Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Tanner

• Decision Date: 19 June 1987
• Docket Number: Nos. 17692,19348 and 19684,s. 17692
• Citation: 740 P.2d 1296
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Earl D. TANNER and Mary Louise Tanner, his wife, David V. Trask, Grant S. Kesler, and Larry V. Lunt, Defendants, Cross-Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Cross-Defendant. REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Earl D. TANNER and Mary Louise Tanner, his wife; David V. Trask; Grant S. Kesler; and Larry V. Lunt, Defendants and Appellants. REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TRASK & BRITT, a professional corporation; Grant S. Kesler; Larry V. Lunt; and Capitol Life Insurance Co., a corporation, Defendants and Appellants.

Page 1296

740 P.2d 1296

REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Earl D. TANNER and Mary Louise Tanner, his wife, David V.

Trask, Grant S. Kesler, and Larry V. Lunt, Defendants, Cross-Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant

and Cross-Defendant.

REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Earl D. TANNER and Mary Louise Tanner, his wife; David V.

Trask; Grant S. Kesler; and Larry V. Lunt,

Defendants and Appellants.

REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TRASK & BRITT, a professional corporation; Grant S. Kesler;

Larry V. Lunt; and Capitol Life Insurance Co., a

corporation, Defendants and Appellants.

Nos. 17692, 19348 and 19684.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June 19, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 17, 1987.

Harold A. Hintze, Provo, and William D. Oswald, Salt Lake City, for Redevelopment Agency.

Robert S. Campbell and E. Barney Gesas, Salt Lake City, for defendants Tanner, Trask, Kesler, and Lunt.

Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for Trask & Britt.

HALL, Chief Justice:

These cases, consolidated for purposes of appeal, emanate from action of the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City (the RDA) to acquire appellants' properties. The Tanner group in case No. 19348 and the Trask group in case No. 19684 appeal separate trial court determinations that the RDA did not misrepresent or mislead appellants into waiving claims and abandoning litigation challenging the RDA's jurisdiction to condemn their properties. Case No. 17692 involves a condemnation compensation trial and raises claims of jury misconduct and trial court error in denying appellants' request to call the RDA's consultant to testify as an "expert witness." For reasons enumerated below, we affirm the trial court's determination in each of the three appeals.

I

In 1969, the Utah legislature enacted the "Utah Neighborhood Development Act." ¹ Under the provisions of this act, municipal redevelopment agencies are created and empowered in part to undertake "redevelopment projects" within areas determined to be "blighted." ² Acquisition and redevelopment of "blighted" property contributes to the health of the community and may be accomplished by various means, including eminent domain. ³

Pursuant to this act, Salt Lake City's Board of Commissioners (the Commission) was designated to act as the City's RDA. In June 1977, the Commission enacted an ordinance specifying 18 1/2 blocks of downtown Salt Lake City, Utah, as a "blighted" area. Appellants' real properties are situated on Block 53 (between Third and Fourth South and State Street and Second East) and are included within the project area. In early 1979, the RDA began the statutory process necessary for the acquisition of Block 53. A "redevelopment plan" for Block 53 was finally published and put into effect by the Commission in June 1979.

In July 1979, the Tanner group and the Trask group filed separate actions in Third District Court challenging the authority of the RDA to condemn their properties.

Shortly thereafter, the RDA commissioned a private architectural firm to develop a "master plan" report for Block 53. Apparently, the purpose of this report was to provide recommendations and guidelines to private developers choosing to bid on the acquisition and redevelopment of the block. In October 1979, the RDA met with appellants at the architect's office to review drawings and a scale model of the "master plan." Representations made by the RDA at and subsequent to that meeting are at issue herein.

In November 1979, the RDA offered the Trask group $277,400 and the Tanner group $394,000 for their respective properties. Both groups declined, and further negotiation continued for approximately two months. In January 1980, the RDA commenced condemnation proceedings against appellants' properties. Thereafter, the parties entered into stipulations wherein the RDA agreed to deposit with the court 100 percent of a higher estimate of the market value of the properties for appellants' immediate withdrawal and use. In exchange, appellants stipulated to the RDA's immediate possession of the properties and agreed to dismiss their lawsuits and waive all claims and challenges (except the issue of just compensation) to the RDA's authority to condemn. Pursuant to these stipulations, both trial courts entered orders of immediate occupancy for the RDA, and appellants withdrew the monies the RDA deposited with the courts. The parties thereafter proceeded to trial on the issue of "just compensation."

In August 1980, a jury awarded the Tanner group $357,000 as just compensation for their property. This sum was less than the $417,640 appellants originally received and resulted in a $60,640 refund to the RDA. Subsequently, the Trask group stipulated that the $294,044 offered by the RDA was in fact just compensation for their property.

Thereafter, the Tanner group filed appeal No. 17692, claiming jury misconduct and error by the court in refusing appellants' request to call the RDA's consultant to testify as an expert witness. While that appeal was pending, both the Trask group and the Tanner group alleged that the RDA misrepresented and abandoned its original plans for the use of their properties. Accordingly, appellants filed several motions below, including motions to vacate the orders of immediate occupancy and to dismiss the condemnation proceedings. Therein, appellants sought to withdraw their stipulations to the RDA's occupancy and right to condemn their properties.

Upon motions to this Court, we stayed the parties' pending appeals and remanded the cases to the trial courts for evidentiary proceedings on the issues of misrepresentation and mistake. We also issued an order of mandamus in Tanner v. District Judges of Third Judicial District Court. ⁴ Thereafter, both trial courts conducted evidentiary hearings and subsequently denied appellants' requests for relief, thereby sustaining the condemnation awards and the binding effect of the stipulations. Appeals in cases No. 19348 and No. 19684 followed. ⁵

II Cases No. 19348 and No. 19684

Both the Tanner group and the Trask group argue on appeal that since the RDA failed to follow statutory prerequisites to condemning their properties, the trial courts had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the lawsuits and dismissal of the condemnation actions was required. However, as discussed below, the dispositive issue presented by these appeals is whether appellants were induced by mistake or misrepresentation into signing stipulations waiving all claims and defenses to the RDA's authority. The conclusions of the trial courts in favor of the RDA are not clearly erroneous and preclude this Court from substituting its judgment for that of the trial courts.

Each "Order of Immediate Occupancy" based upon the parties' stipulations provided in pertinent part:

[T]he Court having carefully examined the pleadings and the written Stipulation pertaining thereto referred to above, and, having determined that plaintiff has the right of eminent domain ⁶ and that the purpose for which the property of defendants sought by plaintiff herein to be condemned is for a public purpose ⁷ and that the property is located within a redevelopment project area which is blighted, and that the project area is detrimental or inimical to the public health, safety or welfare, and that the immediate occupancy thereof is necessary and proper; and, the parties having expressly reserved for future adjudication only the issue of the amount of just compensation to be paid Defendants, in accordance with the provisions of Section 78-34-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended:

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Subject to and in accordance with the "Stipulation for Order of Immediate Occupancy," a copy of which is attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof, Plaintiff be and is hereby authorized to occupy the property belonging to Defendants above-named described in the Complaint on file herein ... [descriptions of particular property] which said properties are sought for uses by the public in connection with and as part of the C.B.D. Neighborhood Development Project authorized and approved by the Salt Lake City Commission on June 21, 1979.

2. Plaintiff is hereby permitted to take immediate possession of said properties and continue in possession of the same pending further hearing and trial on the issue of just compensation which is the only issue which may be raised in this action....

3. Plaintiff has tendered into court and deposits with the Clerk of the Court herewith for the benefit of Defendants the sum of [$294,044 for the Trask group and $417,640 for the Tanner group] being 100% of the amount of just compensation based upon two independent appraisals which Plaintiff has caused to be made of the premises, adjusted to the date of taking.

....

5. Defendants may withdraw the [total sums indicated above] deposited with the Clerk of the Court for the use and benefit of Defendants without prejudice to any claim they may wish to assert for additional just compensation in the trial of the matter....

(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to these orders, the RDA deposited with the courts 100 percent of the agreed sums. Appellants subsequently withdrew these monies pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (1977), which provides in pertinent part:

Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court shall order that the money deposited in the court be paid forthwith for or on account of the just compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. A payment to a defendant as aforesaid shall be held to be an abandonment by such defendant of all defenses excepting his claim for greater compensation.[ ⁸

(Emphasis added.) The explicit effect of the parties' stipulations and withdrawal of funds pursuant to section 78-34-9 was to relieve the RDA of presenting proof that the...