Realty Co. of N.J. v. Burghardt

• Decision Date: 17 November 1919
• Docket Number: No. 63.,63.
• Citation: 111 A. 275
• Parties: REALTY CO. OF NEW JERSEY v. BURGHARDT.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

111 A. 275

REALTY CO. OF NEW JERSEY

v. BURGHARDT.

No. 63.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 17, 1919.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from Court of Chancery.

Suit by the Realty Company of New Jersey against M. Loretta Burghardt to compel specific performance of a contract to accept a deed to real estate and to pay for the same. From the decree of the Court of Chancery (106 Atl. 423), dismissing the bill, complainant appeals. Decree reversed.

Hartshorne, Insley & Leake, of Jersey City, for appellant.

Clarence Linn, of Jersey City, for respondent.

MINTURN, J. The substantial inquiry in the case involves the construction to be put upon an act of the Legislature, entitled "An act to compel the determination of claims to real estate in certain cases, and to quiet the title to the same," approved March 2, 1870, (P. L. p. 20), in conjunction with sections 10 and 11 of the revision of the Chancery Act of 1902 (C. S. p. 413).

The bill was filed to compel specific performance of a contract for the sale of certain land in Jersey City, the title to which the vendee refused to accept upon the ground that the title thereto was not marketable.

The alleged imperfection arose out of the fact that Charles Siedler, a previous owner of the locus in quo, for the purpose of perfecting title thereto, acquired by him to one-half of the original tract, and of which he had been in adverse possession for over 20 years, filed a bill of complaint, in the year 1903, in the Court of Chancery, to quiet his title to the land thus acquired; alleging inter alia that his title was denied and disputed by a large number of persons, specifically named, and also by Jacob Vreeland, the former owner of the entire tract, "or his heirs, devisees, and personal representatives."

Due process of publication as required by the statute was effected, after which, upon proof of compliance with the statutory requirements, the chancellor made a final decree adjudging that as to the lands in question, including the locus in quo, the said "Jacob Vreeland, his heirs, devisees, and personal representatives, have no estate, interest in, or incumbrance upon, the same or any part thereof," and the title of the complainant Siedler thereto was thereby determined, "fixed and settled, and declared to be good."

The complainant in this suit acquired title to the locus in quo from Siedler. The contention now is that the proceedings taken to quiet the Siedler title were not warranted or authorized by the legislation to which we have referred, and the title was rejected as unmarketable for that reason.

The contention is based upon the ruling of Vice Chancellor Stevens, in Hill v. Henry, 66 N. J. Eq. 150, 57 Atl. 554, decided more than a year subsequent to the decree in the Siedler Case. The learned Vice Chancellor in the case referred to held that the tenth section of the Chancery Act of 1902 did not apply to proceedings to quiet title, and doubted arguendo whether the act was constitutional under the due process provisions of the federal Constitution.

The act of 1870 enables a person in peaceable possession of lands and claiming to own the same "to bring and maintain a suit in chancery to settle the title of said lands, and to clear up all doubts and disputes concerning the same."

The Chancery Act of 1902 provides that—

"In all actions hereafter commenced, * * * whenever it shall appear * * * that any person mentioned in said bill or petition, or his heirs, devisees or personal representatives, are proper parties defendant * * * and that the complainant * * * after diligent and careful inquiry, * * * as in case of absent defendants, has been unable to ascertain * * * the names and residences of such of his heirs, devisees or personal representatives * * * such action may proceed against such person by name, and his heirs, devisees and personal representatives, as in the case of absent defendants whose names are known. * * * All such defendants * * * shall thereupon be bound by all orders and decrees in said cause as if they had been duly named and * * * served with process in this state."

Vice Chancellor Lane in 1918 in Silver v. Gattel, 89 N. J. Eq. 402, 105 Atl. 137, took a contrary view of this legislation, and held the construction adopted in Hill v. Henry to be against the express language of the legislation, its clear purpose, and against the established practice. The Chancellor in the case sub judice followed the determination in Hill v. Henry, and dismissed the bill, and from that decree this appeal is taken.

The legal importance of the present inquiry, involving as it does the settlement of titles to real estate, the accepted legality of which has been founded and predicated upon the provisions of this legislation, is obviously accentuated by this contrariety of judicial opinion.

The fact that the Legislature in 1902 prescribed without limitation a method of procedure in chancery causes, based upon the existing provisions of the act of 1870, would indicate a legislative recognition and...