Rector, Etc of Holy Trinity Church v. United States

• Decision Date: 29 February 1892
• Citation: 36 L.Ed. 226,12 S.Ct. 511,143 U.S. 457
• Parties: RECTOR, ETC., OF HOLY TRINITY CHURCH v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

143 U.S. 457

12 S.Ct. 511

36 L.Ed. 226

RECTOR, ETC., OF HOLY TRINITY CHURCHv.UNITED STATES.

February 29, 1892.

Seaman Miller, for plaintiff in error.

Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for the United States.

Mr. Justice BREWERdelivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff in error is a corporation duly organized and incorporated as a religious society under the laws of the state of New York.E. Walpole Warren was, prior to September 1887, an alien residing in England.In that month the plaintiff in error made a contract with him, by which he was to remove to the city of New York, and enter into its service as rector and pastor; and, in pursuance of such contract, Warren did so remove and enter upon such service.It is claimed by the United States that this contract on the part of the plaintiff in error was forbidden by chapter 164, 23St.p. 332; and an action was commenced to recover the penalty prescribed by that act.The circuit court held that the contract was within the prohibition of the statute, and rendered judgment accordingly, (36 Fed. Rep. 303,) and the single question presented for our determination is whether it erred in that conclusion.

The first section describes the act forbidden, and is in these words:

'Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America, in congress assembled, that from and after the passage of this act it shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership, or corporation, in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the importation or migration, of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United States, its territories, or the District of Columbia, under contract or agreement, parol or special, express or implied, made previous to the inportation or migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States, its territories, or the District of Columbia.'

It must be conceded that the act of the corporation is within the letter of this section, for the relation of rector to his church is one of service, and implies labor on the one side with compensation on the other.Not only are the general words 'labor' and 'service' both used, but also, as it were to guard against any narrow interpretation and emphasize a breadth of meaning, to them is added 'of any kind;' and, further, as noticed by the circuit judge in his opinion, the fifth section, which makes specific exceptions, among them professional actors, artists, lecturers, singers, and domestic servants, strengthens the idea that every other kind of labor and service was intended to be reached by the first section.While there is great force to this reasoning, we cannot think congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like that in the present case.It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.This has been often asserted, and the Reports are full of cases illustrating its application.This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator; for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.As said in Stradling v. Morgan, Plow. 205: 'From which cases it appears that the sages of the law heretofore have construed statutes quite contrary to the letter in some appearance, and those statutes which comprehend all things in the letter they have expounded to extend to but some things, and those which generally prohibit all people from doing such an act they have interpreted to permit some people to do it, and those which include every person in the letter they have adjudged to reach to some persons only, which expositions have always been founded upon the intent of the legislature, which they have collected sometimes by considering the cause and necessity of making the act, sometimes by comparing one part of the act with another, and sometimes by foreign circumstances.'

In Pier Co. v. Hannam, 3 Barn. & Ald. 266, ABBOTT, C. J., quotes from Lord Coke as follows: 'Acts of parliament are to be so construed as no man that is innocent or free from injury or wrong be, by a literal construction, punished or endangered.'In the case of State v. Clark, 29 N. J. Law, 96, 99, it appeared that an act had been passed, making it a misdemeanor to willfully break down a fence in the possession of another person.Clark was indicted under that statute.The defense was that the act of breaking down the fence, though willful, was in the exercise of a legal right to go upon his own lands.The trial court rejected the testimony offered to sustain the defense, and the supreme court held that this ruling was error.In its opinion the court used this language: 'The act of 1855, in terms, makes the willful opening, breaking down, or injuring of any fences belonging to or in the possession of any other person a misdemeanor.In what sense is the term 'willful' used?In common parlance, 'willful' is used in the sense of 'intentional,' as distinguished from 'accidental' or 'involuntary.'Whatever one does intentionally, he does willfully.Is it used in that sense in this act?Did the legislature intend to make the intentional opening of a fence for the purpose of going upon the land of another indictable, if done by permission or for a lawful purpose?* * * We cannot suppose such to have been the actual intent.To adopt such a construction would put a stop to the ordinary business of life.The language of the act, if construed literally, evidently leads to an absurd result.If a literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity.The court must restrain the words.The object designed to be reached by the act must limit and control the literal import of the terms and phrases employed.'In U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486, the defendants were indicted for the violation of an act of congress providing 'that if any person shall knowingly and willfully obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, or of any driver or carrier, or of any horse or carriage carrying the same, he shall, upon conviction, for every such offense, pay a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.'The specific charge was that the defendants knowingly and willfully retarded the passage of one Farris, a carrier of the mail, while engaged in the performance of his duty, and also in like manner retarded the steam-boat Gen. Buell, at that time engaged in carrying the mail.To this indictment the defendants pleaded specially that Farris had been indicted for murder by a court of competent authority in Kentucky; that a bench-warrant had been issued and placed in the hands of the defendant Kirby, the sheriff of the county, commanding him to arrest Farris, and bring him before the court to answer to the indictment; and that, in obedience to this warrant, he and the other defendants, as his posse, entered upon the steamboat Gen. Buell and arrested Farris, and used only such force as was necessary to accomplish that arrest.The question as to the sufficiency of this plea was certified to this court, and it was held that the arrest of Farris upon the warrant from the state court was not an obstruction of the mail, or the retarding of the passage of a carrier of the mail, within the meaning of the act.In its opinion the court says: 'All laws should receive a sensible construction.General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence.It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character.The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.The common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted 'that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,' did not extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit.The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1 Edw. II., which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire, 'for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.'And we think that a like common sense will sanction the ruling we make, that the act of congress which punishes the obstruction or retarding of the passage of the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply to a case of temporary detention of the mail caused by the arrest of the carrier upon an indictment for murder.'The following cases may also be cited: Henry v. Tilson, 17 Vt. 479;Ryegate v. Wardsboro, 30 Vt. 743;Ex parte Ellis, 11 Cal. 220;Ingraham v. Speed, 30 Miss. 410;Jackson v. Collins, 3 Cow. 89;People v. Insurance Co., 15 Johns. 358;Burch v. Newbury, 10 N. Y. 374;People v Commissioners, 95 N. Y. 554, 558;People v. Lacombe, 99 N. Y. 43, 49, 1 N. E. Rep. 599;Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 4 Gill & J. 152;Osgood v. Breed, 12 Mass. 525, 530;Wilbur v. Crane, 13 Pick. 284;Oates v. Bank, 100 U. S. 239.

Among other things which may be considered in determining the intent of the legislature is the title of the act.We do not mean that it may be used to add to or take from the body of the statute, (Hadden v. Collector, 5 Wall. 107,) but it may help to interpret its meaning.In the case of U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 386, Chief Justice MARSHALL...