Red Spot Paint & Varnish Co. v. Columbia St. Partners, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 May 2022
• Docket Number: 21A-CC-1806
• Parties: Red Spot Paint & Varnish Company, Inc. Appellant-Defendant v. Columbia Street Partners, Inc. and Charles D. Storms, Appellees-Plaintiffs.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Red Spot Paint & Varnish Company, Inc. Appellant-Defendant v. Columbia Street Partners, Inc. and Charles D. Storms, Appellees-Plaintiffs.

No. 21A-CC-1806

Court of Appeals of Indiana

May 24, 2022

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

Appeal from the Vanderburgh Circuit Court The Honorable Robert R Aylsworth, Special Judge Trial Court Cause No 82C01-2010-CC-4333

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT James D. Dasso Stephanie Adamo Foley & Lardner LLP Chicago, Illinois J.Herbert DavisStoll Keenon Ogden PLLC Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE G.Daniel KelleySamuel B. GardnerIce Miller LLP Indianapolis, Indiana David V. Miller Newburgh, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PYLE, JUDGE.

Statement of the Case

[¶1] In this appeal, Red Spot Paint & Varnish Company ("Red Spot") attempts to challenge the trial court's order, in which the trial court granted summary judgment to Columbia Street Partners, Inc. ("Columbia") and Charles D. Storms ("Storms") (collectively "Columbia Street") on one of two claims in Columbia Street's complaint and specifically reserved jurisdiction to hold a hearing and determine an unresolved matter regarding Columbia's claim for attorney fees and costs. Because the trial court's order was neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, we sua sponte dismiss the appeal without prejudice to Red Spot's right to file an appeal once a final judgment has been entered or the order has been certified for an interlocutory appeal.

[¶2] We dismiss.

Issue

Whether the trial court's order was either a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order.

Facts

[¶3] This current case commenced in October 2020 when Columbia Street filed a complaint against Red Spot. Columbia Street sought declaratory relief based on the interpretation of Section 7 of a prior settlement agreement entered between Columbia Street and Red Spot in 2010 ("the 2010 settlement agreement"). Specifically, Columbia Street sought declaratory relief that it had no obligation to indemnify Red Spot for Red Spot's costs and attorney fees incurred when a third party had impleaded Red Spot into an environmental legal action lawsuit that had been filed against the third party by Columbia Street in 2016 ("the 2016 litigation"). Additionally, in its complaint, Columbia Street sought relief, pursuant to a different section of the 2010 settlement agreement, to recover attorney fees and costs incurred in this current litigation.

[¶4] Thereafter, Red Spot filed a counterclaim against Columbia Street. Red Spot's counterclaim, which was also based on the interpretation of Section 7 of the 2010 settlement agreement, sought indemnity for the costs and fees incurred in the 2016 litigation and asserted that Columbia Street had breached the 2010 settlement agreement by failing to indemnify Red Spot. Red Spot also sought relief, pursuant to the 2010 settlement agreement, to recover attorney fees and costs from this current litigation.

[¶5] Both parties filed motions for summary judgment on Columbia Street's complaint and Red Spot's counterclaim. The parties' summary judgment motions sought to have the trial court interpret Section 7 of the 2010 settlement agreement and determine whether Columbia Street was required to indemnify Red Spot for Red Spot's costs from the 2016 litigation. Additionally, both parties sought to recover, pursuant to Section 15 of the 2010 settlement agreement, attorney fees and costs to be determined in a later hearing during which evidence of the costs and fees could be presented.

[¶6] In July 2021, the trial court issued an order on the summary judgment motions that addressed only the indemnity issue. Specifically, the trial court granted Columbia Street's summary judgment motion, concluding that, pursuant to the "clear and unambiguous" language of Section 7 of the 2010 settlement agreement, Columbia Street was "entitled to a declaration and judgment that they ha[d] no obligation under Section 7 to indemnify Red Spot" for Red Spot's costs and attorney fees from the 2016 litigation. (App. Vol. 2 at 11). The trial court also denied Red Spot's summary judgment motion, concluding that Red Spot was not entitled to any relief on its counterclaim. In its order, the trial court also specifically "reserve[ed] jurisdiction to hear and determine any matters as yet unresolved in this matter." (App. Vol. 2 at 12) (emphasis added).

[¶7] Thereafter, Columbia Street filed a motion, seeking to have the trial court set deadlines for the determination of Columbia Street's claim for attorney fees and costs. The trial court granted Columbia Street's motion to set deadlines for a future hearing on Columbia Street's claim for the fees and costs. Subsequently, Red Spot filed its notice of appeal with this Court and indicated that it was appealing a final judgment as defined under Appellate Rule 2(H).

Decision

[¶8] Red Spot argues that the trial court erred by granting Columbia Street's summary judgment motion and denying Red Spot's summary judgment motion. We, however, decline to review Red Spot's challenge at this juncture because the trial court's order was neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order.

[¶9] "Whether an order is a final judgment governs the appellate courts' subject matter jurisdiction." Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 757 (Ind. 2014). See Ind. Appellate Rule 5(A) (providing that this Court has jurisdiction in appeals from final judgments). As set forth in Indiana Appellate Rule 2(H), a judgment is a "final judgment" if:

(1) it disposes of all claims as to all parties;

(2) the trial court in writing expressly determines under . Trial Rule 56(C) that there is no just reason for delay and in writing expressly directs the entry of judgment . . . under Trial Rule 56(C) as to fewer than all the claims or parties;

(3) it is deemed final under Trial Rule 60(C);

(4) it is a ruling on either a mandatory or permissive Motion to Correct Error. . .; or

(5) it is otherwise deemed final by law.

App. R. 2(H). "[A] final judgment disposes of all issues as to all parties thereby ending the particular case" and "leaves nothing for future determination." Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind. 2003) (cleaned up), reh'g denied.

[¶10] In this case, the trial court granted summary judgment to Columbia Street on the claim in its complaint in which Columbia Street sought to have the trial court interpret and enforce Section 7 of the parties' 2010 settlement agreement and enter a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to indemnify Red Spot. We recognize that, under Appellate Rule 2(H)(5), a judgment is considered a "final judgment" if "it is otherwise deemed final by law" and that, pursuant to the Indiana Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, a trial court's "declaration has the full force and effect of a final judgment or decree." I.C. § 31-14-1-1.

[¶11] Here, however, the trial court's order ruling on the parties' summary judgment motions decided only one of Columbia Street's two claims before the trial court, and the trial court specifically reserved jurisdiction on the remaining claim to be determined at a later date following a hearing on the matter. Specifically, the trial court interpreted Section 7 of the 2010 settlement agreement to determine that Columbia Street was entitled to summary judgment on its claim that Columbia Street had no obligation to indemnify Red Spot. However, the trial court did not interpret Section 15 of the 2010 settlement agreement to determine whether Columbia Street was entitled to attorney fees and costs or determine the amount of any such fees and costs. Because the trial court's order did not "disposes of all issues as to all parties thereby ending the particular case" and there remained a matter left "for future determination," the summary judgment order in this particular case was not a final judgment. See Georgos, 790 N.E.2d at 451. See also Forman v. Penn, 938 N.E.2d 287, 288 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010) (concluding that the trial court's order granting an insurer's summary judgment motion seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to provide a defense to its insurer was not a final appealable order where there were remaining unresolved claims), on reh'g, 945 N.E.2d 717 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011), trans. denied. Cf. Kornelik v. Mittal Steel USA, Inc., 952 N.E.2d 320, 324 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011) (explaining that a trial court's ruling in a declaratory judgment case was a final appealable order because it disposed of all remaining claims between the remaining parties), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[¶12] "[I]f a trial court's summary judgment order is not final as to all issues, claims, and parties, the order must include the 'magic language' set forth in Trial Rule 56(C) to be considered final."^[1] Indy Auto Man, LLC v. Keown &amp Kratz, LLC, 84 N.E.3d 718, 721 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017) (emphasis in original). "Otherwise, a summary judgment order...