Reavis v. Frost

• Decision Date: 28 July 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-7042,19-7042
• Parties: Jo Kathryn REAVIS, administrator of the ESTATE OF James Carl COALE, deceased, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Blake FROST, individually, Defendant - Appellant, and Derrell Summers, individually; Okfuskee County Sheriff, in his official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

967 F.3d 978

Jo Kathryn REAVIS, administrator of the ESTATE OF James Carl COALE, deceased, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Blake FROST, individually, Defendant - Appellant,andDerrell Summers, individually; Okfuskee County Sheriff, in his official capacity, Defendants.

No. 19-7042

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

FILED July 28, 2020

Randall J. Wood (Robert S. Lafferrandre, Jessica L. Dark, and Charles A. Schreck, with him on the briefs), Pierce Couch Hendrickson Baysinger & Green, L.L.P., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant.

Andrew M. Casey, Foshee & Yaffe, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Carla R. Stinnett, Stinnett Law, Sapulpa, Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before BRISCOE, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.

McHUGH, Circuit Judge.

This appeal involves a police traffic stop that ended with the tragic death of the motorist. On November 5, 2016, Okfuskee County Sheriff Deputy Blake Frost shot and killed James Carl Coale, as Mr. Coale was fleeing in his truck from a roadside police stop. Mr. Coale's estate sued Deputy Frost, alleging the use of excessive force in violation of Mr. Coale's Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied Deputy Frost's motion for summary judgment that was based on qualified immunity. Because it was clearly established that Deputy Frost's use of deadly force to stop Mr. Coale's fleeing vehicle was objectively unreasonable, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History¹

Deputy Blake Frost and Deputy Zachary Scribner, deputies with the Okfuskee County Sheriff's Department, responded to the report of a stabbing incident on November 5, 2016. They went to the Creek Nation Emergency Room in Okemah, Oklahoma, where the stabbing victim identified his assailant as Josh Williams. According to the victim, Mr. Williams fled the scene of the stabbing in a large, black 1990s model Chevrolet truck with a loud exhaust. The victim further stated that the truck was towing a trailer and that Mr. Williams had a toddler with him in the vehicle.

After taking the stabbing victim's report, Deputy Frost and Deputy Scribner employed their separate police vehicles to locate Mr. Williams. At County Road 3750, the two split up, with Deputy Frost driving north and Deputy Scribner driving south.

While proceeding north, Deputy Frost drove past a dark-colored Chevrolet truck, no trailer attached, as it was backing out of a driveway attached to a house. After Deputy Frost passed the vehicle, its reverse lights went off and the truck pulled forward in a semi-circle through the front yard of the house and proceeded south on CR 3750—the same direction as Deputy Scribner and away from Deputy Frost. None of these actions constituted a traffic violation.

Deputy Frost radioed Deputy Scribner and reported he believed he had found the suspect, Mr. Williams. Deputy Scribner then turned around and began driving north while Deputy Frost turned around and began driving south, both pursuing the dark-colored truck. Unbeknown to the deputies, James Coale was driving the truck—not the suspect, Mr. Williams.

After Deputy Frost began following the truck, Mr. Coale made a U-turn. Mr. Coale was now driving north in front of Deputy Scribner, while Deputy Frost was driving south toward Mr. Coale and Deputy Scribner. At some point during the pursuit, Deputy Frost activated his emergency lights.

While still driving southbound, Deputy Frost changed lanes and stopped his vehicle in the northbound lane, directly in the path of Mr. Coale. Mr. Coale stopped his truck about one and a half to two car lengths away from Deputy Frost in the same northbound lane, with the vehicles facing each other. Deputy Frost exited his vehicle and walked behind it so he could approach Mr. Coale from the passenger side. This resulted in Deputy Frost standing in the middle of the road. According to Deputy Frost, he did so to improve his "tactical position" and to get a better line of sight because Mr. Coale's truck headlights were in his eyes.

Deputy Frost testified that he identified himself as with the Sheriff's office and repeatedly commanded Mr. Coale to show his hands. Deputy Frost had his gun flat against his chest in the "ready" position as he spoke to Mr. Coale. Deputy Frost did not check whether anyone else was in Mr. Coale's vehicle at that time. When Mr. Coale did not show his hands, Deputy Frost pointed his gun at Mr. Coale.

Mr. Coale accelerated his truck forward and toward Deputy Frost. Deputy Frost moved closer to his own vehicle and Mr. Coale's truck went around Deputy Frost and the police truck, passing within inches of Deputy Frost. About the time Mr. Coale's side mirror passed Deputy Frost, he raised his gun to fire at Mr. Coale. Deputy Frost fired five to seven times as the vehicle passed. The district court determined that "all of the bullets were [fired] behind and to the side of Mr. Coale." App., Vol. I at 323. A sketch of Mr. Coale's truck and the bullet trajectories strongly supports this finding.² The bullet trajectory diagram shows the bullets entered Mr. Coale's truck through the rear window or next to the rear window on the passenger side. The district court's finding is also not surprising in light of how Deputy Frost described the sequence of events: "As he's passing by, I watch the front of the truck go by. The mirror comes, and I find sight picture on my firearm. [As] soon as I found sight picture, I squeezed." App., Vol. II at 370. Deputy Frost further testified:

Q. Where were you aiming?

A. For the driver.

Q. Was this through the back window?

A. That was as soon as I gained sight picture to initiate, yes.

App., Vol. II at 371.

The vehicle continued a short way down the road and then ran into a ditch. Deputy Frost went to his vehicle to report that shots had been fired. Deputy Scribner arrived while Deputy Frost was on his car radio reporting the incident. Intending to make an arrest, Deputy Scribner advanced on Mr. Coale's vehicle. But Mr. Coale was unresponsive. Deputy Scribner, who had encountered Mr. Williams before, knew that Mr. Coale was not the stabbing suspect. He informed Deputy Frost of that fact.

Neither deputy attempted to render aid to Mr. Coale, but Deputy Scribner called Emergency Medical Services. While the two deputies were waiting for others to arrive, Deputy Frost told Deputy Scribner that Mr. Coale had tried to run him over. Deputy Frost made no other statements, handed over his service weapon when it was requested, and was taken to the police station. Subsequent examination concluded that Mr. Coale died from a gunshot wound

to the back of the head.

B. Procedural History

On April 12, 2017, Jo Kathryn Reavis, the administrator of Mr. Coale's estate (the Estate), filed a Complaint alleging two claims against Deputy Frost. First, the Estate brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Deputy Frost violated Mr. Coale's Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. Second, the Estate brought a wrongful death claim pursuant to Oklahoma Statute Title 12, § 1053. Deputy Frost moved for summary judgment on both claims. With respect to the § 1983 claim, Deputy Frost asserted he is entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied Deputy Frost's motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim. But the district court dismissed the Estate's wrongful death claim because the Estate conceded that Deputy Frost is not a proper party to that claim. Deputy Frost filed a timely appeal of the district court's denial of qualified immunity.

An order denying qualified immunity from suit, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an immediately appealable decision under the collateral order doctrine and is a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 525–30, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). We therefore have jurisdiction over the legal issues raised by Deputy Frost's appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

"We review the denial of a summary judgment motion raising qualified immunity questions de novo." Estate of Ceballos v. Husk , 919 F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). However, "the appealable issue is a purely legal one: whether the facts alleged (by the plaintiff, or, in some cases, the defendant) support a claim of violation of clearly established law." Mitchell , 472 U.S. at 528 n.9, 105 S.Ct. 2806.

[I]f a district court concludes a reasonable jury could find certain specified facts in favor of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court has indicated we usually must take them as true—and do so even if our own de novo review of the record might suggest otherwise as a matter of law.

Lynch v. Barrett , 703 F.3d 1153, 1159 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also Fancher v. Barrientos , 723 F.3d 1191, 1199 (10th Cir. 2013) ("This court, however, lacks jurisdiction at this stage to review a district court's factual conclusions, such as the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for a jury to decide, or that a plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to support a particular factual inference." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

"The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ " Mullenix v. Luna , 577 U.S. 7, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ). Deputy Frost's "assertion of qualified immunity creates a presumption that [he is] immune from suit." Perea v. Baca , 817 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2016). The Estate can overcome this presumption only by "show[ing] that (1) the officers’ alleged conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) it was clearly established at the time of the violation, such that ‘every reasonable official would have understood,’ that such conduct constituted a violation of that right." Id. (quoting Mullenix , 136 S. Ct. at 308 ).

The district court denied...