[Redacted v. [Redacted, Docket No. 1997 SUP 2019

• Decision Date: 22 December 2015
• Docket Number: Docket No. 1997 SUP 2019
• Court: D.C. Superior Court
• Parties: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EX REL: [Redacted] ET AL., MINOR, Petitioner, v. [Redacted] Respondent.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EX REL: [Redacted] ET AL., MINOR, Petitioner, v. [Redacted] Respondent.

Docket No. 1997 SUP 2019

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FAMILY COURT DOMESTIC RELATIONS BRANCH

December 22, 2015

Judge Judith A. Smith

ORDER GRANTING GOVERNMENT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER

This matter comes before the Court upon the District of Columbia's Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge's Order pursuant to D.C. Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. Rule D, filed on July 2, 2014. See D.C. Super. Ct. Gen. Fam. R. D(e)(1). The government seeks relief from two orders issued by Magistrate Judge Diane Brenneman: the portion of the November 14, 2011 Permanent Order of Support which disestablished paternity of the minor child [Redacted] ("minor child"), born January 19, 1997, by [Redacted] ("respondent") and dismissed the child support case: and the June 26, 2014 Order explaining on remand the Magistrate Judge's factual findings and legal conclusions underpinning her 2011 dismissal. For the foregoing reasons, the government's Motion for Review is GRANTED. This matter is reversed and remanded for further child support proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

On [Redacted] the minor child was born to [Redacted] at Washington Hospital Center in Washington, D.C. Two days later, on [Redacted] and the respondent executed a notarized Acknowledgment of Parentage form for the minor child. The District of Columbia commenced the instant case on August 4, 1997 by filing a petition for support alleging that the respondent owed a duty to support the minor child. The matter was placed on the "stet" docket on September 1, 1998 and ultimately dismissed without prejudice as the government was unable to locate and serve the respondent. Nearly twelve years later, on May 24, 2010, the government filed a praecipe indicating thai it hud located the respondent and requesting a reissuance of a Notice of Hearing and Order Directing Appearance (NOHODA), The NOHODA was issued on June 11, 2010 and the respondent appeared in court on July 22, 2010. The respondent had recently been released from a period of incarceration lasting several years. At the Initial Support Hearing before Magistrate Judge Aida Melendez, the government and the respondent appeared having already reached an agreement on a temporary consent support order for the minor child in the amount of fifty dollars per month.

At the lime the consent support order was issued, a separate custody matter was underway at the D.C. Superior Court concerning the minor child and his younger sister, [Redacted] born [Redacted] (Case no: 2008 DRB 1406). (The government is not challenging any final order with respect to[Redacted] For clarity, the siblings will be referred to separately as "the minor child" and " [Redacted] for else together as "the children".) [Redacted] and the respondent's sister [Redacted] each sought primary custody of the children, while the respondent was named as a defendant but was not seeking physical or legal custody. Due to prolonged health issues endured by [Redacted] the children had been in the care of their paternal aunt, [Redacted] For several years. However. an November 9, 2010, the family count judge presiding over the custody mailer reverted sole custody to [Redacted] It appears from the record that the driving factor behind Judge Jeanette Clark's decision was the combination of[Redacted] increasing ability to care for her own children and the unfortunate deterioration of the relationship between the children and [Redacted]. Ultimately [Redacted] conceded to the change in custody and the matter was closed.¹

Shortly after his sister lost custody, on December 1, 2010, the respondent filed a Motion for Genetic Testing of the children. The government timely filed an opposition to the motion on December 10, 2010, The government contended that paternity had been established and the respondent had missed both the 60-day rescission period under D.C. Code § 16-909.01(a-1) as well as the one-year deadline to challenge on the basis fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact under Domestic Relations Rule 60(b).

A motions hearing was set on Magistrate Judge Brenneman's calendar for March 2, 2011 to hear the respondent's Motion for Genetic Testing. Present at the hearing were the government, the respondent, and [Redacted] Magistrate Judge Brenneman granted the government's oral requests to add [Redacted] to the temporary child support order and to change the payee from [Redacted] to [Redacted] in light of the recent change in custody. In support of ills request for DNA testing, the respondent alleged that [Redacted] had deceived him about his paternity of the minor child and that she had admitted as such in the recent child custody proceedings. As evidence, he provided to the court and the government copies of a transcript(s) from a hearing(s)² in the related custody matter. After reviewing the transcript silently. Magistrate Judge Brenneman granted the motion for DNA testing for the children. She also suspended the respondent's temporary support order tor the minor child, nunc pro tunc March 1, 2011. TheMagistrate Judge did not elicit further testimony from the respondent after reading the transcript, nor any from [Redacted] and made no oral findings of fact conclusions of law. A DNA/HLA Review and Support hearing was scheduled to review the lest results.

The respondent, [Redacted] and the children submitted to DNA testing. The testing results excluded the respondent as the lather of the minor child. The respondent was not excluded as the father of [Redacted] As a result, at the November 14, 2011 review hearting, Magistrate Judge Brenneman dismissed the paternity and support matter with prejudice to the minor child. She entered an adjudication of paternity and permanent support order for [Redacted] the amount of fifty dollars per month.

II. Government's Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge's Order

The government timely filed a Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge's Order on November 21, 2011. In support of its motion, the government argued that the trial court erred by disestablishing the respondent as the father of the minor child. Despite the paternity lest results excluding the respondent, the government argues that the trial court improperly ordered genetic testing since the respondent had previously signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. The government cited D.C. Code § 16-2342 to argue that "proceedings to establish paternity for a particular child may only be brought if the paternity of that child has not been previously established." See Motion for Review at 6. The government argued that the parents' written acknowledgment of parentage dated January 21, 1997 was sufficient to establish the legal relationship between the respondent and the minor child and that disestablishment by the trial court was an abuse of discretion.

a. First Remand

On December 5, 2013, this Court remanded the matter to the trial court to make further findings as to the basis for its dismissal of the minor child's support matter. The trial court issued further findings in its Order of June 26, 2014³. In the Order, Magistrate Judge Brenneman clarified that she had construed the respondent's request for DNA testing as a request for relief under D.C. Domestic Relations Rule 60(b)(6). Order at 2. The "catch-all" provision of Rule 60(b)(6) allows a court to grant a party relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding when justified by unusual and extraordinary circumstances. See D.C. Dom. Rel. Rule 60(b)(6).

In her June 26, 2014 Order, Magistrate Judge Brenneman found that

Respondent did not challenge the acknowledgment of paternity sooner for several reasons; he had no reason to disbelieve the assertions of the biological mother; he had no notice that there were any court proceedings in which he could challenge paternity after he signed the acknowledgment; the government filed this support ease on 7/21/1997, was unable to serve the Respondent and did not proceed for more than 10 years; the Respondent was incarcerated for most of that time period and was served with a new petition for support on June 8, 2010 while he was in D.C. Jail and the children were in the care of his sister, their paternal aunt; the Respondent had no on-going relationship with the children and consented to his sister having custody. On the other hand, [Redacted] from the time of conception, knew that it was likely that Respondent was not [Redacted] biological father yet she tailed to reveal that information to him before signing the acknowledgment. Instead, she actively precluded [Redacted] from questioning the parentage of [Redacted] maintaining that he was the father and by not pursuing child support from him. Order at 2-3.

As a result, she found that the respondent "had a reasonable, although misplaced, reliance on the misleading statements of [Redacted]." Order at 3. Magistrate Judge Brenneman concluded that "allowing an erroneous acknowledgement of paternity to stand as the truth for this family will continue to work an undue hardship for the Respondent and the minor child Corey. The Court determined that these extraordinary circumstances warranted relief under Rule 60(b)(6)." Order at 2-3.

b. Second Remand

The government timely filed i:s second Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge's Order on July 2, 2014. The second motion contains the same legal arguments as the first.

III. Standard of Review

When reviewing a decision made by a magistrate judge in the Family Court, the standard of review is "the same as applied by the Court of Appeals on appeal of a judgment or order of an associate judge of the Superior Court." D.C. Superior Ct. Gen. Fam. R. D; Weiner v. Weiner, 605 A.2d 18, 20 (D.C. 1992). A magistrate judge's order should not be set aside "except for errors of law unless it appears that the judgment or order is plainly wrong, without evidence to support it, or an abuse of...