Reddington v. Getchell
| Decision Date | 05 July 1917 |
| Docket Number | No. 4926.,4926. |
| Parties | REDDINGTON v. GETCHELL. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; John W. Sweeney, Judge.
Action by Mary E. Reddington against Waldo I. Getchell. Verdict for defendant, and plaintiff excepts. Exceptions sustained in part and overruled in part, and case remitted.
Reargument denied 102 Atl. 88.
Tillinghast & Collins, Easton, Williams & Rosenfeld, and Charles R. Easton, all of Providence, for plaintiff. Mumford, Huddy & Emerson and Charles C. Mumford, all of Providence, for defendant.
This is an action brought under the statute to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff's son, Joseph Reddington, which death is alleged to have been caused by the wrongful act of the defendant. The case was tried before a justice of the superior court sitting with a jury. At the conclusion of the evidence said justice directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. The case is before us upon exception to said action of the justice and upon exceptions tq certain rulings of the justice made in the course of said trial.
It appears that the plaintiff's son Joseph Reddington was, on and before the early morning of September 30, 1913, the driver of an automobile for hire in the city of Providence. The plaintiff claims that there was a way, known as "Bangor street," laid out over the defendant's land in said city, and that the defendant, for a long time previous to said September 30, 1913, had invited the public to use said way. The alleged wrongful act of the defendant consisted in negligently permitting a gully or deep depression to remain across the easterly portion of said way, which gully extended beyond the line of said way and on other land of the defendant. The existence of said gully was unknown to Joseph Reddington. While said Joseph was driving along said way, or across land of the defendant to the east of and near said way, shortly after midnight on September 30, 1913, the wheels of his automobile went into said gully, said automobile was overturned, and he was killed. It appears that said way known as Bangor street was 50 feet in width. At the southerly end it intersected, but did not cross, Chalkstone avenue, a public highway of the city of Providence: from Chalkstone avenue it ran northerly for about 250 feet to the north line of the defendant's land, and thence was continued as Rosebank avenue. In the trial of said case and in the argument before us Rosebank avenue has been spoken of as part of a public park of the city of Providence known as the "Pleasant Valley Parkway." From such evidence as was introduced in the superior court and certified to us it appears that said Rosebank avenue for a considerable distance beyond the northerly line of the defendant's land was a highway of the city of Providence. Said Rosebank avenue from its southerly end, at the north line of the defendant's land, proceeds upon a curve toward the northwest and then westerly in a straight line to River avenue, a highway of the city of Providence. There are other highways of said city which run into Rosebank avenue from the north. Just before the occurrence which caused his death Joseph Reddington with five passengers in his automobile drove said automobile from the village of Centredale through some highway and came upon Rosebank avenue, intending to go to Chalkstone avenue, and proceeded around said curve in Rosebank avenue toward Bangor street. Said accident occurred just after the automobile came upon the land of the defendant. The defendant claims that while on said curve Joseph Reddington left the roadway and drove upon the land of the defendant to the east of the way. The plaintiff claims that Joseph Reddington came upon the land of the defendant within the roadway of Bangor street, and that said automobile was overturned by reason of its wheels going into said gully on Bangor street. The ordinance of the city of Providence with reference to "Parks" was introduced in evidence. Section 1, c. 410, of the Ordinances of 1909, now section 7, c. 40, of the Ordinances of 1914, is as follows:
Said justice in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant said:
We have frequently held that a verdict should not be directed for a defendant if on any reasonable view of the testimony the plaintiff can recover. Baynes v. Billings, 30 R. I. 53, 73 Atl. 625. After an examination of the evidence we are of the opinion that said justice was not warranted in directing a verdict upon the second ground stated by him. There was testimony upon which the jury might find that at the time the wheels of the automobile first went into said gully Joseph Reddington was driving his automobile in the trayeled part of Bangor street, and not on the sidewalk thereof or on land east of the sidewalk. No witness except two of the women who were passengers in the automobile testifies that he was present at the time of the accident. Certain witnesses for the defendant, who examined the ground near said gully after the accident, testified that they saw wheel tracks to the east of the roadway, which wheel tracks they inferred were made by said automobile. From this testimony and from the position of the automobile in the gully after the accident an inference might be drawn that just before the accident the automobile was being driven outside the traveled part of Bangor street. Apparently in the opinion of said justice these circumstances produced a preponderance of the evidence in favor of the defendant upon that issue. Witnesses for the plaintiff, however, testified to their examination of the place shortly after the accident, and state that wheel tracks in the roadway which ran from the north to the edge of the gully clearly appeared to them to have been made by the automobile lying in the gully. It was for the jury to say from the testimony whether wheel tracks of the automobile were visible upon the ground, and to determine what inferences, if any, might properly be drawn from their existence and location....
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Zoubra v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.
...conduct of some kind which can reasonably be construed as an authorization to the public to enter the premises. Reddington v. Getchell, 40 R.I. 463, 101 A. 123. I do not wish to depart from this settled rule, and I therefore agree that under the allegations of the declaration the plaintiff ......
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Goyette v. Sousa
...may exist where affirmative conduct on the part of the landowner has indicated a willingness to permit such use. Reddington v. Getchell, 40 R.I. 463, 101 A. 123. A determination of what portions of the premises are included within an invitation in a particular case is a question of fact. Mi......
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Munsill v. United States, C.A. No. 97-041L (D. R.I. 7/__/1998)
...A.2d 500, 502 (R.I. 1960) (emphasis added) (quoting 4 Shearman & Redfield, Negligence (Rev.Ed.) § 779, p.1783); See Reddington v. Getchell, 101 A. 123, 125 (R.I. 1917). Requiring a business owner to remove snow before a storm ends would hold him to an extraordinary standard of care, forcing......
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Ferra v. United Electric Rys. Co., 6886.
...the facts and circumstances in the case is that an ordinary prudent person would not have acted as did the plaintiff. Reddington v. Getchell, 40 R. I. 403, 101 A. 123; Gilbane v. Lent, 41 R. I. 462, 104 A. 77. These cases have been cited and followed with approval many The undisputed facts ......