Red v. Lam Platt St. Hotel

• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
• Writing for the Court: LEWIS J. LIMAN, United States District Judge
• Decision Date: 28 April 2022
• Docket Number: 19-cv-4992 (LJL)
• Citation: Red v. Lam Platt St. Hotel, 19-cv-4992 (LJL) (S.D. N.Y. Apr 28, 2022)
• Parties: THERESA RED and GREGORY RED, Plaintiffs, v. LAM PLATT STREET HOTEL, LLC, LAM PLATT STREET HOTEL, LLC a/k/a FOUR POINTS BY SHERATON NEW YORK DOWNTOWN HOTEL, REAL HOSPITALITY GROUP, Defendants. REAL HOSPITALITY GROUP d/b/a FOUR POINTS BY SHERATON NEW YORK DOWNTOWN HOTEL, LAM PLATT STREET HOTEL, LLC, REAL HOSPITALITY GROUP, LLC, LAM PLATT STREET HOTEL LLC, Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. SKYTEAM CORP., Third-Party Defendant. SKYTEAM CORP. Cross Claimant, v. LAM PLATT STREET HOTEL LLC, LAM PLATT STREET HOTEL, LLC, REAL HOSPITALITY GROUP, Cross Defendants.

THERESA RED and GREGORY RED, Plaintiffs, v. LAM PLATT STREET HOTEL, LLC, LAM PLATT STREET HOTEL, LLC a/k/a FOUR POINTS BY SHERATON NEW YORK DOWNTOWN HOTEL, REAL HOSPITALITY GROUP, Defendants.

REAL HOSPITALITY GROUP d/b/a FOUR POINTS BY SHERATON NEW YORK DOWNTOWN HOTEL, LAM PLATT STREET HOTEL, LLC, REAL HOSPITALITY GROUP, LLC, LAM PLATT STREET HOTEL LLC, Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. SKYTEAM CORP., Third-Party Defendant.

SKYTEAM CORP. Cross Claimant, v. LAM PLATT STREET HOTEL LLC, LAM PLATT STREET HOTEL, LLC, REAL HOSPITALITY GROUP, Cross Defendants.

No. 19-cv-4992 (LJL)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

April 28, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER

LEWIS J. LIMAN, United States District Judge Plaintiff Theresa Red (“Plaintiff” or “Red”) alleges that she suffered physical injuries when on August 18, 2018, she tripped on a hump in the carpeting on the 26^th floor of the Four Points by Sheraton New York Downtown Hotel (the “Hotel”) on Platt Street in New York City. Dkt Nos. 1, 64. On August 18, 2018, the Hotel was owned by Lam Platt Street Hotel, LLC (“Lam”) and Real Hospitality Group LLC (“RHG”) was the manager of the Hotel. Dkt. No. 88 ¶ 2. Red sued Lam, Lam “a/k/a Four Points by Sheraton New York Downtown Hotel ” RHG, and RHG “d/b/a Four Points by Sheraton New York Downtown Hotel” (together “Defendants” or “Third-Party Plaintiffs”) for negligence, and her husband, Gregory Red, sued for loss of services and consortium and associated damages.^[1] Red also initially sued Skyteam Corp. (“Skyteam”), the entity that installed the carpeting on the 26^th floor, for negligence, but has since voluntarily discontinued her action against it. Dkt. No. 102. Defendants cross-claim against third-party defendant Skyteam for contribution and apportionment, alleging that if Plaintiff was injured by any cause other than her own negligence, that would mean Skyteam was negligent in the installation of the carpeting and shares responsibility for Plaintiff's injury. Dkt. No. 23.

Two motions are currently before the Court. Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to identify evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact that a dangerous or defective condition existed or that they created the alleged defect or had actual or constructive notice of it and that, on the undisputed facts, any defect, if it existed, was trivial as a matter of law. Dkt. Nos. 90, 91. Third-party defendant Skyteam moves for summary judgment on the cross-claim against it, arguing that it did not owe any duty that could give rise to liability in this case, that it is not responsible for any negligence of the carpet installers it hired, and that there is no evidence from which a jury could find that it created a non-trivial defect giving rise to Plaintiff's injury.^[2] For the reasons that follow, both motions are denied.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And “[a]n issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” WWBITV, Inc. v. Village of Rouses Point, 589 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue to be tried as to any material fact, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). If the movant meets its burden, “the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). To survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party “may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts, ” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), and must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The non-moving party “cannot defeat the motion by relying on the allegations in [its] pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible.” Gottlieb v. Cnty. of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). But if “the party opposing summary judgment propounds a reasonable conflicting interpretation of a material disputed fact, ” summary judgment must be denied. Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1983).

The federal burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment differs from the corresponding standard under New York law in a slip-and-fall action. See, e.g., Tenay v. Culinary Teachers Ass'n of Hyde Park, 281 Fed.Appx. 11, 12-13 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order); Vasquez v. United States, 2016 WL 315879, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2016). “Under New York law, ‘[a] defendant who moves for summary judgment in a [sl]ip-and-fall case has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the alleged hazardous condition, nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a length of time sufficient to discover and remedy it.'” Vasquez, 2016 WL 315879, at *4 (quoting Levine v. Amverserve Ass'n, Inc., 938 N.Y.S.2d 593, 593 (2d Dep't 2012)). Conversely, under federal law, the moving party “need not make any affirmative prima facie showing on [a] motion for summary judgment, and may discharge its burden of proof merely ‘by pointing to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of [Plaintiff's] claim.'” Id. at *5 (quoting Zeak v. United States, 2014 WL 5324319, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2014); see also Feis v. United States, 394 Fed.Appx. 797, 79899 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (applying New York substantive law and federal procedural law and concluding that “contrary to plaintiff's assertions, defendant was not required to affirmatively disprove each element of plaintiff's [slip-and-fall] claim”). While New York law governs the substantive slip-and-fall claim, federal law applies to procedural aspects of the claim, and “[b]ecause the moving party's burden of proof on a summary judgment motion is procedural, it is therefore governed by federal law.” Sampson v. Sarah Lawrence College, 2021 WL 3855862, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2021).

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's complaint, arguing that Plaintiff has not presented evidence to create a triable issue on any of the elements of her claim.^[3]

“To establish liability under New York law, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant owed her a duty; (2) that the defendant breached that duty; and (3) that she suffered injuries proximately resulting from that breach.” Coyle v. United States, 954 F.3d 146, 148 (2d Cir. 2020). For a defendant to be held liable to the plaintiff in a slip-and-fall case, there must be evidence showing two things: first, that a dangerous or defective condition existed, and second, that the defendant either (1) “created the condition” or (2) “had actual or constructive notice of it and failed to remedy it in a reasonable time.” Winder v. Exec. Cleaning Servs., LLC, 936 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688 (2d Dep't 2012); see also Feis, 394 Fed.Appx. at 798 (2d Cir. 2010) (“To make out a prima facie case of negligence in a slip and fall case under New York law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant had knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition, either actual or constructive, or that it caused the condition to be created by its own affirmative act.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Gonzalez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 299 F.Supp.2d 188, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining that, for a slip-and-fall premises liability case, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the landowner created the condition that caused the injury, or that the landowner had actual or constructive notice of the condition”).

Drawing all inferences in Plaintiff's favor as the non-moving party, there is sufficient evidence to create a jury issue that she was injured as a result of a dangerous or defective condition and that the Defendants had actual or constructive notice of it and failed to remedy it within a reasonable time. In particular, the evidence could support that Plaintiff and her daughter, non-party Katie Red, were paying guests at the Hotel from August 16, 2018 to August 19, 2018, Dkt No. 88 ¶ 1; that on the evening of August 18, 2018, Plaintiff tripped and fell in the Hotel's hallway after she exited her room on the 26^th floor as she headed towards the elevator banks to go to the hotel gym, id. ¶¶ 11, 26; Dkt. No. 92-18 at 42-44, and that as a result she suffered injuries and had to be taken from the Hotel to the hospital by ambulance, Dkt. No. 88 ¶ 21; Dkt. No. 92-18 at 65-66. Immediately after her fall, she contacted the Hotel front desk and reported that she fell on a hump in the carpet next to her door. Dkt. No. 92-6; Dkt. No. 92-18 at 58-69.

Although Defendants dispute that there existed any defect in the Hotel hallway carpeting that caused Plaintiff's...