Reagan v. United States

Decision Date25 March 1895
Docket NumberNo. 755,755
Citation157 U.S. 301,39 L.Ed. 709,15 S.Ct. 610
PartiesREAGAN v. UNITED STATES
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

A. H. Garland, for plaintiff in error.

Sol. Gen. Conrad, for the United States.

Mr. Justice BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.

On April 30, 1894, the defendant was found guilty by the verdict of a jury in the circuit court of the United States for the Western district of Texas of a violation of section 3082, Rev. St., in unlawfully, fraudulently, willfully, knowingly, and with intent to defraud the United States, receiving into his possession and concealing 40 head of cattle, which had been, with like intent, smuggled and introduced into the United States from the republic of Mexico. Judgment having been entered on the verdict, he sued out his writ of error.

The first question presented is in respect to peremptory challenges. Section 819, Rev. St., after providing for challenges in capital offenses, reads: 'On the trial of any other felony, the defendant shall be entitled to ten and the United States to three peremptory challenges; and in all other cases, civil and criminal, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges.' The contention is that the offense charged is a felony, and that, therefore, defendant was entitled to ten peremptory challenges. The circuit court ruled otherwise, and allowed him only three. The question then is whether the offense charged is a felony. The claim of defendant is based upon the character of the punishment, which is a fine not exceeding $5,000 nor less than $50, or imprisonment for any time not exceeding two years, or both. By section 5541, Rev. St., imprisonment for a period longer than one year may be in a penitentiary, and such an imprisonment, it is said, is the test of felony. It may be conceded that the present common understanding of the word departs largely from the technical meaning it had at the old common law. This departure is owing to the fact that the punishments other than death, to wit, forfeiture of the lands or goods of the offender, which formerly constituted the test of a felony, are no longer inflicted, at least in this country, and to the further fact that, in many of the states, offenses are by statute divided into two classes, felonies and misdemeanors, the former including all offenses punishable by death or imprisonment in a penitentiary, and the latter those punishable only by fine or imprisonment in a county jail, and in other states, in which no statutory classification is prescribed, many offenses punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary are in terms declared to be felonies. These matters have thrown about the meaning of the word, as ordinarily used, no little uncertainty. Indeed, in Webster's Dictionary, after the common-law definition of the term, there are quoted from John Stuart Mill these pertinent observations: 'There is not a lawyer who would undertake to tell what a felony is, otherwise than by enumerating the various kinds of offenses which are so called. Originally, the word 'felony' had a meaning. It denoted all offenses, the penalty of which included forfeiture of goods. But subsequent acts of parliament have declared various offenses to be felonies, without enjoining that penalty, and have taken away the penalty from others, which continue, nevertheless, to be called felonies, in so much that the acts so called have now no property whatever in common, save that of being unlawful and punishable.' 1 Mill's Logic.

There is no statutory definition of 'felonies' in the legislation of the United States. We must therefore look elsewhere for the meaning of the term. The question was recently before us in Bannon v. U. S., 156 U. S. 464, 15 Sup. Ct. 467; and Mr. Justice Brown, delivering the opinion of the court, after referring to the statutory provisions in some of the states, said: 'But in the absence of such statute the word is used to designate such serious offenses as were formerly punishable by death, or by forfeiture of the lands or goods, of the offender. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 423, 5 Sup. Ct. 935.' See, also, U. S. v. ithe subordinate offense of receiving

But in this case we need not refer to the common law for a classification of the offense. Section 2865, Rev. St., provides that: 'If any person shall knowingly * * * smuggle, or clandestinely introduce, into the United States, any goods, wares, or merchandise, subject to duty by law * * * without paying or accounting for the duty * * * every such person * * * shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment for any term of time not exceeding two years, or both.' By this section, smuggling is, in terms, declared a misdemeanor. The penalty imposed is substantially the same as that by section 3082, and the charge of which the defendant was convicted, under this section, was of receiving and concealing smuggled cattle. The latter offense is subordinate to the former. It therefore cannot be an offense of a higher grade. If, for instance, the crime of larceny was by statute classified as a misdemeanor, the receiving of stolen property should not, in the absence of clear language in the statute demanding it, be placed in a higher class. And so or smuggling. When that which is the principal offense is specifically defined a misdemeanor, the subordinate offense of receiving and concealing the smuggled goods ought not to be held a felony, unless there by some statutory definition, or equally significant provision. There is no such definition, and the punishment prescribed in the two sections is substantially the same. It is neither death nor forfeiture of the lands or goods of the offender. It is true, the latter section provides that the smuggled goods shall be forfeited, but these may or may not be the property of the defendant, and the forfeiture of the thing in respect to which an offense is committed is not the equivalent of a forfeiture of the lands or goods of the offender. The ruling of the circuit court was correct. The offense was nothing but a misdemeanor, and the defendant was only entitled to three peremptory challenges.

A second objection is that the court gave this instruction: 'You should especially look to the interest which the respective witnesses have in the suit, or in its result. Where the witness has a direct personal interest in the result of the suit, the temptation is strong to color, pervert, or withhold the facts. The law permits the defendant, at his own request, to testify in his own behalf. The defendant here has availed himself of this privilege. His testimony is before you, and you must determine how far it is credible. The deep personal interest which he may have in the result of the suit should be considered by the jury in weighing his evidence, and in determining how far, or to what extent, if at all, it is worthy of credit.'

By the act of March 16, 1878 (20 Stat. 30), a defendant in a criminal case may, 'at his own request but not otherwise, be a competent witness.' Under that statute it is a matter of choice whether he become a witness or not, and his failure to accept the privilege 'shall not create any presumption against him.' This forbids all comment in the presence of the jury upon his omission to testify. Wilson v. U. S., 149 U. S. 60, 13 Sup. Ct. 765.

On the other hand, if he avail himself of this privilege, his credibility may be impeached, his testimony may be assailed, and is to be weighed as that of any other witness. Assuming the position of a witness, he is entitled to all its rights and protections, and is subject to all its criticisms and burdens. It is unnecessary to consider whether, when offering himself as a witness as to one matter, he may, either, at the will of the government or under the discretion of the court, be called upon to testify as to other matters. That question is not involved in this case, and we notice it simply to exclude it from the scope of our observations. The privileges and limitations to which we refer are those which inhere in the witness as a witness, and which affect the testimony voluntarily given. As to that he may be fully cross-examined. It may be assailed by contradictory testimony. His credibility may be impeached, and by the same methods as are pursued in the case of any other witness. The jury properly consider his manner of testifying, the inherent probabilities of his story, the amount and character of the contradictory testimony, the nature and extent of his interest in the result of the trial, and the impeaching evidence, in determining how much of credence he is entitled to.

It is within the province of the court to call the attention of the jury to any matters which legitimately affect his testimony and his credibility. This does not impl that the court may arbitrarily single out his testimony, and denounce it as false. The fact that he is a defendant does not condemn him as unworthy of belief, but at the same time it creates an interest greater than that of any other witness, and to that extent affects the question of credibility. It is therefore a matter properly to be suggested by the court to the jury. But the limits of suggestion are the same in respect to him as to others. It is a familiar rule that the relations of a witness to the matter to be decided are legitimate subjects of consideration in respect to the weight to be given to his testimony. The old law was that interest debarred one from testifying, for fear that such interest might tend to a perversion of the truth. A more enlightened spirit has thrown down this barrier, and now mere interest does not exclude one from the witness stand, but the interest is to be considered as affecting his credibility. This rule is equally potent in criminal as in civil cases, and in neither is it error for the trial court to direct the attention of the jury to the interest which any witness may have in the result of the trial as...

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