Redding v. Rice

• Decision Date: 07 October 1895
• Docket Number: 419
• Citation: 33 A. 330,171 Pa. 301
• Parties: Mary Redding and Cornelius N. Redding her Husband, in Right of Said Mary Redding, v. William H. Rice, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

33 A. 330

171 Pa. 301

Mary Redding and Cornelius N. Redding her Husband, in Right of Said Mary Redding, v. William H. Rice, Appellant

No. 419

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 7, 1895

Argued April 25, 1895

Appeal No. 419, Jan. T., 1895, by defendant, from judgment of C.P Blair Co., June T., 1893, Nos. 175 and 176, on verdict for plaintiffs. Reversed.

Ejectment for one sixth interest in a lot of ground on Mary street in Altoona. Before BARKER, P.J., of the 47th district, specially presiding.

At the trial it appeared that Thomas Rice, of Altoona, died in 1866 leaving to survive him a widow and six children. In his will dated the day before his death, he provided as follows "I will and bequeath all my real and personal property to my beloved wife, Mary, to have and to hold the same for her own proper use and behoof as long as she shall remain my widow, and if she should get married then she shall be only entitled to the one-third in said property, the balance, being two-thirds to my youngest daughter Kate; if the said Kate should die then I will and bequeath the two-thirds to my son William, and if both should die then the residue remaining shall be equally divided among my remaining children under the rules and regulations and construction of the orphans' court controlling all estates under will and intestate estates to be so divided as the judges of the orphans' court shall decide according to law."

Mary Rice, the widow, did not remarry, and during her lifetime she conveyed part of the land, of which her husband died seized, to her son, Wm. Rice, the defendant in this suit, and another part to Kate Clohessey, a daughter, and both built houses on the lots purchased by them; after her death Mrs. Nally and Mrs. Redding, two of the children of Thomas Rice, brought ejectment against the parties above named, alleging that Mary Rice took but a life estate in her husband's real estate under his will, and could not convey a fee to the purchasers; the defendant contended that she took a fee.

The court charged the jury in part as follows:

[After carefully considering the terms of this will and the authorities bearing upon the construction of wills, we have concluded to say to you, as a matter of law in these cases, that she took only a life interest in the property; and that, therefore, a person who purchased from her in her lifetime, as did this defendant, would take no title as against the other heirs of Thomas Rice.] This is purely a question of law, with which you have nothing to do. The duty is incumbent upon us to construe this will, and, if we are in error in our construction of it, we can be reviewed in a higher court and the parties set right in the premises.

Now, if that were all that there is in these cases, those parties would have no title whatever, and it would be your duty, under our instructions, to render verdicts for the plaintiffs; but the defendant says that, even supposing we are correct in our construction of this will, he was placed in his present position by the acts and conduct of these plaintiffs, and that it is now too late for them to say that the defendant has no title. In other words, he says that, by the conduct of Mrs. Redding and Mrs. Nally, either by their positive acts or by their silence, he was induced to buy this property and put valuable improvements thereon, and he, therefore, invokes what is known in law as an estoppel. He says that even though his title would not be good under the will of Thomas Rice, and even though the position of the plaintiffs is correct, that it is too late now for the plaintiffs to come here and assert themselves, because it was by their encouragement that they made these valuable improvements on this land and that, therefore, they should not now be permitted to take advantage of their silence.

[The Supreme Court have laid down, in precise language, the principles which govern such a case as this. The general principle now is that where the conduct of a party has been such as to induce action by another he shall be precluded from afterwards asserting to the prejudice of that other the contrary of that which his conduct has induced him to believe. The primary ground of determination is that it would be a fraud in a party to assert what his previous conduct had denied, when, on the faith of that denial, others have acted. If the conduct of these plaintiffs was such as to induce action on the part of this defendant, they cannot now take advantage of the situation in which the others are placed and recover this land. You will observe that in this definition which we have given you, the conduct of the parties must have induced the other party to take action, and the law is, on questions of this kind, that unless there had been something in the conduct of the parties, on the faith of which the other party relies, he is not estopped from asserting the rights which the other party claims he has waived by his conduct. Now, apply that principle to the case of William Rice. William Rice goes on the stand and testifies that when he bought this property he relied on the strength of his mother's title, and in plain and conclusive language asserts that this action was not induced by anything that the plaintiffs in this case did. As a plain and simple proposition of law it seems to us that that ends his case. If, when he went there and bought this property and built on it, he did so because he believed that his mother had a good title, and there was nothing in the acts or conduct of these parties...