Redfern v. Sullivan
| Decision Date | 23 December 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 482-0336,482-0336 |
| Citation | 444 N.E.2d 205,67 Ill.Dec. 166,111 Ill.App.3d 372 |
| Parties | , 67 Ill.Dec. 166 Theron REDFERN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marian SULLIVAN, as Executor of the William Paul Sullivan Estate, and Marian Sullivan, Individually, Thomas L. Hargis, McLaughlin and Hargis, Inc., Hazel Magee, Horace A. Hanes, Orville J. Monroe, Stephen M. Monroe, and Kenneth M. Monroe, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James McLaughlin, McLaughlin & Florini, Sullivan, Richard F. Record, Jr., Gregory C. Ray, Craig & Craig, Attys. at Law, Mattoon, for defendants-appellees.
We deal here with res judicata, injunctive relief, and possession to farmland.
It's a mixed bag: affirmed in part and reversed in part.
But first--the procedural facts.
Redfern brought an action seeking injunctive relief or, in the alternative, damages for breach of an oral lease of certain farmland. He alleged that defendants are the owners of a tract of farmland and that he is in possession of this tract. He alleged that W. Paul Sullivan, acting as agent for the defendants, entered into an oral lease of this farmland with him. He agreed to provide machinery, equipment, and labor for the purpose of farming defendants' land. The defendants agreed to pay him according to a schedule of rates published annually in The Prairie Farmer. The term of the lease ran from March 1 to February 28 and had been reaffirmed each year for a period of several years.
W. Paul Sullivan died in November 1981. In January 1982, plaintiff was notified by letter that defendants had decided to terminate the "relationship." Based upon these allegations, plaintiff, in counts I and II of his amended complaint, sought injunctive relief to restrain defendants from taking possession of the land or otherwise breach the lease. In counts III and IV, plaintiff realleged the same basic facts but requested damages.
Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. They argued that plaintiff failed to allege that his remedy at law was inadequate or that he would be irreparably harmed if the injunction were not granted. Defendants further contended that the facts set forth in plaintiff's complaint failed to establish that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between the parties.
The trial court entered an order on May 11, 1982, dismissing counts I and II of plaintiff's amended complaint with prejudice. The trial court also dismissed counts III and IV with prejudice as to defendants McLaughlin & Hargis, Inc., and Thomas Hargis while granting plaintiff leave to amend counts III and IV as to the remaining defendants. The trial court also held that plaintiff had no right of possession in the property in question. A finding pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (87 Ill.2d R. 304(a)) was made by the trial court.
Plaintiff appealed from the entry of the order dismissing counts I and II. While that portion of the case was on appeal, plaintiff filed a "second amended complaint" pursuant to the leave granted by the trial court in its order of May 11. The "second amended complaint" contained one count seeking money damage for the alleged breach of the farm lease. Defendants moved to dismiss and the trial court dismissed the "second amended complaint" with prejudice on July 9, 1982. No appeal has been taken from that order.
Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss this appeal--which we have taken with the case--on the ground that it had become moot because of the actions of the trial court subsequent to the filing of the notice of appeal. Defendants argue that the allegations of counts I and II of plaintiff's amended complaint and the allegations contained in plaintiff's "second amended complaint" are substantially the same and arise from a common nucleus of facts. They contend that the dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's "second amended complaint" was a conclusive determination of the facts and issues presented in that complaint. Therefore, defendants argue, since the claims are based upon a common nucleus of facts and arise from the same transaction, the res judicata effect of the later dismissal has caused this appeal to become moot. RES JUDICATA
Res judicata is a doctrine which reflects the public policy favoring finality in litigation and judicial economy. (Smith v. Bishop (1962), 26 Ill.2d 434, 187 N.E.2d 217.) The doctrine of res judicata is divided into two branches: estoppel by judgment, sometimes referred to as res judicata, and estoppel by verdict, also known as collateral estoppel. Hassett Storage Warehouse, Inc. v. Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago (1979), 69 Ill.App.3d 972, 25 Ill.Dec. 909, 387 N.E.2d 785.
Estoppel by judgment (res judicata) provides that a valid judgment in a previous action between the parties bars a subsequent action between those parties on the same claim or cause of action. The doctrine applies not only to those issues which were actually raised in the first proceeding, but also to any issues which might have been raised in that proceeding. (Kahler v. Don E. Williams Co. (1978), 59 Ill.App.3d 716, 16 Ill.Dec. 927, 375 N.E.2d 1034.) Where estoppel by verdict (or collateral estoppel) is applied, the parties are precluded from relitigating an issue in a subsequent proceeding where that issue was actually or necessarily decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in an earlier proceeding involving the same parties and a different cause of action. Smith v. Bishop; Fred Olson Motor Service v. Container Corp. (1980), 81 Ill.App.3d 825, 37 Ill.Dec. 5, 401 N.E.2d 1098; see also Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Pollution Control Board (1979), 78 Ill.2d 1, 34 Ill.Dec. 334, 398 N.E.2d 9 ().
Under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, a final judgment may be asserted in bar of a second action where the parties and the cause of action are identical. (City of Hickory Hills v. Village of Bridgeview (1977), 67 Ill.2d 399, 10 Ill.Dec. 539, 367 N.E.2d 1305.) In the case at bar, the parties on appeal were the parties involved in the subsequent proceedings. Thus, the key question to be answered is whether the causes of action involved are identical. (See 23A Ill.L. & Prac. Judgments § 331 (1979).) Causes of action are identical where the evidence necessary to sustain a second verdict would sustain the first, i.e., where the causes of action are based upon a common core of operative facts. Morris v. Union Oil Co. of California (1981), 96 Ill.App.3d 148, 51 Ill.Dec. 770, 421 N.E.2d 278; Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook (1980), 88 Ill.App.3d 745, 43 Ill.Dec. 792, 410 N.E.2d 925; Pierog v. H.F. Karl Contractors, Inc. (1976), 39 Ill.App.3d 1057, 351 N.E.2d 249.
Here, counts I and II are based upon a different cause of action than that underlying the "second amended complaint"; the same evidence would not sustain both verdicts. Counts I and II seek injunctive relief against dispossession by the defendants. In order to obtain a favorable verdict on these counts, plaintiff would have to show: that his possessory rights were violated; that his legal remedies were inadequate; and that he will suffer irreparable injury if injunctive relief is not granted. (Kaplan v. Kaplan (1981), 98 Ill.App.3d 136, 53 Ill.Dec. 449, 423 N.E.2d 1253.) In order to obtain damages under the theory advanced in his "second amended complaint," plaintiff would need to show: that he had a contractual right to farm the land; that defendants breached the contract; and that plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breach.
In an analogous situation, our courts have held that a judgment in a prior action for specific performance does not bar a subsequent action for damages. Pillsbury v. Early (1927), 324 Ill. 562, 155 N.E. 475; In re Estate of Heyder (1964), 48 Ill.App.2d 119, 198 N.E.2d 350.
The doctrine of estoppel by verdict likewise is inapplicable to the case at bar. An adjudication of a controlling fact or issue between the parties collaterally estops those parties from relitigating that fact or issue in a second suit. (23A Ill.L. & Prac. Judgments § 361 (1979).) The fact or matter must have been in issue and actually determined. (Morris v. Union Oil Co. of The question of plaintiff's right to possession of the farmland was not necessarily determined by the trial court's order dismissing the "second amended complaint." In that particular count, plaintiff was seeking damages; the court may have dismissed the count because plaintiff failed to allege damages properly. The trial court's order does not specify why the "complaint" was found to be inadequate. To speculate that the dismissal was grounded upon a determination that plaintiff had no right to possession of the subject property would remove from the party asserting the defense of res judicata the burden of showing what was determined by the prior judgment with certainty and clarity. (Gale v. Transamerica Corp. (1978), 65 Ill.App.3d 553, 22 Ill.Dec. 92, 382 N.E.2d 412; Gonyo v. Gonyo (1973), 9 Ill.App.3d 672, 292 N.E.2d 591.) Defendants have failed to meet this burden and therefore have not shown that the doctrine of estoppel by verdict is applicable here.
[67 Ill.Dec. 170] California; Raymond Construction Co. v. Midwest America Development, Inc. (1978), 67 Ill.App.3d 332, 24 Ill.Dec. 40, 384 N.E.2d 907.) The issue must have necessarily been decided by the [111 Ill.App.3d 377] court and if any uncertainty exists, the doctrine will not be applied. Lange v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago (1969), 44 Ill.2d 73, 254 N.E.2d 467, 468; Baird & Warner, Inc. v. Addison Industrial Park, Inc. (1979), 70 Ill.App.3d 59, 26 Ill.Dec. 1, 387 N.E.2d 831
Thus, defendants have failed to...
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