psychiatrist, whose qualification as an expert witness was conceded, testified that appellee first came to him in April of 1982. She had a number of ongoing psychological conflicts. She was "mistrustful" of other people, especially men, and seemed to have no ability to form any "lasting interpersonal relationships." She suffered from a lack of self-confidence, "low self-image and low self-esteem." She had seen Dr. Spodak 12 times in 1982, but only once in 1983 and once in 1984 when she was attending college. Dr. Spodak's opinion was that she had deteriorated psychologically and emotionally during that period and that she needed another "year and a half to two years" of weekly therapy. He said she was not psychotic. His diagnosis was "dysthymic disorder," which he defined as depression in reaction to a series of events. He stated:

I feel that she suffered psychiatric and psychological harm as a result of the sexual misconduct. This would be particularly reflected in her ability to perform in satisfying adult relationships and her sexual adjustment. This might not be particularly reflected in her functional ability, which seemed to be quite adequate.

At the time of the trial, appellee was a college student with above average intelligence, receiving good grades, and able to function adequately in many of her daily activities.

Further facts will be supplied as the need arises.

I Causation

Appellant asserts that because appellee's emotional distress did not become apparent immediately after and in direct response to the sexual acts, she failed to show a causal connection. He posits that we so held in Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md.App. 1, 494 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985), when we said:

The evidence concerning the cause of Ms. Cook's distress is similarly unequivocal: her testimony and that of her husband revealed that she was affected immediately following and in direct response to her termination.

64 Md.App. at 19, 494 A.2d at 221. While the emotional distress in Moniodis did follow immediately after and in direct response to an act, we did not hold it to be a requirement that the distress must immediately follow the event which caused it.

Appellant further suggests that there was evidence of other traumatic events which could have contributed to appellee's distress, such as conflicts with her mother and her obesity. Completely aside from the fact that there is no requirement that a proximate cause be the sole cause of an injury, Certain-Teed Prod. v. Goslee Roof., 26 Md.App. 452, 339 A.2d 302, cert. denied, 276 Md. 739, 741 (1975), the testimony in this case is that the other possible causes of appellee's distress were directly attributable to appellant's conduct. Her conflicts with her mother were largely based on a feeling that her mother "let her down" by failing to leave appellant as promised and by paying his legal fees for the criminal trial. She testified specifically that all her problems were due to his conduct. Dr. Spodak stated:

Based on the history Ms. Rider gave me, which indicates that the main source of trauma was the sexual abuse from her stepfather, I feel that what she has experienced, what I saw in her and the types of symptoms and problems she had is very, is totally consistent with someone who's been sexually abused.

On cross-examination as to other possible causes, he said:

There are a lot of things that could cause [the dysthymic disorder]. In my estimation, the most significant trauma in Ms. Rider's life is the sexual abuse from her stepfather and that causes all other traumas to pale in significance. I mean, it's just insignificant in response to something that catastrophic. So, the answer is yes, there are lots and lots of things that could cause it. However, in this case, I think that one trauma is so significant that the others become somewhat incidental.

There was more than adequate evidence from which the jury could find appellant's conduct was the cause of appellee's emotional distress.

II Severity

In Harris v. Jones, supra, the Court of Appeals said the fourth element of the tort--that the emotional distress must be severe--requires the plaintiff to show that she suffered a severely disabling emotional response to the defendant's conduct. 281 Md. at 570, 380 A.2d at 617 (emphasis in original). The Court said, quoting Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill.2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961)

"... not ... every emotional upset should constitute the basis of an action. Indiscriminate allowance of actions for mental anguish would encourage neurotic overreactions to trivial hurts, and the law should aim to toughen the psyche of a citizen rather than pamper it. But a line can be drawn between the slight hurts which are the price of a complex society and the severe mental disturbances inflicted by intentional actions wholly lacking in social utility." 174 N.E.2d at 164.

281 Md. at 571, 380 A.2d at 617.

The Court quoted comment j of § 46 of the Restatement, supra:

"Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or...