Reagon v. State, 269

• Decision Date: 04 November 1969
• Docket Number: No. 269,269
• Citation: 251 N.E.2d 829,253 Ind. 143
• Parties: Everett H. REAGON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. S 33.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 829

251 N.E.2d 829

253 Ind. 143

Everett H. REAGON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 269 S 33.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 4, 1969.

James R. White, New Castle, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Murray West, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

ARTERBURN, Judge.

The facts in this case are uncontroverted. Appellant was indicted by the grand jury of reckless homicide, manslaughter, and driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The indictment charged that on July 14, 1967, appellant was traveling on Indiana State Road #3 at an excessive rate of speed and while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. While attempting to pass another car on an area of obstructed vision, appellant's car collided with a car driven by Robert L. Thompson II. Thompson suffered mortal wounds as a result of the crash. Appellant suffered severe physical injuries and brain damage as a result of the accident.

In response to a petition filed by the state, the court appointed two disinterested physicians to examine appellant and 'to testify to the court regarding his sanity, specifically, whether or not the defendant had sufficient comprehension to understand the proceedings and to make his defense and aid his counsel in making his defense.' The physicians reported that they were of the opinion that appellant did not have sufficient comprehension to understand the nature of the action against him. On April 12, 1968, the trial judge delayed and continued the trial and ordered appellant committed to the Department of Mental Health pursuant to Burns' Ind.Stat.Anno. § 9--1706a because of lack of sufficient comprehension to make a defense.

On August 20, 1968, a letter was written to the trial judge by the Superintendent of the Richmond State Hospital which stated that appellant had improved and further said:

'It is the current opinion of our staff that this man does not now lack comprehension to stand trial and that he is able to participate in his own defense.'

This certification was made pursuant to the statute, Burns' Ind.Stat.Anno. § 9--1706a, which provides:

'Whenever the defendant shall become sane the superintendent of the state psychiatric hospital shall certify the fact to the proper court, who shall enter an order on his records directing the sheriff to return the defendant, * * *. Upon the return to court of any defendant so committed he or she shall then be placed upon trial for the criminal offense the same as if no delay or postponement had occurred by reason of defendant's insanity.'

On August 28, 1968 the appellant was ordered released from the Richmond State Hospital and returned to the jurisdiction of the court. On October 8, 1968 the appellant, by his attorney, filed his motion for a continuance, contending that appellant's loss of memory precluded appellant from aiding his attorney in his defense, thus making a fair trial impossible. The appellant was then tried by the court and found guilty. The sole error alleged on appeal is the overruling of the motion for a continuance. A hearing on the motion for continuance was held on October 28, 1968 and testimony was heard.

Testimony by William E. Murray, a psychiatrist and physician, who was at the time superintendent of New Castle State Hospital, in answer to questions by the court, was to the effect that the appellant comprehended and understood the proceedings against him. Murray testified that appellant could understand an intelligent conversation and understood completely the legal proceedings. He further testified that appellant could reason and could communicate with his attorney.

The court denied the continuance. The appellant contends there was an abuse of discretion. The state, on the other hand, urges that the court had no discretion in view of the certification as to appellant's mental condition, made pursuant to the statute. Whether the legislature may take from the court its discretionary function in determining whether or not a defendant may have a fair trial, we need not consider, since in our judgment we must first determine if there was sufficient evidence to support the determination of the trial court. An examination of the evidence upon which the court acted shows it not only had the certification that the appellant was able to stand trial from the state health agency empowered by the statute to make such determination, but also the testimony given at the hearing on the continuance. This evidence entirely supported the judge's determination that the appellant was competent to stand trial. We find no evidence introduced to the contrary. We may not overturn a trial court's finding where the evidence supports it.

In the consideration of the question before us we must draw a distinction between a mental condition of insanity, which is a valid defense to a criminal charge, and a mental incapacity, such as amnesia, which may or may not prevent a defendant from aiding his counsel in making a valid defense. In this connection the rule has been generalized to the following extent:

'In determining a defendant's capacity to stand trial, the test is whether he has the capacity to comprehend his position, to underwstand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to co-operate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed * * *.' 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 63, p. 144.

Under the facts before us it appears that the appellant is contending that because he does not remember the facts relative to the accident, although he does understand the charges against him and is fully aware of events since the accident, still, he should not be put on trial until he can remember events in regard to which his memory now fails him. With this contention we cannot agree. Many times in a trial of a criminal case evidence is lost, a material witness dies, or, as in this case, the defendant has amnesia as to certain events or a time. Still, such handicaps from a defendant's point of view cannot prevent a trial from taking place eventually. Rarely would we find a case in which a defendant could not contend that he was deprived of some evidence and therefore he ought not to be tried. However, evidence which is never to be obtained because of the death of witnesses cannot prevent a criminal trial from taking place, and that must be said from the state's point of view as well as that of the defendant.

The testimony of Dr. Murray, as well as the certification from the state hospital, is sufficient to support the trial court's judgment in denying a continuance in this case.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

HUNTER and GIVAN, JJ., concur.

DeBRULER, C.J., dissents with opinion, in which JACKSON, J., concurs.

DeBRULER, Chief Justice (dissenting).

I dissent from the majority opinion and would hold that the trial court should have granted appellant's motion for continuance on the grounds that he was not legally competent to stand trial.

As a result of the accident appellant was severely injured, receiving a depressed skull fracture, and was hospitalized for several months. On March 28, 1968, at a hearing to determine whether appellant could stand trial two doctors testified that appellant had organic brain damage caused by the skull fracture. Dr. McDonald testified that as a result of the injury appellant could not understand the charge against him. Dr. Murray, a psychiatrist, stated that appellant could not assist counsel in his defense due to the fact that the brain damage resulted in amnesia concerning the circumstances surrounding the accident.

In Indiana the test for capacity to stand trial is set out in Acts 1951, ch. 238, § 2, as last amended by Acts 1967, ch. 291, § 2, being Burns Ind.Stat.Ann. § 9--1706a which says in relevant part:

'If the court shall find that the defendant has not comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense, the trial shall be delayed or continued on the ground of the alleged insanity of the defendant.'

The trial court found that appellant did not have 'comprehension sufficient to understand the criminal action against him and the proceedings thereon and to make his defense, and that he is without mental capabilities to comprehend and understand the criminal charge against him and is unable to assist his attorney in preparing his defense.' Appellant was committed to Richmond State Hospital and the staff there concurred in that finding in a report filed May 15, 1968.

On September 28, 1968, in a letter to the court, Dr. Klepfer, the Superintendent of Richmond State Hospital, stated that appellant had improved and no longer lacked the comprehension to stand trial. However, he also said at that time that appellant could only remember events occurring since the accident.

Upon receiving this letter the trial court, without a hearing of any kind, set the cause for trial. Appellant moved for a continuance, alleging:

'That in truth and in fact the above named defendant does not have sufficient comprehension to act in his own defense or to testify concerning any defenses the defendant might have to the charges now pending against him. That to allow the State of Indiana to proceed with the trial of the action now pending would be a deprivation of defendant's constitutional rights to assist in his own defense.'

On October 28, 1968, at the hearing on the motion for continuance, Dr. Murray testified as follows concerning an examination of appellant made three weeks prior to the hearing:

'A. I found that Mr. Reagon was very manneristic in his behavior, and he had a lot of blinking behaviour, held his head to one side and could not speak above a whisper. And on the mental status, he had a lot of memory defects, he had remembered seeing me before but was not able to say when; I felt there was defective memory of recent events and remote events; he generally showed no abnormal thought...