Reaves v. Pub. Schs. of Robeson Cnty.

• Decision Date: 08 September 2022
• Docket Number: 7:22-CV-39-FL
• Parties: KATHY JUANITA REAVES, Plaintiff, v. PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF ROBESON COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina

KATHY JUANITA REAVES, Plaintiff,
v.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF ROBESON COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

No. 7:22-CV-39-FL

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Southern Division

September 8, 2022

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Robert B. Jones, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs amended application to proceed in forma pauperis, [DE-12], and for frivolity review of the complaint, [DE-1-1], pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff has demonstrated appropriate evidence of inability to pay the required court costs, and the application to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed. However, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

I. Standard of Review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) “to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless claims”). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations

1

are ‘so nutty,' ‘delusional,' or ‘wholly fanciful' as to be simply ‘unbelievable.'”). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28.

In order to state a claim on which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Id.

In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). This court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id.; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

II. Discussion

Plaintiff alleges she was employed as a CTE teacher, or resource teacher, by the Robeson County Public Schools, and she brings this action against the Public Schools of Robeson County, the Public Schools of Robeson County Board of Education, Michael Mike Smith, Brenda Fairley-Ferebee, Freddie Williamson, Angela Faulkner, Catherine Truitt, Roy Cooper, the Public Schools

2

of North Carolina, the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, the North Carolina State Board of Education, and the State of North Carolina. On December 6, 2021, Plaintiff filed a grievance against defendant Freddie Williamson, the Superintendent for the Public Schools of Robeson County. On December 10, 2021, Williamson had Plaintiffs work email blocked, which prevented her from accessing the CTE curriculum and standards she needed to teach CTE, and resulted in her seventy-two CTE students being denied CTE education from December 10 through February 28. Plaintiff, who is black, asserts that the work email addresses of a white male and a white female resource teacher were not blocked. Plaintiff further alleges that she and her seventy-two CTE students were discriminated against, and defendants Angela Faulkner, the school principal, and Freddie Williamson failed to report the discrimination as required by federal and state law. On February 14, Plaintiff made a statement accusing Faulkner of falsifying CTE grades to the State of North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. Compl. [DE-1-1].

Plaintiffs email access was restored on March 1, 2022, and on that day and the following day, Faulkner attempted to conduct a teacher evaluation of Plaintiff, which Plaintiff refused. On March 2, Plaintiff informed Defendants via email that she was reporting the alleged discrimination against the CTE students to the United States Department of Education, and Plaintiff also informed the parents of her CTE students that they were discriminated against and denied CTE education. On March 3, Plaintiff was suspended with pay for ninety days and escorted from the school premises by law enforcement, while the white resource teachers, Faulkner, and Williamson remained employed. The grievance Plaintiff filed against Williamson was not addressed at board meetings on January 3 and February 23, 2022, and remains outstanding. Plaintiff brings claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the North Carolina Retaliatory Employment

3

Discrimination Act (“REDA”), the Whistleblower Protection Act of 2014, Chapter 115C of the North Carolina General Statutes for Elementary and Secondary Education, the North Carolina State Tort Claims Act, 20 U-S.C. § 1703, and for interference with contract. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Compl. [DE-1 -1 ].

1. Due Process

Plaintiff alleges a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, which the court construes as a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on her work email being blocked without a legal explanation. Compl. [DE-1-1] ¶¶ 108-110.

To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) a cognizable liberty or property interest; (2) the deprivation of that interest by some form of state action; and (3) that the procedures employed were constitutionally inadequate.” Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2009). “In assessing a procedural due process claim, unless there has been a deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest by state action, the question of what process is required is irrelevant, for the constitutional right to due process is simply not implicated.” Id. at 146. As the court recently explained,

“The Supreme Court has identified ‘certain attributes of ‘property' interests protected by procedural due process.'” Strickland, 32 F.4th at 348 (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls, v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” 408 U.S. at 577. Property interests “are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id. “A ‘person's interest in a benefit is a ‘property' interest for due process purposes if there are rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.' ” Strickland, 3 2 F .4th at 348 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972)).

4

Helsius v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., No. 5:21-CV-433-FL, 2022 WL 2532488, at *4 (E.D. N.C. July 7, 2022).

Plaintiff alleges that her work email was blocked without legal explanation. [DE-1-1] ¶¶ 108-110. While due process protections can extend, under certain circumstances, to continued employment, Helsius, 2022 WL 2532488, at *5, the court has found no authority to support a work email account being a protected property interest for due process purposes. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a procedural due process claim based on the deprivation of her work email account.

To the extent Plaintiffs complaint could be liberally construed to allege that her suspension with pay constituted a procedural due process violation, she has likewise failed to state a claim. Under North Carolina law, the superintendent may, under certain circumstances, suspend a teacher with pay for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed ninety days. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 11 SC-325.5(c). If the superintendent does not initiate dismissal or demotion proceedings against the teacher within the ninety-day period, the teacher must be reinstated immediately. Id. There are notice and hearing procedures regarding the dismissal or demotion of a teacher for cause set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-325.6.

Plaintiffs complaint alleges that she was suspended with pay for ninety days on March 3, 2022. [DE-1-1] ¶ 52. Plaintiff filed her complaint on March 11, 2022, prior to the end of the ninety-day period, and there is no allegation that dismissal or demotion proceedings had been initiated against her by the superintendent. Thus, under North Carolina state law, Plaintiff was not yet due a hearing. Because an actionable constitutional violation “is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process,” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 114, 126 (1990), Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of her due process rights.

5

...