Redline Express, Inc. v. KANSAS EMPLOYMENT SECURITY BOARD, 84,410.

• Decision Date: 22 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. 84,410.,84,410.
• Citation: 11 P.3d 85,27 Kan. App.2d 1067
• Parties: REDLINE EXPRESS, INC., Appellee, v. STATE OF KANSAS EMPLOYMENT SECURITY BOARD OF REVIEW and RODNEY D. PATTISON, Appellants.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

27 Kan. App.2d 1067

11 P.3d 85

REDLINE EXPRESS, INC., Appellee, v. STATE OF KANSAS EMPLOYMENT SECURITY BOARD OF REVIEW and RODNEY D. PATTISON, Appellants.

No. 84,410.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Opinion filed September 22, 2000.

James R. McEntire, of Topeka, for the appellant Kansas Employment Security Board of Review.

Larry J. Putnam, of Patton, Putnam & Hollembeak, of Emporia, for the appellee. Before PIERRON, P.J., LEWIS, J., and PAUL E. MILLER, District Judge, assigned.

LEWIS, J.:

Appellant Rodney D. Pattison was discharged by appellee Redline Express, Inc., (Redline) and sought unemployment compensation benefits. The Kansas Security Board of Review (Board) awarded Pattison benefits from December 12, 1998, and thereafter. On appeal, the trial court limited those benefits to the period of time from December 11, 1998, to December 24, 1998. The Board appeals from that decision.

We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Pattison had been employed by Redline for approximately 6½ years. On December 11, 1998, Pattison resigned from his job with Redline via written resignation, which stated that his last day of work would be December 24, 1998. Upon receiving Pattison's written resignation, Redline terminated his employment immediately, effective December 11, 1998. He was paid for 2 weeks' vacation and for 28 hours' sick pay but was not paid regular wages from December 11, 1998, to December 24, 1998. Pattison filed for unemployment compensation benefits.

The matter was initially heard before an examiner, who determined that Pattison was not eligible for any unemployment benefits because he had left work voluntarily. This decision was reviewed by a referee, who reversed it, holding Pattison was entitled to benefits beginning December 12, 1998. The decision of the referee was then affirmed by the Board. The trial court modified the decision of the referee and the Board by holding that Pattison was entitled to benefits beginning December 11, 1998, and ending December 24, 1998. That decision is the focus on appeal.

The principal question on appeal is whether Pattison is entitled to unemployment compensation benefits after December 24, 1998. The trial court held that he was not and limited the compensation between December 11, 1998, to December 24, 1998. In reaching this decision, the trial court applied K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 44-706(a) and K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 44-706(b)(4).

Our standard of review in matters of this nature is defined by the Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions (KJRA), K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. National Council on Compensation Ins. v. Todd, 258 Kan. 535, 538, 905 P.2d 114 (1995)

. The Act indicates that a reviewing court will grant relief if it determines that the agency erroneously interpreted or applied the law. K.S.A. 77-621(c)(4).

In this case, we are reviewing the decision of the trial court, which reviewed an agency action. Under those circumstances, we must first determine whether the trial court observed the requirements and restrictions placed upon it in reviewing the agency action and then make the same review of the agency's action as did the trial court. Reiter v. City of Beloit, 263 Kan. 74, 86, 947 P.2d 425 (1997). If the agency's action is authorized by statute, it is presumed to be valid on appeal unless it is not supported by substantial competent evidence and is so wide off the mark as to be arbitrary or capricious. Farmers Co-op Elevator v. Kansas Employment Security Bd. of Review, 25 Kan. App.2d 567, 571-72, 966 P.2d 699 (1998).

We have said that persons claiming unemployment benefits are entitled to a liberal interpretation of the Employment Securities statutes. See Farmers Co-op, 25 Kan. App.2d at 572. Interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing it is generally entitled to great judicial deference. The interpretation of the agency may, in fact, be entitled to controlling significance and, if there is a rational basis for its determination, we should uphold it on judicial review. Wheeler v. Boeing Co., 25 Kan. App.2d 632, 635, 967 P.2d 1085 (1998), rev. denied 266 Kan. 1116 (1999).

Despite all of the foregoing deference, we will reverse an agency decision if we find the agency's action is erroneous as a matter of law. In re Tax Appeal of Univ. of Kan. School of Medicine, 266 Kan. 737, 749, 973 P.2d 176 (1999). The question of whether the agency has erroneously interpreted a statute is a question over which we have unlimited review. K.S.A. 77-621(c)(4); Pouncil v. Kansas Employment Security Board of Review, 268 Kan. 470, 476, 997 P.2d 715 (2000).

The Board's decision was to the effect that Pattison was discharged after he had given written notice of a future intent to resign and he was therefore entitled to unemployment benefits under K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 44-706(b)(4)(A) beginning December 12, 1998. The trial court held the Board was correct in determining that Pattison was entitled to benefits but that it erred when it did not limit those benefits to the 2-week period covered by Pattison's notice of resignation.

The controlling statute is K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 44-706(a), which provides:

"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

(a) If the individual left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work or the employer." (Emphasis added.)

K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 44-706(b)(4)(A) states:

"An individual shall not be disqualified under this subsection (b) if the individual is discharged under the following circumstances:

(A) The employer discharged the individual after learning the individual was seeking other work or when the individual gave notice of future intent to quit." (Emphasis added.)

There is no question that Pattison was discharged after Redline learned that he was seeking other work and had given a notice of future resignation. Under those circumstances, he was certainly entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. The question is for how long a period of time those benefits should extend.

The Board applied only K.S.A. 1999...