Redevelopment Authority of Oil City v. Woodring
| Decision Date | 26 May 1982 |
| Citation | 445 A.2d 724,498 Pa. 180 |
| Parties | REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF OIL CITY, Appellant, v. Jane T. WOODRING, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued March 1, 1982.
John D. Rynd, Jr., Rynd & Olmes, Oil City, for appellant.
Benjamin G. McFate, Oil City, for appellee.
Before O'BRIEN, C. J., and ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY McDERMOTT and HUTCHINSON, JJ.
On May 17 1978, appellee, Jane T. Woodring, filed a petition for the appointment of a board of viewers in the Venango County Court of Common Pleas, [1] alleging that the actions of appellant, the Redevelopment Authority of Oil City (hereinafter Authority), [2] constituted a de facto taking of her property, and that she was entitled to just compensation. [3]
After an evidentiary hearing on the petition, the court of common pleas concluded that a de facto taking had occurred and directed the appointment of a board of viewers to ascertain just compensation for Mrs. Woodring. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed. Redevelopment Authority of Oil City v. Woodring, 60 Pa.Commw. 234, 430 A.2d 1243 (1981). We granted allocatur and we now affirm.
On May 21, 1974, the City Council of Oil City approved an urban redevelopment proposal submitted by the Authority. The proposal required, among other things, that "[e]xisting above ground utilities shall be incorporated into the underground system" along Elm Street in downtown Oil City. Mrs. Woodring owns several buildings, used for residential and commercial purposes, on Elm Street.
On August 9, 1976, construction of the new underground system began and the Authority invited Elm Street property owners to a meeting to discuss the relocation of their electrical service. Mrs. Woodring attended this meeting. A memorandum of the meeting, dated August 13, 1976 and sent to Elm Street property owners, indicates that the Authority planned to install underground service conduits ending at each owner's property line; that property owners were responsible for providing the encasement conduit for electrical service from their buildings to the property line; and that Pennsylvania Electric Company, pursuant to its tariff, was obligated to provide and reconnect all wiring for the relocation. [4] According to the memorandum, construction was to be completed within three to five months, and the changeover of service was to take place in early 1977.
Upon receipt of this memorandum, Mrs. Woodring employed an electrical contractor who installed new electrical connections in her buildings. Mrs. Woodring alleged in her petition that this work cost in excess of $5,000.
It is the contention of the Authority on this appeal that Mrs. Woodring is not entitled to compensation because (1) the Authority never exercised its power of eminent domain; (2) even if it did, Mrs. Woodring was never deprived of the use and enjoyment of her property; and (3) even if Mrs. Woodring was, that deprivation was not the immediate, necessary and unavoidable consequence of any action on the Authority's part. [5]
Compensation under the Eminent Domain Code does not require an actual taking. Rather, a taking occurs within the meaning of the Code, and compensation is due, whenever "the entity clothed with the power of eminent domain substantially deprives an owner of the use and enjoyment of his property." Griggs v. Allegheny County, 402 Pa. 411, 414, 168 A.2d 123, 124 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 84, 82 S.Ct. 531, 7 L.Ed.2d 585 (1962). See also Conroy-Prugh Glass Company v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 456 Pa. 384, 388, 321 A.2d 598, 599 (1974); Monaco v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 26 Pa.Commw. 387, 363 A.2d 857, 859 (1976) (). [6]
The Authority first argues that its decision requiring all electrical wires to be relocated underground constituted an exercise of police power, not an exercise of its power of eminent domain. This argument is without merit.
Police power involves the regulation of property to promote health, safety and general welfare and its exercise requires no compensation to the property owner, even if there is an actual taking or destruction of property, while eminent domain is the power to take property for public use, and compensation must be given for property taken, injured or destroyed. White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 264, 134 A. 409 (1926).
In a case involving the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance, this Court held that "neither aesthetic reasons nor the conservation of property values or the stabilization of economic values in a township are, singly or combined, sufficient to promote the health or the morals or the safety or the general welfare of the township or its inhabitants or property owners." Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 226, 104 A.2d 118, 122 (1954). This Court concluded that actions taken in furtherance of these objectives could, therefore, never constitute an exercise of the police power. This definition of police power is equally applicable in a case where there is an alleged exercise of the power of eminent domain; police power is the same, whether it is used to justify a zoning ordinance or a taking for public use without compensation, pursuant to an urban redevelopment plan.
In the instant case, the introduction to the Authority's proposal states that Oil City has experienced deterioration due to a "general lack of aesthetics," and that the potential for improvement can be realized through "the provision of public improvements necessary to create an esthetically appealing environment"; the proposal's project description states that one of the objectives of the plan is to improve economic vitality "by creating an attractive environment"; and the proposal's design objectives "were developed to promote a functional, attractive and visually appealing environment in the Downtown Urban Renewal Area." In addition, the letter of April 15, 1974 which the Authority received from Quaker State Oil Refining Corporation concerning Quaker State's new corporate headquarters, to be built in Oil City in conjunction with the Authority's redevelopment plan, states:
Further, the Mayor of Oil City and the City Manager of Oil City verbally agreed to the removal of all overhead wiring on both sides of Elm Street facing the proposed Quaker State office building and as a factor consistent with attractive external appearance.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The finding of the court of common pleas that "[t]he action of defendant [the Authority] was taken on the basis of aesthetic considerations only" is supported by the record, and that court was thus correct when it concluded that the Authority's action in this case constituted an exercise of its power of eminent domain and not an exercise of police power. [7]
The Authority advances two arguments in support of its contention that Mrs. Woodring was not deprived of the use and enjoyment of her property: first, that only the location of her electrical service was changed; and second, that the electrical work Mrs. Woodring had done in her buildings actually enhanced the value of her property. Both of these arguments are without merit.
The Authority did not change the location of Mrs. Woodring's electrical service. Rather, Mrs. Woodring changed the location of her electrical service in response to the Authority's announcement that by early 1977 her overhead electrical service would be discontinued. If Mrs. Woodring had been unable to bear the expense of installing new electrical connections in her buildings, the Authority's plan would have left her with no electricity. As the court of common pleas correctly concluded:
[P]laintiff [Mrs. Woodring] had to spend large sums of money in order to convert her electrical facilities to accommodate defendant's [the Authority's] actions and thus continue her electric service. If she had not done so, her use of the property would have been permanently interfered with because of lack of service.
We conclude that the Authority's action substantially deprived Mrs. Woodring of the use and enjoyment of her property, and that it thus constituted a taking within the meaning of the Eminent Domain Code.
In addition, we hold that the fact that any changes Mrs. Woodring chose to make after the Authority had effected a taking may have ultimately enhanced the value of her property is irrelevant, since changes in value brought about by a property owner after a taking has occurred have no bearing on the existence or absence of a taking in the first instance. [8]
Finally, the Authority argues that the changes Mrs. Woodring made in the electrical system of her buildings were not the immediate, necessary or unavoidable consequence of any action on its part. [9] This argument also lacks merit.
The Authority first argues that the changes Mrs. Woodring made were required not by its redevelopment plan, but by the provisions of the Authority's agreement with Pennsylvania Electric Company and the electric company's tariff.
Pennsylvania Electric Company's Tariff of Rates, Rules and Regulations, filed pursuant to the Public Utility Commission's order of June 2, 1976, states:
In the event [Pennsylvania Electric] Company may be required by any public authority to place underground any portion of its mains, wires or services or relocate any pole or feeders, the customer at own expense shall change the location...
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