Reams v. City of Frontenac
| Decision Date | 24 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-02133-TC |
| Citation | 587 F.Supp.3d 1082 |
| Parties | Brad REAMS, et al., Plaintiffs v. CITY OF FRONTENAC, KANSAS, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
587 F.Supp.3d 1082
Brad REAMS, et al., Plaintiffs
v.
CITY OF FRONTENAC, KANSAS, et al., Defendants
No. 20-cv-02133-TC
United States District Court, D. Kansas.
Signed February 24, 2022
Mark H. Epstein, Benny Joel Harding, The Epstein Law Firm, LLC, Leawood, KS, for Plaintiffs.
Blake Kennedy Porter, Terelle A. Mock, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, LLP, Brian Mauldin, Topeka, KS, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Toby Crouse, United States District Judge
Plaintiffs are three former City of Frontenac, Kansas, employees who were terminated by the city council in a public vote. They brought this suit against the City and individual council members for Fourteenth Amendment violations, conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, and breach of contract. The City and council members moved for summary judgment on all counts, Docs. 59 & 60, and Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity, Docs. 61 & 62. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs’ motion is granted in part and denied in part as moot.
I
A
Summary judgment is proper under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the moving party demonstrates "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" when it is essential to the claim's resolution.
Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998). And disputes over those material facts are "genuine" if the competing evidence would permit a reasonable jury to decide the issue in either party's favor. Id. Disputes—even hotly contested ones—over facts that are not essential to the claims are irrelevant. Indeed, belaboring such disputes undermines the efficiency Rule 56 seeks to promote.
At the summary judgment stage, material facts "must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein." Adler , 144 F.3d at 671 ; see also D. Kan. R. 56.1(d). To determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court views all evidence, and draws all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Allen v. Muskogee , 119 F.3d 837, 839–40 (10th Cir. 1997). That said, the nonmoving party cannot create a genuine factual dispute by making allegations that are purely conclusory, Adler , 144 F.3d at 671–72, 674, or unsupported by the record as a whole, see Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 378–81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
The filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter this standard. Each motion—and its material facts—must "be treated separately," meaning that "the denial of one does not require the grant of another." Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank Wichita , 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000). For each motion, the moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Hicks v. City of Watonga , 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that genuine issues remain for trial as to those dispositive matters. Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc. , 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990) ; see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc. , 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991).
B
Brad Reams, Terri Kutz, and Timothy Fielder each worked for the City of Frontenac. They allege that a small class of "protected" persons controlled the city. Doc. 67 at ¶ 52. This case, they assert, is the result of local dislike and mistrust of outsiders like themselves—victims of "in crowd favoritism." Id. at 5. Ultimately, the city council terminated Plaintiffs in a public vote at an open meeting without notice or explanation. Defendants argue that this is irrelevant "back story" and that the key facts concern Plaintiffs’ employment terms. Doc. 74 at 5.
1. Reams served as Frontenac's City Administrator. The City originally hired him with a three-year contract, which was replaced in July 2019 by a new three-year contract approved by city council vote. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 10–11. The contract included termination and severance provisions. Id. at ¶ 12; Doc. 67 at ¶ 12. In the event that the City terminated his employment before the end of his term, the City would pay Reams a severance of six months’ salary and benefits. Doc. 60 at ¶ 12; Doc. 67 at ¶ 12. (The parties dispute whether Reams could be terminated without cause. See Doc. 60 at 12–14; Doc. 67 at 23.) City Ordinance 2016-03 laid out his duties: to "[d]irect and supervise the administration of all departments, offices and agencies of the City, except as otherwise provided by city ordinance or by law" and to "[e]mploy and, when necessary for the good of the
City, suspend or terminate any city employee." Doc. 60-8 at 1.
Kutz was the City Clerk. In March 2018, the city council approved a hiring recommendation by the City Administrator and the Mayor for Kutz to fill the role. Doc. 55 at ¶ 2.a.9. The Mayor and Kutz then signed an employment agreement that listed the City and Kutz as parties. Id. at ¶ 2.a.10; Doc. 60-6. Defendants dispute the agreement's validity because the agreement neither contained the City seal nor the City Administrator's signature. Doc. 60-6 at 1–2. Plaintiffs note that the previous clerks’ agreements also lacked the City seal. Doc. 67 at ¶ 20. No second, separate vote was held on the signed employment agreement. See Doc. 60 at ¶ 19; Doc. 67 at ¶ 19; Doc. 74 at ¶ 19. Nonetheless, the agreement provided for a one-year term, renewing each January unless either party gave 90-days’ notice. Doc. 60-6 at 1–2. Finally, the agreement stated that the City Clerk was an at-will position. Id. at 2. Plaintiffs argue that this was a contractual irregularity and that the City Clerk position was actually an "exempt position." Doc. 67 at ¶ 20; Doc. 67-14 at 26.
Fielder held the combined role of City Attorney and Prosecutor. The Mayor first appointed him in 2017, and then again in 2019. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 24, 28; Doc. 67 at ¶¶ 24, 28. Both times, the city council voted to approve the Mayor's appointment. Fielder also claims that he had a retainer agreement with the City. Doc. 60 at ¶ 25; Doc. 67 at ¶ 25. Defendants note that the agreement submitted as evidence does not contain the City seal, nor was it signed by any city representative. Doc. 60 at ¶ 27; see Doc. 60-11. There is no evidence that the city council voted on a separate employment contract for Fielder or on his retainer agreement, which is undated but appears to be from 2017 based on the attached memorandum. Doc. 60 at ¶ 27; Doc. 67 at ¶ 27; Doc. 74 at ¶ 27; Doc. 60-11 at 1.
2. In September 2019, the city council voted to terminate Reams, Kutz, and Fielder. Doc. 60 at ¶ 31; Doc. 67 at ¶ 31. The motion passed without discussion or debate. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 32–33; Doc. 67 at ¶¶ 32–33; Doc. 74 at ¶ 33. As the three left the meeting, they heard applause from the unusually large crowd. Doc. 67 at 42–43. Defendant council member Clinton asked the Frontenac Chief of Police to escort the three to their offices so they could collect their belongings. Doc. 60 at 6.
Following the terminations, the City issued checks to each for wages owed. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 40, 43–44; Doc. 67 at ¶¶ 40, 43–44. The City issued Reams and Fielder additional checks: Reams received a severance payment, and Fielder the wages he would have earned had he remained employed through December 2019. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 41, 45; Doc. 67 at ¶¶ 41, 45. All three Plaintiffs dispute the sufficiency of the check amounts.
3. Plaintiffs contend there is more to the story. They allege that Frontenac is actually controlled by a small class of persons—the "in crowd"—who use coded language to identify members. Doc. 67 at ¶¶ 52–54; see Doc. 67-16 at ¶ 3. Plaintiffs claim that these favored persons received better treatment than themselves and "ordinary citizen[s]." Doc. 67 at ¶ 54. The group is never not expressly defined, but Plaintiffs refer generally to a "protected class," "nepotism ... of its favored locals," "real Frontenacers," and "favored local Frontenac residence [sic]." Id. at ¶¶ 54, 68; id. at 5–6. Examples of alleged favoritism toward in-crowd persons include: turning a blind eye to violations of building codes, id. at ¶ 55; making an exception for extending utility services to a home beyond city limits, id. at ¶ 56; reducing a permit fee for fireworks vendors operating within city
limits, id. at ¶ 58; allowing a yard sign in violation of a city ordinance, id. at ¶ 59; overpaying for private property designated for public acquisition, id. at ¶ 60; and over-paying retirement benefits, id. at ¶ 61.
Plaintiffs allege that this favoritism came to a head against them when Jayme Mjelde, a city employee and member of the favored crowd, failed a random drug test in violation of City policy. Doc. 60 at 23; Doc. 67 at ¶¶ 63, 73. Plaintiffs participated in the internal investigation that led to Mjelde's termination. Doc. 60 at ¶ 29; Doc. 67 at ¶¶ 63. Mjelde hired a lawyer and threatened action against the City. Doc. 67 at 1–2. Soon after, the city council terminated Plaintiffs and hired Mjelde as City Clerk, replacing Kutz. Id. at ¶ 76. Plaintiffs claim that the "real reason" they lost their jobs was their involvement in Mjelde's firing. Id. at ¶¶ 63, 67; Doc. 67-14 at ¶ 3. Defendants dispute this fact and cite other reasons for terminating Plaintiffs. Doc. 74 at ¶ 67. Each had either "lost confidence" in Plaintiffs, believed that one or more were not a "good fit for the job," or observed Plaintiffs behaving rudely or...
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