Redfield v. Bitterman, No. 20000107
| Decision Date | 21 December 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 20000162, No. 20000181., No. 20000107 |
| Parties | Roger REDFIELD, Special Administrator of the Estate of Esther Reinhardt, Plaintiff, v. Gail BITTERMAN, Colleen Schneider, and Neal G. Reinhardt, Defendants and Appellees, North Dakota Department of Human Services, Appellant. In the Matter of the Estate of Esther Reinhardt. North Dakota Department of Human Services, Claimant and Appellant, and Roger Redfield, Special Administrator of the Estate of Esther Reinhardt, Appellant, v. Gail Bitterman, Colleen Schneider, and Neal G. Reinhardt, Respondents and Appellees. Roger Reified, Special Administrator of the Estate of Esther Reinhardt, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Gail Bitterman, Colleen Schneider, and Neal G. Reinhardt, Defendants and Appellants, North Dakota Department of Human Services, Appellee. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Ann C. Mahoney, Mahoney & Mahoney, Center, ND, for plaintiff, appellant, and appellee Roger Redfield. Submitted on briefs.
John A. Richardson, Richardson, Lange & Donovan, Hazen, ND, for defendants, appellees, respondents, and appellants Gail Bitterman, Colleen Schneider, and Neal G. Reinhardt.
Blaine L. Nordwall, Special Assistant Attorney General, Bismarck, ND, for appellant, claimant, and appellee North Dakota Department of Human Services.
[¶ 1] The North Dakota Department of Human Services ("Department") appealed district court orders disallowing its claim for recovery of medical assistance benefits and dismissing the complaint of Roger Redfield, Special Administrator of the Estate of Esther Reinhardt ("Redfield") against Gail Bitterman, Colleen Schneider, and Neal G. Reinhardt. Redfield appealed the order dismissing his complaint. Gail Bitterman, Colleen Schneider, and Neal G. Reinhardt appealed an order granting additional time within which to appeal the order dismissing Redfield's complaint. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting additional time within which to appeal. We affirm the orders from which the appeals were taken, and we remand for further proceedings.
[¶ 2] Edwin and Esther Reinhardt married in 1949. Edwin entered a nursing facility in 1992. In 1992, and again in 1993, Esther purchased a $25,000 certificate of deposit in her name, but payable on death to her three children, Gail Bitterman, Colleen Schneider, and Neal Reinhardt. Edwin qualified for medical assistance benefits on May 1, 1995, and received benefits until July 31, 1997, in the amount of $101,047.99. Esther died on July 12, 1997, and Edwin became ineligible for medical assistance benefits, because of the assets in Esther's estate. Esther's children cashed the certificates of deposit, worth $59,680.39 at her death, before Edwin died on November 19, 1997.
[¶ 3] On August 8, 1997, Neal Reinhardt applied for appointment as the personal representative in the matter of Estate of Esther Reinhardt, and was granted letters testamentary. On August 21, 1997, the first notice to creditors was published.1 On October 31, 1997, Neal Reinhardt served the Department with a copy of his application for appointment of personal representative.2 On July 1, 1998, the Department filed a claim for medical assistance benefits issued to Edwin Reinhardt in the amount of $101,047.99 against the estate of Esther Reinhardt. On July 17, 1998, Neal Reinhardt notified the Department its claim had been disallowed, stating "such claim was not filed in a timely fashion, and in addition, the claimant is not a creditor of the decedent, and it does not have a legal claim against the decedent's estate." The Department petitioned the district court for allowance of its claim on July 21, 1998.
[¶ 4] Roger Redfield, Director of the Mercer County Social Service Board, petitioned the district court for appointment as special administrator of the estates of Esther Reinhardt and Edwin Reinhardt. Redfield was appointed Special Administrator of the estates. By summons and complaint of July 7, 1998, Redfield sued Gail Bitterman, Colleen Schneider, and Neal Reinhardt (Redfield v. Bitterman) to collect the certificates of deposit, alleging, among other things, "Edwin Reinhardt, deceased, is entitled to certain property and assets of the Estate of Esther Reinhardt by virtue of being the surviving spouse of Esther Reinhardt." Redfield sought a judgment "[f]or transfer and payment to the Estate of Esther Reinhardt of all assets with a right of survivorship or P.O.D. to which decedent Esther Reinhardt was beneficially entitled under Section 30.1-31-08."
[¶ 5] On January 24, 2000, the district court issued an order denying Redfield's motion for summary judgment. In applying N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-08(2) and 30.1-31-09, the court concluded: (1) The Department "offered no evidence to contradict Neal's affidavits which clearly show Edwin had no beneficial interest in the certificates of deposit"; and (2) In applying 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1994) and N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-07, the court concluded:
[I]n order for [the Department] to assert a claim against the estate of a spouse of a medical-assistance-benefits-recipient, the spouse must survive the recipient. She must be a "survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (1994).
On February 1, 2000, the district court issued an order dismissing Redfield's case on the merits. Notice of entry of the order of dismissal was served on Redfield on February 3, 2000. By letter of February 4, 2000, counsel for Redfield mailed to the Department a copy of the court's February 1, 2000, order of dismissal in Redfield v. Bitterman and a copy of the court's order disallowing the Department's claim against the Estate of Esther Reinhardt on February 1, 2000. The Department mailed a notice of appeal on April 6, 2000, which was filed by the district court clerk on April 7, 2000. The district court issued an order granting the Department's motion for an extension of the time within which to appeal. The defendants in Redfield v. Bitterman appealed the district court's order granting the extension.
[¶ 6] On February 1, 2000, the district court issued an order disallowing the Department's claim in Estate of Esther Reinhardt, "for the reasons set forth" in the court's January 24, 2000, order in Redfield v. Bitterman. The Department and Redfield appealed, and the two cases were consolidated on appeal. We first consider the order granting the Department's motion for an extension of time within which to appeal.
[¶ 7] Under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a), a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days of service of notice of entry of the judgment or order from which an appeal may be taken. "The time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional." LaRocque v. LaRocque, 1998 ND 143, ¶ 4, 582 N.W.2d 645. The time for appeal does not begin to run until notice of entry is served. Gierke v. Gierke, 1998 ND 100, ¶ 6, 578 N.W.2d 522. However, actual knowledge of entry of a judgment or order, clearly evidenced in the record, commences the running of the time for appeal. Gierke, at ¶ 7. "A party having knowledge of the entry of judgment cannot indefinitely delay the period for filing an appeal based upon failure to serve a notice of entry of judgment." Domres v. Domres, 1998 ND 217, ¶ 7, 587 N.W.2d 146. Under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a), the trial court may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal for up to 30 days upon a showing of excusable neglect. "We will not set aside a trial court's order on a motion for an extension of time based on excusable neglect absent an abuse of discretion." Schaan v. Magic City Beverage Co., 2000 ND 71, ¶ 22, 609 N.W.2d 82. "A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, unconscionably or unreasonably." Id. We have held a party must show unique or extraordinary circumstances caused the delay in filing a notice of appeal to establish excusable neglect. Id. at ¶ 24.
[¶ 8] The Department supported its motion for an extension of time to file its notice of appeal with an affidavit by a Department lawyer relating (1) confusion about who should sign the notice of appeal; (2) the absence of Redfield's attorney, who was on vacation from April 3 until April 12; (3) the staff person who normally secures a check for payment of a filing fee "was out of the office due to an illness in her family"; (4) an inexperienced staff member handled the request for a filing fee check; (5) the Department attorney "who oversees this staff person, was also out of the office due to a family illness"; (6) the Department's "other attorney in the Legal Advisory Unit who handles general duties had just resigned her position effective March 31, 2000"; and (7) The trial court could reasonably have considered those matters extraordinary circumstances, and we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Department's motion for an extension of time to appeal.
[¶ 9] In ruling the Department "has no valid claim against the Esther Reinhardt Estate," the district court held "that in order for [the Department] to assert a claim against the estate of a spouse of a medical-assistance-benefits-recipient, the spouse must survive the recipient." The Department contends the district court erred.
[¶ 10] Recovery of medical assistance benefits is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b), which provides, in part:
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