Redford v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin.

• Decision Date: 05 October 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 6:21-CV-00333-JCB
• Parties: PATRICK REDFORD, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

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PATRICK REDFORD, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 6:21-CV-00333-JCB

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Tyler Division

October 5, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JOHN D. LOVE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

On August 24, 2021, Plaintiff filed this civil action pursuant to the Social Security Act (“the Act”), Section 205(g), for judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of his application for Social Security benefits. (Doc. No 1.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the case was referred to the undersigned for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation for the disposition of the instant action. For the reasons stated below, the court RECOMMENDS that the ALJ's decision be AFFIRMED.

BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. (Transcript (“Tr.”) at 79, 83, 93, 95.) Plaintiff alleged disability beginning on August 22, 2018. Id. at 95. The claim was initially denied on April 10, 2019 (id. at 91-92), and upon reconsideration on July 25 2019 (id. at 108-09, 126-28). A telephonic hearing was held before ALJ Derek N. Phillips on October 28, 2020. Id. at 26, 38, 40, 147. The ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act on December 8, 2020. Id. at 26-32.

Plaintiff appealed, and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's Request for Review on April 9, 2021. Id. at 1-5. Therefore, the ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision. See Sims v Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). Plaintiff has filed the instant action for review.^[1]

LEGAL STANDARD

Title II of the Act provides for federal disability insurance benefits. Judicial review of the denial of disability benefits under section 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), is limited to “determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the proper legal standards were used in evaluating the evidence.” Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990)); Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only where there is a conspicuous absence of credible choices or no contrary medical evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983)). Accordingly, the court “may not reweigh the evidence in the record, nor try the issues de novo,” and is not allowed to substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's judgment. Bowling, 36 F.3d at 435 (quoting Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988)); see Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992); Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 392 (5th Cir. 1985). Rather, conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner to decide. Spellman, 1 F.3d at 360 (citing Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990)); Anthony, 954 F.2d at 295 (citing Patton v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 590, 592 (5th Cir. 1983)). A decision on the ultimate issue of whether a claimant is disabled, as defined in the Act, rests with the Commissioner. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455-56 (5th Cir. 2000); SSR 96-5p, 61 Fed.Reg. 34471 (July 2, 1996).

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance-that is, enough that a reasonable mind would judge it sufficient to support the decision.” Pena v. Astrue, 271 Fed.Appx. 382, 383 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Falco v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994)). Substantial evidence includes four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the plaintiff's age, education, and work history. Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1302 n.4 (5th Cir. 1987). If supported by substantial evidence, the decision of the Commissioner is conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). However, the court must do more than “rubber stamp” the ALJ's decision; the court must “scrutinize the record and take into account whatever fairly detracts from the substantiality of evidence supporting the [Commissioner]'s findings.” Cook, 750 F.2d at 393.

A claimant bears the burden of proving a disability. Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1991). A disability is an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A “physical or mental impairment” is an anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormality which is demonstrable by acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner utilizes a five-step, sequential process. Villa, 895 F.2d at 1022. A finding of “disabled” or “not disabled” at any step of the sequential process ends the inquiry. Id.; see Bowling, 36 F.3d at 435 (citing Harrel, 862 F.2d at 475). At Step One, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. At Step Two, the Commissioner determines whether one or more of the claimant's impairments are severe. At Step Three, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or equal one of the listings in Appendix I. At this Step, the Commissioner must also determine the claimant's Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”), or the most that the claimant can do given his impairments, both severe and non-severe. Then, at Step Four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is capable of performing his past relevant work. Finally, at Step Five, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant can perform other work available in the local or national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b)-(f) and 404.1520(b)(1)(f).

An affirmative answer at Step One or a negative answer at Steps Two, Four, or Five results in a finding of “not disabled.” See Villa, 895 F.2d at 1022. An affirmative answer at Step Three, or an affirmative answer at Steps Four and Five, creates a presumption of disability. Id. The burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four steps but shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five if the claimant shows that he cannot perform his past relevant work. Anderson v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS

The ALJ made the following findings in his December 8, 2020 decision:

1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2018.

2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of August 22, 2018 through his date last insured of December 31, 2018. (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).

3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease (lumbar-status post-fusion surgery in 2016); degenerative disc disease (cervical-status post-disc replacement surgery with residual cervicalgia); and degenerative joint disease/osteoarthritis-bi-lateral shoulders (left shoulder arthroplasty in 2015 with multiple surgeries bi-laterally} (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).

4. Through the date last insured, the claimant had no impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that through the date last insured, the claimant had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b), except:

• He can lift, carry, push, and/or pull 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently.

• In an 8-hour workday, he can sit, stand, and/or walk for 6 hours.

• He can operate hand controls with the left hand frequently.

• He is limited to occasionally reaching overhead to the left, frequently reaching overhead to the right, and for all other reaching, he can reach frequently to the left.

• He can frequently balance, kneel, crouch, and/or climb ramps and stairs, while he can occasionally stoop, crawl, and/or climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.

• He can work at unprotected heights occasionally, but he can frequently operate a motor vehicle as well as be exposed to vibration and/or extreme cold.

6. Through the date last insured, the claimant was capable of performing past relevant work as a Cashier 2 (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT} 211.462-010/specific vocational preparation (SVP}-2/Light), Mail Clerk (DOT 290-477-014/SVP-3/Light), House Sitter (DOT 309.670-010/SVP-2/Light), and Credit Clerk (DOT 205.367-022/SVP-4/Sedentary). This work did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's RFC. (20 CFR 404.1565).

7. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Act, at any time from August 22, 2018, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2018, the date last insured. (20 CFR 404.1520(f)).

(Tr. at 28-32.)

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Act. Id. at 32.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges the decision of the Commissioner is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ (1) relied on his own interpretation of “raw medical data” to determine Plaintiff's RFC, (2) failed to...