Rearick v. Sieving

• Citation: 103 So.3d 815
• Decision Date: 24 August 2012
• Docket Number: 2110473.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
• Parties: Anita REARICK v. Immanuel SIEVING and Jeri Sieving.

103 So.3d 815

Anita REARICK

v.Immanuel SIEVING and Jeri Sieving.

2110473.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Aug. 24, 2012.

William J. Moore, Enterprise, for appellant.

Jodee R. Thompson, Enterprise, for appellee.

THOMAS, Judge.

Anita Rearick appeals a judgment of the Coffee Circuit Court (“the trial court”) in favor of Immanuel Sieving and Jeri Sieving.

The record indicates the following. Rearick and the Sievings were coterminous landowners of property located in Coffee County. In May 2007, Rearick contacted the Sievings and offered to sell them the property on which she lived (“the property”) for $50,000. The Sievings accepted her offer. At some point well before the occurrence of the events leading up to this action, Rearick had sold the property to her daughter, Hope Zonca. However, Rearick had continued to live on the property, and it is undisputed that Rearick was Zonca's attorney-in-fact for the purpose of conducting the real-estate transaction giving rise to this litigation.

On or about July 31, 2007, Rearick and the Sievings met in the office of Marty Williams, a real-estate attorney, to close the real-estate transaction. The parties and Williams testified at trial that Rearick was very emotional at the closing, because she had lived in the mobile home on the property for a long period. After the parties signed the deed transferring the property in fee simple from Zonca to the Sievings, the Sievings instructed Williams to draft an agreement allowing Rearick to continue living on the property. The separate document drafted by Williams, entitled “Agreement” (“the agreement”), stated, in pertinent part:

“We the undersigned, do hereby agree to allow Anita M. Rearick to live in the present residence on the following described property for the rest of her natural life. This agreement shall be binding on Immanuel C. Sieving and Jeri B. Sieving and their heirs and assigns. Anita M. Rearick agrees to maintain the residence in its current condition.”

A description of the property and the signatures of all of the parties followed the above statement. The agreement was recorded in the Coffee County probate office.

All parties acknowledge that Rearick often visited her adult children for extended periods. The Sievings testified that approximately one month after the parties signed the agreement, they learned that Rearick had allowed members of her family (“the family members”) to reside in the mobile home. The Sievings further testified that they believed that allowing the family members to do so violated the agreement and that they sought to collect rent from the family members. They testified to other occurrences that they also believed violated the agreement, such as allowing a pet to live inside the mobile home and parking an 18-wheel transfer truck in the yard.

The Sievings testified that at some point they received a letter from an attorney stating that, because Rearick possessed a life-estate interest in the property, she could allow other individuals to live in the mobile home. The Sievings contend that they never intended the agreement to convey a life estate to Rearick. In fact, they testified, they had never heard of a life estate before receiving the letter from Rearick's attorney.

The Sievings further testified that they sent a letter to Rearick in March 2010 stating that she had breached the agreement and giving her 30 days to vacate the property. Rearick then contacted the Sievings' attorney, who told her that the Sievings would work with her if additional time was needed. However, the Sievings testified that one of Rearick's adult children contacted the Sievings' attorney two to three days after Rearick received the letter. According to the Sievings, Rearick's adult child left a voice-mail message for the Sievings' attorney, which the Sievings characterized as irate. The voice-mail message from Rearick's adult child allegedly stated that Rearick was not moving. At that point, the Sievings testified, they decided to file the underlying complaint in the trial court.

Rearick also testified at trial. She testified that she had asked the Sievings if she could continue to live on the property when she made the offer to sell them the property. According to her testimony, she and the Sievings had agreed, before the real-estate closing, that she could remain on the property. Rearick acknowledged at trial that she did not compensate the Sievings for her continued residence on the property, nor was the value of her retaining a life estate negotiated into the price the Sievings paid for the property.

Williams testified that she had drafted the agreement during the real-estate closing. She further testified that no party requested that she draft a document creating a life estate. Instead, she stated that the Sievings had asked her to draft a document allowing Rearick to live on the property for the rest of her life. Williams further testified that she had specifically intended to draft the agreement in such a manner that it would not be interpreted as creating a life estate.

On October 13, 2010, the Sievings filed the complaint asking the trial court to terminate the agreement and to direct Rearick to vacate the property. Rearick answered the Sievings' complaint on December 8, 2010. A bench trial was held on June 22, 2011, at which the trial court heard evidence ore tenus. On November 10, 2011, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the Sievings. The judgment, in pertinent part, terminated the agreement, restored possession of the property to the Sievings, and ordered Rearick to vacate the property in no more than 30 days.

Rearick filed a timely postjudgment motion; she also filed a motion to stay enforcement of the judgment pending a hearing. The trial court granted the motion to stay. The Rearicks filed a response to the postjudgment motion on January 12, 2012. A hearing was held on the postjudgment motion on January 17, 2012. The trial court entered an order on that same day denying the postjudgment motion and setting aside the order staying enforcement of the judgment. Rearick filed a timely appeal with this court on January 25, 2012.

“ ‘ “When ore tenus evidence is presented, a presumption of correctness exists as to the trial court's findings on issues of fact; its judgment based on these findings of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or against the great weight of the evidence. J & M Bail Bonding Co. v. Hayes, 748 So.2d 198 (Ala.1999); Gaston v. Ames, 514 So.2d 877 (Ala.1987). When the trial court in a nonjury case enters a judgment without making specific findings of fact, the appellate court ‘will assume that the trial judge made those findings necessary to support the judgment.’Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. AmSouth Bank, 608 So.2d 375, 378 (Ala.1992). Moreover, ‘[u]nder the ore tenus rule, the trial court's judgment and all implicit findings necessary to support [it] carry a presumption of correctness.’ Transamerica, 608 So.2d at 378. However, when the trial court improperly applies the law to [the] facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the trial court's judgment. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 675 So.2d 377 (Ala.1996); Marvin's, Inc. v. Robertson, 608 So.2d 391 (Ala.1992); Gaston, 514 So.2d at 878;Smith v. Style Advertising, Inc., 470 So.2d 1194 (Ala.1985); League v. McDonald, 355 So.2d 695 (Ala.1978). ‘Questions of law are not subject to the ore tenus standard of review.’ Reed v. Board of Trustees for Alabama State Univ., 778 So.2d 791, 793 n. 2 (Ala.2000). A trial court's conclusions on legal issues carry no presumption of correctness on appeal. Ex parte Cash, 624 So.2d 576, 577 (Ala.1993). This court reviews the application of law to facts de novo. Allstate, 675 So.2d at 379 (‘[W]here the facts before the trial court are essentially undisputed and the controversy involves questions of law for the court to consider, the [trial] court's judgment carries no presumption of correctness.’).” '

“[ Farmers Insurance Co. v. Price–Williams Assocs., Inc.,] 873 So.2d [252,] 254–55 [ (Ala.Civ.App.2003) ] (quoting City of Prattville v. Post, 831 So.2d 622, 627–28 (Ala.Civ.App.2002)).”

Kellis v. Estate of Schnatz, 983 So.2d 408, 412 (Ala.Civ.App.2007).

On appeal, Rearick asserts that the trial court exceeded its discretion by: (1) considering parol evidence when interpreting the agreement, (2) terminating the agreement and restoring the property to the Sievings, and (3) determining that the agreement did not convey a life estate.

The trial court determined that the agreement created a revocable license, as opposed to a life estate. The judgment of the trial court provided, in pertinent part:

“In consideration of the foregoing and all other relevant matters presented, the Agreement of the parties can be considered only a real property license which conveyed unto [Rearick] a personal privilege to live in the residence located on the subject property during her lifetime. That license was not coupled with an interest in the land and is therefore revocable by [the Sievings] at their sole discretion. The [Sievings], in exercising such discretion, have expressed their desire to revoke the license or otherwise annul the Agreement.”

We must first determine if the trial court erred by considering parol evidence when interpreting the agreement. Rearick argues in her brief that “[t]he plain language of the ‘Agreement’ is consistent with the definition of a life estate.” We agree that “for the rest of her natural life” is language often indicating the conveyance of a life estate. See generally Barnett v. Estate of Anderson, 966 So.2d 915, 919 (Ala.2007) (holding that the language “ ‘shall not be sold during the terms of [the daughters'] natural lives and twenty-one years thereafter’ ” (emphasis omitted), coupled with a provision establishing a remainder interest, was sufficient to create a life estate); ...