Reddick v. Chater
| Decision Date | 06 October 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-15111,97-15111 |
| Citation | 157 F.3d 715 |
| Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 16105B, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7628, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,597 Susan REDDICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Mark H. Lipton, Lipton, Warnlof & Segal, Walnut Creek, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
John C. Cusker, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; Ronald M. Whyte, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-96-20331-RMW.
Before HUG, Chief Judge, FERNANDEZ and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
This case involves a claim for Social Security disability benefits by Susan Reddick ("Claimant") who was diagnosed with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome ("CFS"). The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that Claimant suffered from CFS but that she was not disabled because the disease did not undermine her ability to perform substantial gainful work. The district court concluded that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence and granted summary judgment for the Commissioner. A principal issue in this case is whether the ALJ was justified in discounting the testimony of Claimant, her treating doctor, and an examining doctor concerning her disability from fatigue, and instead relying upon the testimony of two consultative examiners who concluded that she was not disabled. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to remand to the ALJ for an award of benefits.
Claimant filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., alleging that she had been unable to work since October 4, 1989 due to CFS. Claimant's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration by the ALJ. The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council declined review. Claimant filed a timely complaint for review by the federal district court. The parties each filed motions for summary judgment. The district court denied Claimant's motion and granted the Commissioner's. Claimant filed a timely appeal.
Claimant was born in 1956 and was thirty eight years old at the time of her hearing before the ALJ. Her education includes high school and some secretarial schooling. She last worked in 1989 as a payroll clerk at Adept Technology, processing time cards and preparing computerized reports. During her tenure at Adept, she complained of severe fatigue and an inability to stay awake to perform her work. She was put on disability in October 1989. At this time, Claimant was seeing her treating physician, Dr. Jacobson, who diagnosed a viral syndrome. In April 1990, he diagnosed a fatigue syndrome, with a possible viral illness and possible narcolepsy, also noting depression. Dr. Jacobson referred Claimant to a neurologist, Dr. Likowsky, who examined her in May 1990 and concluded that she probably had a fatigue syndrome, possibly with a psychological basis. Dr. Likowsky indicated that other possible diagnoses should be eliminated, and he ordered, among other examinations, a psychiatric evaluation. Claimant was examined by a psychologist, Dr. Cheng, in August 1990. She informed Dr. Cheng that she first experienced persistent fatigue in 1988. He noted that CFS required diagnosis by exclusion and recommended lab testing.
Dr. Jacobson diagnosed CFS in October 1990. In November, at the request of Claimant's long-term disability carrier, GroupAmerica Insurance, Claimant was examined by Dr. Charney, an internal medicine and infectious disease specialist. Dr. Charney found that Claimant met the major criteria for CFS established by the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC"). He also noted the presence of the Epstein-Barr antibody, frequently associated with CFS. Dr. Charney described "severe fatigue" and stated in his report to GroupAmerica that Claimant was disabled.
In January, 1991, Dr. Jacobson again diagnosed CFS. He noted that Claimant was tired and was undertaking aerobic exercises once weekly. He recommended exercise three to five times per week for thirty to forty-five minutes and prescribed Motrin and Tagamet. Claimant was examined by Dr. Campen, a rheumatologist, in February 1991. Dr. Campen agreed with Dr. Jacobson's diagnosis of CFS, although noting that CFS is a somewhat nebulous term with multiple contributing factors. Dr. Campen agreed with Dr. Likowsky that psychological issues played a role in Claimant's condition. He encouraged Claimant to attempt to pursue employment alternatives.
GroupAmerica Insurance, which had referred Claimant to Dr. Charney in 1990, referred her to Dr. Ng in February 1992. After reviewing previous medical records and performing a history and physical, Dr. Ng agreed with Dr. Charney that Claimant met the CDC's criteria for CFS.
Claimant saw her treating physician, Dr. Jacobson, on several occasions during 1992 and 1993. Dr. Jacobson continued to diagnose CFS during this period, also noting swollen ankles and weight gain. Claimant had ceased aerobics and was attempting to exercise with a stationary bicycle and stair machine. A low-grade fever, one of the criteria for CFS, appears throughout the record. On June 4, 1993, Dr. Jacobson wrote a letter in response to a request from GroupAmerica, reporting that Claimant's specific limitations included myalgias and chronic debilitating fatigue, with a diagnosis of CFS. Dr. Jacobson noted that Claimant had been unable to work since October 1989. Three and a half years of extensive laboratory testing had excluded thyroid problems, diabetes, anemia, auto-immune diseases, lyme disease, hepatitis, renal failure, calcium disturbance, gall bladder problems and other diseases. The letter concluded: "The specific limitations that Ms. Reddick has that keep her from performing any occupation on a full time basis are her myalgias, but even more importantly her chronic debilitating fatigue."
Also in 1993, two Social Security consultative examiners saw Claimant in connection with her disability claim. Dr. Wood, of Health Analysis, Inc., examined Claimant and filled out an occupational health medical report in June. Dr. Wood diagnosed possible CFS, and noted exogenous obesity (174 pounds) and a depressive reaction. He found no functional limitations on hand or fine finger movements, sitting, standing, or walking. Dr. Wood noted that Claimant had "extreme lethargy," but made no comment on how lethargy would affect her ability to function.
Dr. Moseley, a psychologist, the second Social Security consultative examiner, saw Claimant in August 1993. Dr. Moseley did not have Claimant's medical file available to him, except for the recent occupational health report from Dr. Wood. After conducting some psychological tests, Dr. Moseley concluded that Claimant's scores "were well within the range necessary to carry out routine or customary job instructions." Based on the psychological results, he concluded that "[s]he may be expected to resume ... an eight-hour workday routine and 40-hour work week."
In response to a request by Claimant's attorney in June 1994, Dr. Jacobson indicated that Claimant's condition had not changed since his 1993 report.
We review a district court's order upholding the Commissioner's denial of benefits de novo. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.1997). The Commissioner's findings may be set aside if they are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir.1996). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Jamerson, 112 F.3d at 1066. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id.; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1279. In determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, we must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir.1989); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir.1985). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the Secretary's conclusion the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary. Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir.1995).
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that a medically determinable physical or mental impairment prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity and that the impairment is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The claimant carries the initial burden of proving disability. Id. at § 423(d)(5); Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir.1989). Where the claimant establishes an inability to perform her prior work, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. Swenson, 876 F.2d at 687.
Disability claims are evaluated according to a five-step procedure. Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir.1991). In step one, the Secretary determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). In step two, the Secretary determines whether the claimant has a "medically severe impairment or combination of impairments," as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the answer is no, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Young v. Saul
...v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). An ALJ's paraphrasing of record material must be accurate. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722-23 (9th Cir. 1998). Although the ALJ can and must weigh conflicting evidence, "he cannot reach a conclusion first, and then attempt to justify it b......
-
Van Ness v. Colvin
...The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility and resolving ambiguities and conflicts in the medical evidence. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). Determining whether or not inconsistencies in the medical......
-
Geraldine C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
... ... 42 U.S.C. § ... 1382(a) (2020). The burden of proof to establish a disability ... rests upon the claimant. Gomez v. Chater , 74 F.3d ... 967, 970 (9th Cir.), cert. denied , 519 U.S. 881 ... (1996) (DIB); Drouin v. Sullivan , 966 F.2d 1255, ... 1257 ... insufficient.'” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 ... F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005), (quoting Reddick" v, ... Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998)) ; ... Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir ... 1991) (en banc.) (\xE2" ... ...
-
Manenica v. Astrue, CASE NO. 12-cv-05131 JRC
...to explain adequately why his interpretation was more correct than that of the doctor, committing legal error. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (the ALJ must explain why his own interpretations, rather than those of the doctors, are correct) (citing Embrey v. Bowen, ......
-
Case survey
...Callahan , 975 F. Supp. 1366 (D. Or. 1997), citing Drouin v. Sullivan , 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Reddick v. Chater , 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Swenson v. Sullivan , 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989). The claimant satisfies her burden of proving her disab......
-
Issue Topics
...unsupported by objective medical findings. Id., citing Fragale v. Chater , 916 F. Supp. 249, 253-54 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Reddick v. Chater , 157 F.3d 715, 723-24 (9th Cir. 1998); Sisco v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. , 10 F.3d 739, 743 (10th Cir. 1993). In Bischof , the ALJ reje......
-
Assessment of disability issues
...testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence.” Reddick v. Chater , 157 F.3d 715 (9 th Cir. 1998), citing Bunnell v. Sullivan , 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9 th Cir. 1991). See also McNeil v. Apfel , 34 F. Supp.2d 1255, 159, 1260 (D. Or. 1......
-
Federal court issues
...that the claimant was entitled to benefits and that need for further proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Reddick v. Chater , 157 F.3d 715, 729-30 (9 th Cir. 1998). In Reddick , the ALJ determined that the claimant, who suffered from Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, could return to her past ......