Redd v. Dougherty
| Decision Date | 24 September 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 08 C 343.,08 C 343. |
| Parties | Samone REDD, Plaintiff, v. J. DOUGHERTY, Adam Weber, Rosemarie Nolan, Unknown and Unnamed Cook County Department of Corrections Employees, Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart, individually, City of Chicago, and Cook County, Illinois, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
RUBEN CASTILLO, District Court.
Samone Redd ("Plaintiff") filed this action against Chicago Police Detective J. Dougherty ("Detective Dougherty"), Assistant State's Attorney Adam Weber ("ASA Weber"), Cook County's Director of Personnel Rosemarie Nolan ("Nolan"), Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart ("Sheriff Dart"), unknown and unnamed County employees ("unknown defendants"), the City of Chicago ("the City"), and Cook County, Illinois ("the County") after she was discharged from her position as a correctional officer with the Cook County Department of Corrections ("DOC").1 She raises claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of her constitutional rights and related claims under state law. (R. 1, Compl.) Pending before the Court are three separate motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. (R. 17, 23, 26.) For the reasons stated below, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.
In February 2007, following the completion of her training at the Cook County Sheriffs Institute for Law Enforcement Education and Training, Plaintiff began working as a correctional officer at the DOC for a probationary period to end on November 13, 2007. (R. 1, Compl.¶ 11.) During this period, Plaintiff worked the night shift, which began at 11:00 p.m. and ended at 7:00 a.m. (Id. ¶ 14.)
On May 29, 2007, around 11:00 p.m., Plaintiff witnessed a man and a woman arguing outside of a residence near 92nd Street and Lawrence Avenue in Chicago.2 (Id. ¶ 15.) Two days later, Plaintiff met with Detective Dougherty and gave a statement about what she had witnessed. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff informed Detective Dougherty that she did not witness a battery during the altercation. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) She did not sign any written statement at this time. (Id. ¶ 17.)
Throughout the following weeks, Plaintiff claims that she received repeated calls "of an intimidating and harassing nature" from Detective Dougherty. (Id. ¶ 18.) On July 5, 2007, at 3:00 a.m., Detective Dougherty called Plaintiff and "demand[ed]" that Plaintiff "immediately" give a second statement. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) Plaintiff told Detective Dougherty that she was unable to do so at that time, but he continued to demand that she provide a second statement and that she "cooperate" with the police. (Id. ¶ 21.) Later that morning, Detective Dougherty "arrived at Plaintiffs door" and served her with a subpoena to testify before a grand jury on July 6 and 9, 2007. (Id. ¶ 22.)
At 1:45 a.m. on July 6, 2007, Detective Dougherty called Plaintiff during her "lunch break" to tell her that he and ASA Weber were coming over to obtain another statement from her. (Id. ¶ 23.) When they arrived, however, DOC officers would not allow them to enter the building. (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges that she was in no way involved in their inability to gain access to the building. (Id.)
At 9:00 a.m. that morning, Plaintiff appeared to testify before the grand jury. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges that after she arrived, ASA Weber attempted to coerce her into changing her original statement to Detective Dougherty. (Id. ¶ 25.) ASA Weber allegedly "intimidated" Plaintiff and accused her of lying about what she saw. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that she refused to "perjure herself" by changing her statement, and ASA Weber did not call her as a witness in the July 6 proceeding. (Id.)
On July 9, 2007, Plaintiff again arrived at 9:00 a.m. for the grand jury proceedings. (Id. ¶ 26.) ASA Weber allegedly repeated his behavior from a few days earlier by "harass[ing]" Plaintiff and falsely accusing her of lying. (Id.) Again, Plaintiff refused to change her statement. (Id.) She was not called to testify before the grand jury. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27.)
ASA Weber thereafter filed a complaint against Plaintiff with the Cook County Sheriffs Department for "failing to cooperate in an ongoing criminal investigation" and for "providing the State's Attorney with false statements in said investigation." (Id. ¶ 27.) On October 31, 2007, Nolan discharged Plaintiff based on the complaint filed by ASA Weber. (Id. ¶ 28.)
On January 15, 2008, Plaintiff filed an eight-count Complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois state law. (R. 1, Compl.) She raises the following federal claims: in Count I, a claim against Nolan and unknown defendants3 for violations of her procedural due process rights; in Count II, a claim against Nolan and unknown defendants for violations of her substantive due process rights; in Count III, a First Amendment retaliation claim against Nolan and unknown defendants; and in Count IV, claims against Detective Dougherty, ASA Weber, and unknown defendants for unspecified violations of her "First, Fourth, Sixth, and/or Fourteenth Amendment" rights. (Id. ¶¶ 1-47.) Plaintiff also raises the following state law claims: in Count V, a retaliatory discharge claim against Nolan, Sheriff Dart, and unknown defendants; in Count VI, a tortious intentional interference with a business relationship claim against ASA Weber, Detective Dougherty, and unknown defendants; in Count VII, an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against all the defendants; and in Count VIII, an indemnification claim against the County. (Id. ¶¶ 48-62.)
The defendants have filed motions to dismiss. ASA Weber moves to dismiss Counts IV, VI, and VII pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). (R. 17, ASA Weber's Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) The City and Detective Dougherty (collectively "City Defendants") jointly move to dismiss Counts IV, VI, and VII under Rule 12(b)(6). (R. 23, City Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) The County, Nolan and Sheriff Dart (collectively "County Defendants") jointly move to dismiss Counts II, III, V, and VII under Rule 12(b)(6). (R. 26, County Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 1-2.)
In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court assumes all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint to be true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank, 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir.2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must overcome "two easy-to-clear hurdles:" (1) "the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests;" and (2) "its allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level." Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir.2008).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff is suing a number of unknown defendants. (See R. 1, Compl.) Although there is no prohibition on filing suit against unknown defendants, "John Doe defendants must be identified and served within 120 days of the commencement of the action against them." Aviles v. Village of Bedford Park, 160 F.R.D. 565, 567 (N.D.Ill.1995); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) () More than 120 days have passed since the filing of Plaintiffs complaint, and the unknown defendants have not been identified or served. Accordingly, these defendants are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). See Harrell v. Bower Motors, Inc., No. 02-8252, 2004 WL 1745758, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Jul.30, 2004); Aviles, 160 F.R.D. at 567. With this issue resolved, the Court turns to the claims against the named defendants.
Count II alleges that Nolan violated Plaintiffs substantive due process rights when she "arbitrarily and capriciously" discharged Plaintiff without cause, thereby depriving her of her constitutionally protected property interest in her employment with the DOC. (R. 1, Compl.¶¶ 37-39.) The County Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to satisfy the high standard for alleging a substantive due process violation.4 (R. 27, County Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ( ) at 3-4.) The County Defendants further argue that Count II is in actuality a First Amendment claim, and that under Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), this claim cannot be brought as a substantive due process claim. (Id. at 4-5.)
Substantive due process protects persons from deprivations of life, liberty or property by arbitrary or irrational state action. Gen. Auto Serv. Station v. City of Chicago, 526 F.3d 991, 1000 (7th Cir.2008). For purposes of a substantive due process claim, "property interests are created and defined by an independent source, such as a contract or state law." Id. Once it is established that the plaintiff has a property right, "the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment circumscribes, but does not eliminate, the government's ability to deprive him of that interest." Id. "[S]ubstantive due process is not a blanket protection against unjustifiable interferences with property." Id. (citation omitted). Rather, substantive due...
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