Redding v. Ameriprise Auto & Home Ins.
| Decision Date | 13 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. DKC 11-3141 |
| Parties | JAMES REDDING v. AMERIPRISE AUTO & HOME INSURANCE, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this action are motions (1) to dismiss by Defendants Ameriprise Auto & Home Insurance ("Ameriprise"), Neurocare Associates, LLC ("Neurocare"),1 and Rosa Rehab, LLC ("Rosa Rehab") (ECF Nos. 4, 6, 13), and (2) to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment by Defendant Peter Mann (ECF No. 11). Also pending are two papers filed by Plaintiff James Redding: (1) a motion for leave to file supplemental appendix (ECF No. 19), and (2) a surreply that will be construed as a motion for voluntary dismissal of the complaint against Mr. Mann pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) (ECF No. 20).
The relevant issues have been briefed, and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemednecessary. For the reasons that follow, the motions to dismiss filed by Ameriprise, Neurocare, and Rosa Rehab will be granted, as will Plaintiff's request for voluntary dismissal as to Mr. Mann. Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix will be denied, and Mr. Mann's motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment will be denied as moot.
The following limited facts are either asserted or can be inferred from Plaintiff's sparse complaint. Around 2004, Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident and suffered injuries to his back. He subsequently underwent cervical disc surgery at Neurocare.2 Several months after his surgery, Neurocare directed him to undergo "lower back therapy" at Rosa Rehab. (ECF No. 1, at 5). Neurocare's instructions to Rosa Rehab specifically "excluded neck manipulation." (Id.). On November 5, 2008, Dr. Aekta Erry, a physician at Rosa Rehab, entered the chiropractic services room and "immediately began jerking Plaintiff's head from side to side while Plaintiff waslaying on his back." (Id. ). "Any relief that Plaintiff had acquired from Neurocare['s] . . . [prior] surgical procedure was destroyed." (Id. at 6). Indeed, Dr. Erry's procedure "caused Plaintiff's left arm to atrophy and weaken," "damage[d] Plaintiff's cervical discs," and added to Plaintiff's "ongoing medical costs." (Id.). When Plaintiff attempted to contact Neurocare for follow-up medical care, it refused due to "biomedical contamination issues" as well as complaints about Dr. Erry's actions. (Id. ).
In addition to these events, litigation ensued between Plaintiff and Ameriprise, Plaintiff's automobile insurance company, following the accident. Mr. Mann represented Plaintiff during part of this litigation, and the parties entered into a binding arbitration agreement to resolve Plaintiff's outstanding claims. According to Plaintiff, Ameriprise "refused to honor" the agreement when it "knowingly engaged in a conflict of interest by acquiring the services of a public officer with alleged past business relationships" with its law firm. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff fired Mr. Mann for "fail[ing] to alert" him about this conflict. (Id. ). Although Plaintiff requested that Mr. Mann return all case documents to him after terminating the representation, Mr. Mann refused to do so.
On November 3, 2011, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a three-count complaint in this court against Ameriprise, Neurocare, Rosa Rehab, and Mr. Mann. In count one, he alleges fraud against Ameriprise; in count two, he alleges a claim for "breach of fiduciary duty" against Mr. Mann;3 and in count three, he alleges negligence claims against Neurocare and Rosa Rehab. Plaintiff seeks $500,000 in damages, an injunction against Neurocare to "repeat Plaintiff's surgical procedure without cost to Plaintiff, and the return of Plaintiff's documents from Mr. Mann," and for the court to "[o]rder American Express [Ameriprise] to transfer all future charitable contributions from District of Columbia churches to: Paralyzed Veterans of America organizations." (Id. at 7).
On December 14, 2011, Ameriprise filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 4). Two weeks later, Neurocare moved to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiff hadfailed to file his medical malpractice claim with the Health Care Alternative Dispute Resolution Office ("HCADRO") before bringing suit, as required by the Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 3-2A-01 et seq. (ECF No. 6).4 On December 30, 2011, Plaintiff filed an "Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss," addressing only the arguments raised by Ameriprise. (ECF No. 9). Neurocare replied to Plaintiff's opposition approximately three weeks later. (ECF No. 17). Ameriprise has not filed a reply.
On January 3, 2012, Mr. Mann filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for "breach of fiduciary duty." (ECF No. 13). In the motion, Mr. Mann asserted that he had made Plaintiff's files available for pick-up at an earlier date, and that Plaintiff had failed to retrieve them. Plaintiff subsequently opposed Mr. Mann's motion, but stated that he would "immediately present a motion to dismiss the complaint against Mr. Mann" if Mr. Mann would promptly provide him with those files. (ECF No. 15, at 3). On January 19, 2012, Mr. Mann replied to Plaintiff's opposition, noting that he had provided Plaintiff with all of his files asrequested. Approximately one week later, Plaintiff filed a "reply to [Mr. Mann]'s reply" and requested that the court "enter an Order dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint against" Mr. Mann. (ECF No. 20, at 1-2).
During this time, Rosa Rehab also filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's medical malpractice claim on the same ground as Neurocare. On January 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed a document "in opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss," addressing the merits of Rosa Rehab's argument regarding his failure to comply with the Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Act. (ECF No. 18, at 1). He simultaneously submitted a "motion for leave to file supplemental appendix," which included a letter from the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene ("DHMH") regarding a 2008 complaint he had filed against Dr. Erry. (ECF No. 19). On January 26, 2012, Plaintiff filed yet another document specifically opposing "Rosa Rehab's Motion to Dismiss," which presented additional arguments regarding applicability of the Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Act. (ECF No. 21).5
In his complaint, Plaintiff requested that Mr. Mann return all files relating to his automobile accident. After Mr. Mann returned those files, Plaintiff requested that the court "dismiss[] Plaintiff's Complaint against" Mr. Mann. (ECF No. 20, at 1-2). Given the nature of Plaintiff's request, this filing will be construed as a motion for voluntary dismissal made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a).
Despite the use of the word "action" in the Rule, a majority of courts - including this court and others throughout the Fourth Circuit - have permitted plaintiffs to move for voluntary dismissal of fewer than all defendants pursuant to Rule 41(a). See, e.g., Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (); DirecTV, Inc. v. Benson, 333 F.Supp.2d 440, 443 & n.3 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (); Ownby v. Cohen, No. A. 3:02CV00034, 2002 WL 1877519, at *3 & n.1 (W.D.Va. Aug. 15, 2002) (); Eniola v. Leasecomm Corp., 214 F.Supp.2d 520, 523 (D.Md. 2002) (); Leroux v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 626 F.Supp. 962, 965 (D.Mass. 1986) (). Here, Mr. Mann had filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment -which he supported with several exhibits - prior to Plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal. Thus, Rule 41(a)(2) applies.
Rule 41(a)(2) provides that "an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." The purpose of this rule is "to allow voluntary dismissals unless the parties will be unfairly prejudiced." Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). The factors that should guide a district court in deciding a motion under Rule 41(a)(2) include "[any] opposing party's effort and expense in preparing for trial, excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the movant, insufficient explanation of the need for a voluntary dismissal, and the present stage of litigation." Miller v. Terramite Corp. , 114 F.App'x. 536, 540 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Phillips USA, Inc., v. Allflex USA, Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 358 (10th Cir. 1996)).
These factors all weigh in favor of granting Plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff moved for voluntary dismissal of the action against Mr. Mann on January 27, 2012, within days of receiving the documents he had long sought, rendering his claim against Mr. Mann moot. Mr. Mann's motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment will be denied as moot.
Ameriprise, Neurocare, and Rosa Rehab have each moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The purpose of a ...
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