Recorder's Court of Detroit v. City of Detroit

Decision Date12 July 1984
Docket NumberDocket No. 67116
Citation351 N.W.2d 289,134 Mich.App. 239
PartiesRECORDER'S COURT OF DETROIT, Plaintiff, and County of Wayne, Plaintiff-Cross Defendant-Appellant, and Michigan Department of Corrections, Plaintiff-Cross Defendant, v. CITY OF DETROIT, a municipal corporation, Honorable Colman A. Young, Mayor, Defendant-Cross Plaintiff-Appellee. 134 Mich.App. 239, 351 N.W.2d 289
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

[134 MICHAPP 240] George H. Cross, Corporation Counsel, Edward L. Douglas, Acting Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Douglas B. Dimitry, Principal Atty., Detroit, for County of Wayne.

Donald Pailen, Corporate Counsel, Mark R. Ulicny, Deputy Corporate Counsel, and Kay D. Schloff and Harnetha Williams-Jarrett, Asst. Corporation Counsels, Detroit, for City of Detroit.

Before V.J. BRENNAN, P.J., and CYNAR and SIMON *, JJ.

SIMON, Judge.

In this action Wayne County seeks an injunction preventing the City of Detroit from closing the Detroit House of Correction, while the city seeks an order of mandamus requiring the county to assume custody of certain persons convicted in the county. The circuit judge granted summary judgment for the city and issued an order containing the following holding:

"The Court finds that the statutory responsibility for the housing of the convicted misdemeanants and ordinance violators in the County of Wayne is that of said COUNTY, subject to appropriate reimbursements; that the CITY OF DETROIT is not mandated by law to continue the operation of the Detroit House of Corrections in perpetuity regardless of changing conditions and the fact that 95 percent of the inmates at the facility are not the responsibility of that CITY."

The county appeals as of right. The circuit court [134 MICHAPP 241] failed to specify the grounds on which summary judgment was granted and, although the parties agree that the city filed a motion for summary judgment and the county filed a response, the confused circuit court files contain no such documents. Because the county argues on appeal that issues of fact existed which should have precluded summary judgment, we will assume that summary judgment was entered pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(3) on the grounds that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the city was entitled to prevail as a matter of law.

A county is required to maintain a jail. M.C.L. Sec. 45.16; M.S.A. Sec. 5.291. The county jails are to be used as prisons for detention of persons awaiting trial and for the confinement of persons sentenced upon conviction of an offense or committed for any cause authorized by law. M.C.L. Sec. 801.1; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1721. Villages and cities may use the county jail to confine persons convicted of ordinance violations, M.C.L. Sec. 66.8; M.S.A. Sec. 5.1278; M.C.L. Sec. 90.8; M.S.A. Sec. 5.1729, although the county must be compensated by the villages and cities for the expenses of such confinement, People ex rel. Mixer v. Bd. of Supervisors of Manistee County, 26 Mich. 422 (1873). Persons convicted of a crime or contempt of court who receive sentences of imprisonment for one year or less must be confined in a county jail or in the Detroit House of Correction. M.C.L. Sec. 769.28; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1097(1). Confinement in the House of Correction is the legal equivalent of confinement in a county jail. Elliott v. People, 13 Mich. 365 (1865).

The statute governing the House of Correction, M.C.L. Sec. 802.1 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1811 et seq., was first enacted by 1861 P.A. 164. The origin of the statute was explained in Detroit v. Laughna, 34 Mich. 402, 403, 404-405 (1876):

[134 MICHAPP 242] "The city, indeed, built the prison, and has an interest in its finances, as it is responsible to a certain degree for its expenses; but after the house was built under provisions of the city charter, which may or may not have been legally sufficient to provide for its future management, the legislature, either discovering defects, or, more probably, recognizing the manifest impropriety of allowing a prison to be managed by a city council, passed a statute which removed any doubt concerning the legal position of that establishment."

See also Detroit v. Bd. of Water Comm'rs, 108 Mich. 494, 66 N.W. 377 (1896), and Green v. Dep't of Corrections, 30 Mich.App. 648, 186 N.W.2d 792 (1971), aff'd 386 Mich. 459, 192 N.W.2d 491 (1971). The language employed in M.C.L. Sec. 802.1; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1811 shows that the statute merely recognized the existence of the House of Correction and provided for its future management:

"That the building erected for that purpose by the city of Detroit, shall be known and recognized as the 'Detroit house of correction' and shall be used for the confinement, punishment and reformation of criminals or persons sentenced thereto, under the provisions of this act, or any law of this state authorizing the confinement of convicted persons in said house of correction."

There is no language in the statute mandating the continued existence of the House of Correction. The county has pointed to the title of 1861 P.A. 164:

"AN ACT to establish the Detroit house of correction and authorize the confinement of convicted persons and persons awaiting trial or sentence." (Emphasis added.)

However, the title is not part of the statute; reliance on a title for purposes of statutory construction is permissible only to resolve ambiguity [134 MICHAPP 243] in the body of the statute or where there has been a clear error in omitting material from the body of the statute. People v. Jaboro, 76 Mich.App. 8, 258 N.W.2d 60 (1977). In Bankhead v. Mayor of River Rouge, 387 Mich. 610, 614-615, 198 N.W.2d 414 (1972), the Court explained that the title may be used to limit but not expand the scope of the statute. Reliance on the word "establish" in the title of 1861 P.A. 164 to conclude that the continuing existence of the House of Correction is mandated would expand the scope of the statute and would be inconsistent with other language in the body of the statute.

The statute commits the power to perform most management functions for the House of Correction to a board of inspectors, M.C.L. Sec. 802.2; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1812; however, certain powers are reserved to the city. One of those reserved powers is to make agreements to take custody of certain persons. See M.C.L. Sec. 802.8; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1818 (with any organized county for custody of persons sentenced to confinement for not less than 60 days), M.C.L. Sec. 802.8a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1818(1) (with any county having a population of 500,000 or more for custody of persons awaiting trial or sentence), M.C.L. Sec. 802.11; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1821 (with inspectors of the state prison for custody of certain state prisoners), and M.C.L. Sec. 802.16; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1826 (with Wayne County for custody of convicted persons who would otherwise be confined in the county jail). Absent such an agreement, persons may not be committed to the House of Correction. Dorsey v. People, 37 Mich. 382 (1877); see also M.C.L. Sec. 802.9; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1819, and M.C.L. Sec. 802.17; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1827.

Courts will presume that the Legislature did not intend to do a useless thing, if a statute can be reasonably construed to avoid such a consequence. Brown v. Dep't of State, 45 Mich.App. 322 326, 206 N.W.2d 481 (1973). The Legislature could not have [134 MICHAPP 244] intended to require that an empty House of Corrrection remain open. Because persons can only be committed to the House of Correction pursuant to an agreement with the city, the city may close the House of Correction if it has no agreement to take custody of any committed persons.

The county, however, relies on two 19th century cases to argue that it may commit persons to the House of Correction even without an agreement. In Wesley v. People, 37 Mich. 384, 384-385 (1877), the Court held:

"Without attempting to review all the legislation pertaining or referring to the Detroit House of Correction which may be found in the charter of the city of Detroit we are of opinion that section 8160 of the Compiled Laws [the predecessor of MCL 802.16; MSA 28.1826] clearly authorizes the recorder to sentence such convicts to the House of Correction, and that no contract is necessary such as is required by section 8155 of Compiled Laws [now MCL 802.11; MSA 28.1821]. As to the county of Wayne, the House of Correction is made the place of imprisonment for county jail offenses, and must be treated to that extent as if it were the county jail."

In Detroit v. Wayne County Bd. of Auditors, 43 Mich. 169 170-171, 5 N.W. 77 (1880), the Court referred to Wesley v. People and stated:

"[I]t was held that the House of Correction must for certain offenses be treated as if it were the jail of Wayne county, and that the Recorder of the city of Detroit had authority to sentence convicts to the House of Correction, and that no contract was necessary with the county as a condition precedent to such right.

"The legislation relating to this subject in no way interferes with the right of the board of auditors of Wayne county to adjust claims against their county, or [134 MICHAPP 245] places that county in this respect upon a footing essentially different from other counties in the State."

However, the county's reliance on these cases is based on a misunderstanding of the legislative history. Sections 16 and 17 of 1861 P.A. 164, now M.C.L. Sec. 802.16; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1826 and M.C.L. 802.17; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1827, originally read as follows:

"Sec. 16. Immediately after filing the certificate of completion as aforesaid, the said inspectors shall cause a copy thereof to be published in at least three newspapers published in said county, and thereafter it shall be the duty of every court or magistrate in the said county of Wayne, authorized by law to sentence or commit any person to the county jail of said county as...

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